Further References To Vaisesika Sutra In Patanjala Yogasastra Vivarana

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided text, focusing on the references to the Vaisheshika Sutra (VS) within the Patanjala Yogasastra Vivarana (PYSV):

This article, "Further References To Vaisesika Sutra In Patanjala Yogasastra Vivarana" by Albrecht Wezler, aims to shed light on the Patanjala Yogasastra Vivarana (PYSV), a commentary on Vyasa's Yogabhasya (YBh). The author's primary goal is to identify and analyze instances where the PYSV author refers to the Vaisheshika Sutra (VS), often in ways not recognized by the editors of the PYSV. Beyond simply cataloging these references, Wezler seeks to understand the PYSV author's attitude towards the Vaisheshika school and its foundational text, the VS. He argues that this attitude is not solely one of opposition, despite criticisms leveled against the Vaisheshika definition of yoga.

The article presents two detailed examples of these subtle references:

1. The Enumeration of the States of the Mind (Citta Bhūmih):

• Context: The YBh, in its commentary on Yogasutra 1.1, lists the five states of the mind (citta bhūmih) as kṣipta (agitated), mūḍha (dull), vikṣipta (partially agitated), ekāgra (one-pointed), and niruddha (controlled).
• The Problem Identified by the PYSV Author: The PYSV author, demonstrating keen philological insight, observes a subtle grammatical and conceptual issue in the YBh's presentation. The YBh uses adjectives (kṣiptam, mūḍham, etc.) that describe the mind-stuff in these states, rather than the names of the states themselves.
• The PYSV Author's Interpretation and its Link to VS: The PYSV author defends this peculiar phrasing by referencing Vaisheshika Sutra 2.1.8. This sutra uses terms that describe an animal of the bovine species (e.g., having horns, a hump) but, according to the PYSV author's interpretation, are understood to refer to the properties of that animal. The PYSV author argues that just as these descriptive terms in the VS refer to the properties of the cow, the adjectives (kṣipta, etc.) in the YBh refer to the properties (states) of the mind.
• Candrananda's Commentary: Wezler notes that Candrananda, an old commentator on the VS, also grapples with the linguistic peculiarity of VS 2.1.8, highlighting that the terms referring to the dharmin (the possessor of qualities) are used to denote the dharmas (the qualities themselves). This similarity suggests that the PYSV author might have been aware of Candrananda's commentary or an older tradition of commentary that informed both.
• The Author's Motive: By drawing this parallel with VS 2.1.8, the PYSV author implicitly justifies the YBh's phrasing, demonstrating that such linguistic usage was not unique to the YBh but had precedent in foundational philosophical texts like the VS. This also suggests a general familiarity of the PYSV author with the VS.

2. The Nature of Darkness (Tamas):

• Context: In a section of the PYSV discussing the existence of Isvara (God), the author engages in a detailed philosophical debate about the nature of darkness, arguing against the Vaisheshika view that darkness is merely the absence of light (abhāva).
• The Vaisheshika Position (VS 5.2.21): The author references Vaisheshika Sutra 5.2.21, which states that darkness is "only absence" due to the difference in the arising of substances, qualities, and actions compared to darkness. While the PYSV author quotes a paraphrase of this Vaisheshika tenet rather than a direct quote, the reference is clear.
• The PYSV Author's Counter-Argument: The PYSV author strongly refutes the Vaisheshika position, arguing that darkness is a vastu (a real entity), likely a substance. He provides several arguments:
  • Darkness can be faint or intense, a characteristic of real entities, not mere absence.
  • Darkness can be removed by its opposite (light), similar to how a jar can be removed from a space.
  • Darkness obstructs perception, like a wall obstructs sight.
  • Shadow, perceived due to lamplight, suggests that darkness is not merely an absence of light.
  • The shadow argument is further elaborated, drawing parallels to existing philosophical discussions and critiquing older, less rationalistic explanations.
• Similarity to Candrananda: Notably, the PYSV author's paraphrase of the Vaisheshika position ("prakāśābhāvamātram eva tamaḥ na vastu") bears a striking resemblance to Candrananda's concluding remark on VS 5.2.21. This again points to a potential shared source or influence.
• Attitude of Criticism: In this instance, the PYSV author adopts a critical stance, as the Vaisheshika and Samkhya-Yoga philosophies are fundamentally incompatible on this issue. The author's arguments, though potentially archaic to modern sensibilities, demonstrate intelligence and a deep engagement with the philosophical discourse of his time.

Overall Significance:

Wezler concludes that these instances demonstrate the PYSV author's significant engagement with the Vaisheshika Sutra. The author's approach is not merely to cite or refute but to interpret, analyze, and draw parallels, often with the aid of earlier commentators like Candrananda. This suggests a deep familiarity with Vaisheshika thought and a nuanced engagement that goes beyond simple opposition. The author's detailed explanations and critiques also contribute to our understanding of the reception history of the VS and the evolution of Indian philosophical arguments. The article emphasizes the need for continued scholarly attention to the PYSV, a text rich with insights into the interconnections of early Indian philosophical traditions.