Fragments Of Pramana Samuccaya

Here is a comprehensive summary of the provided text, "Fragments Of Pramana Samuccaya" by Masaaki Hattori, focusing on the Jain perspective and concepts discussed:

This document presents a collection of fragments from Masaaki Hattori's work, "Fragments Of Pramana Samuccaya," with a focus on analyzing and comparing Dignāga's philosophical positions, particularly as they relate to Indian epistemology, with specific reference to Jain traditions and later Buddhist commentators. The fragments primarily deal with Dignāga's critique of the Nyāya definition of perception and his theories on inference.

Key themes and arguments discussed include:

• Critique of Nyāya Perception:

  • Ine expressibility: Dignāga challenges the Nyāya inclusion of "inexpressible" in the definition of perception. He argues that expressibility is a characteristic of inference, not perception. Thus, the term "inexpressible" is redundant.
  • Non-erroneousness: Dignāga further questions the qualification of perception as "non-erroneous." He attributes error to the mind (manas), which he distinguishes from sensory organs. While Naiyāyikas consider the mind a sense organ, Dignāga sees its function as apperception, synthesizing present perceptions with past experiences. The objects apprehended by the mind are therefore conceptual and lack ultimate reality. The text acknowledges that later critics, like Dharmakīrti, address the possibility of errors caused by defective sense organs, thereby refining the understanding of erroneous perception.

• The Nature of Inference and its Objects:

  • Inference and the Particular vs. Universal: Dignāga argues that inference, unlike perception which apprehends particulars, cognizes universals. He refutes the view that inference can grasp particulars, stating that when words refer to invisible objects (like heaven), the apprehension is merely an imagination of the object, not a direct cognition of a particular.
  • The Object of Inference (Anumeya): The text clarifies that the object to be inferred (anumeya) is "S qualified by P." There's a discussion about the terminology, with "anumeya" being wrongly translated in some instances. The core idea is that inference establishes a relationship between a subject (S) and a predicate (P).

• Inference for Others (Parārthānumāna):

  • Definition: Dignāga defines "inference for others" as the verbal expression of the three aspects of the logical mark (tri-rūpa-lingākhyānam). This involves making explicit what has already been apprehended by oneself.
  • The Role of Words: The essence of "inference for others" is seen as words or propositions, whereas "inference for oneself" is cognition.

• Valid Reasons (Hetu) in Inference:

  • Conditions for a Valid Reason: A valid reason (hetu) must possess attributes that are recognized by both disputant and opponent. The text outlines four types of invalidity related to the reason:
    1. Ubhayāsiddha: The reason is not proven for either party.
    2. Anyatarāsiddha: The reason is not proven for one of the parties.
    3. Sandigdhāsiddha: There is doubt about the presence of the reason in the subject.
    4. Āśrayasiddha: The very ground or subject of the inference is not proven.

• Dignāga's Critique of Sāṁkhya:

  • The Primordial Matter (Pradhāna): Dignāga challenges the Sāṁkhya assertion of the existence of primordial matter. He argues that if the Sāṁkhya inference aims to prove the particular nature of this primordial matter, it is invalid, as inference cannot apprehend particulars.

• The Nature of Language and Meaning:

  • Words and Exclusion: Words, such as "blue lotus," do not express the object directly but designate it indirectly by excluding other things (e.g., white lotus, blue cloth). This suggests that language functions through differentiation and negation.
  • Words as Indicators: Knowledge derived from words indicates its object through contact or by excluding other things. This process is seen as similar to inference.

• Logical Fallacies (Hetvābhāsa):

  • Kāryasama: The text defines "kāryasama" as seeing the proof of the intended outcome through the medium of an attribute that itself is unproven. This fallacy is categorized into three types based on the disputant's intention. The definition and classification are presented, with connections to other texts noted.

Overall Significance for Jain Studies:

While the fragments are primarily about Dignāga's Buddhist epistemology, the work highlights its engagement with and critique of other Indian philosophical schools, including Nyāya and Sāṁkhya. The detailed referencing of commentaries and alternative translations, including Tibetan versions and the work of scholars like Vasudhararakṣita, suggests a rigorous comparative analysis. Although direct mentions of Jain specific arguments are not extensive in these particular fragments, the study of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya is crucial for understanding the broader landscape of Indian epistemology against which Jain philosophy also developed its own theories of knowledge (pramāṇa). The fragments contribute to understanding how core concepts like perception, inference, and the nature of proof were debated and refined across different philosophical traditions.