Gyan Ki Swa Par Prakashta

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Gyan ki Swa Par Prakashta" by Sukhlal Sanghavi, focusing on the philosophical discussion of knowledge:

The book excerpt delves into a long and diverse philosophical debate concerning the nature of knowledge: whether it is self-luminous (swayamprakash), other-luminous (paraprakash), or both self and other-luminous (swaparaprakash). To understand this discussion, the author first clarifies some fundamental concepts.

Key Concepts and Definitions:

1. Nature of Knowledge: The primary division lies between those who believe knowledge is inherently directly knowable (pratyaksha yogya) and those who assert it is inherently indirectly knowable (paroksha). This fundamental difference forms the bedrock of the debate on knowledge's luminosity.

2. Swayamprakash (Self-Luminous): This term signifies that knowledge is directly perceived by itself.

3. Paraprakash (Other-Luminous): This term has two interpretations:

   • Parapratyaksha (Directly Perceived by Another): One instance of knowledge is directly perceived by another individual's consciousness.
   • Paranumeya (Inferable by Another): One instance of knowledge is inferred by another's consciousness.

4. Clarification of Swayapratyaksha: It's important to understand that if knowledge is swayapratyaksha, it doesn't mean it's never known through inference or other means. Rather, when a particular cognitive event (jnana vyakti) arises, it is directly apprehended by its own subject (swadharma pramata). For others, or even for the same subject if the knowledge is not present, it can be considered indirect (paroksha). This principle also applies to the "parapratyaksha" meaning of paraprakash – only the present cognitive event is directly perceived by its own subject; otherwise, it's indirect.

Philosophical Schools and Their Stances:

The text then categorizes various philosophical schools based on their views on knowledge's luminosity:

1. Swayamprakashavadi (Advocates of Self-Luminosity):

• Included Schools: Vijnanavadi Buddhists, Mimamsakas, Prabhakara, Vedanta, and Jainism.
• Core Belief: All these schools agree that knowledge is, in its essence, directly perceived by itself (swaswarup). Whether the knowledge is direct perception, inference, testimony, or memory, it is always directly known in its own form. Its status as inferred, testified, or remembered should be understood in relation to the object being cognized, not its own nature.
• Nuances within Swayamprakashavadi:
  • Vijnanavada: Believes that no reality exists apart from knowledge, and knowledge itself is formful.
  • Prabhakara: Accepts the existence of external objects (bahyartha) that are perceived.
  • Vedanta: Considers knowledge to be primarily identical with Brahman and therefore eternal.
  • Jainism: Similar to Prabhakara, it accepts the existence of external objects and considers knowledge to be generated (janya).

2. Paraprakashavadi (Advocates of Other-Luminosity):

• Included Schools: Sankhya, Yoga, Nyaya, and Vaisheshika.
• Core Belief: These schools believe that while knowledge can be directly apprehended, it cannot be directly apprehended by itself. Its direct apprehension is dependent on something else. Therefore, all forms of knowledge (direct, inferred, testimonial, memory) are directly grasped through a secondary cognition called anuvyavasaaya (a secondary apprehension of knowledge).
• Differences within Paraprakashavadi regarding "Para":
  • Nyaya-Vaisheshika: The "para" (other) refers to anuvyavasaaya, which directly apprehends a prior instance of knowledge.
  • Sankhya-Yoga: The "para" refers to Chaitanya (consciousness), the intrinsic nature of the Purusha, by which all cognitive modifications (buddhi vritti) are directly illuminated.

3. Paranumeyavadi (Advocates of Inference by Another):

• Included School: Kumarila Bhatta (a Mimamsaka).
• Core Belief: Kumarila alone argues that knowledge is inherently indirect (paroksha) and is inferred through the linga (sign) of the knower's state (jnataratarupa). This inference is causal, inferring the cause from the effect.
• Distinction from Prabhakara: Prabhakara's view of inferring knowledge from the "fruit of cognition" (phalasamvitti) is distinct from Kumarila's inference of knowledge, which is an attribute residing in the self, from the "fruit of manifestation" (prakatya). Kumarila infers knowledge as a quality inherent in the self, while Prabhakara infers knowledge, understood as the "fruit of cognition" itself, from causal factors like sense contact, which are material. The word "jnana" (knowledge) is used in this material sense due to the "karaṇa" (instrumental) suffix 'an'.

Acharya Hemchandra's Position:

The text concludes by highlighting the position of Acharya Hemchandra, a prominent Jain philosopher. He firmly establishes the Jain doctrine of the direct knowability of all knowledge (jnanamatraka pratyaksatva svabhava). He refutes the dualistic interpretations of paraprakash (both parapratyaksha and paranumeya). His arguments for his own position and against opposing views, along with his presentation of direct perception and inference as valid means of knowledge, are consistent with the works like Shalikanatha's Prakaranapanchika and the Shribhashya. His refutation of criticisms against his own school also mirrors the discussions found in those texts.

In essence, the excerpt lays out the foundational philosophical arguments in Jainism regarding the self-evident nature of knowledge, contrasting it with the views of other Indian philosophical traditions that posit knowledge's dependence on external cognitions or inferential processes.