Epistemological Point Of View Of Bhartrhari

Here's a comprehensive summary of Ashok Aklujkar's "The Epistemological Point of View of Bharthari" in English, based on the provided text:

This paper, by Professor Ashok Aklujkar, explores the epistemological viewpoint of the ancient Indian philosopher and grammarian, Bharthari, as presented in his seminal work, the Trikandi (also known as the Vakyapadiya). Aklujkar argues that Bharthari's Trikandi represents a significant turning point in Indian philosophy, primarily due to its uniquely linguistic approach to epistemology.

Key Themes and Arguments:

• Linguistic Turn in Philosophy: Aklujkar contends that Bharthari's most crucial contribution is his fundamentally linguistic approach to philosophical problems, including epistemology and ontology. Unlike earlier or later thinkers who treated these subjects independently, Bharthari believed that understanding language was the key to unlocking these broader philosophical questions.
• Centrality of Language: The paper highlights Bharthari's view that language (śabda) is not merely a tool for expressing pre-existing thoughts or realities, but rather constitutive of our awareness of the world. He posits that nothing can be known or even considered to exist without being articulated, directly or indirectly, through language.
• Three Core Categories: Bharthari's philosophy revolves around three interconnected categories:
  • Śabda (Language): Encompassing all forms of linguistic expression, from spoken words to conceptual structures.
  • Artha (Reality/Things): Referring to objects or entities in the world.
  • Jnana (Cognition): The process and content of knowing. Aklujkar argues that Bharthari establishes theses about language first and then asserts parallel or logically related conclusions in epistemology, rather than establishing epistemological claims independently.
• Correlation of Language Levels with Cognitive Entities: A central thesis presented is Bharthari's identification of different levels of language with fundamental cognitive entities:
  • Parapas'yanti-rūpam (Language/4): Corresponds to Cit/Citi/Chaitanya (Sentience/Consciousness).
  • Pasyanti (Language/3): Corresponds to Buddhi (Intellect/Mind).
  • Madhyama (Language/2): Corresponds to Jnana (Cognition). This identification is supported by the principle of theoretical economy (laghava), avoiding unnecessary postulates.
• Rejection of Superficial Similarities: While acknowledging superficial parallels with traditions like Samkhya, Yoga, and Mimamsa regarding the means of cognition (pratyaksa, anumana, sabda), Aklujkar emphasizes that these similarities do not capture the core of Bharthari's original contribution.
• Nature of Jnana and Buddhi: Bharthari's understanding of buddhi (intellect/mind) is intrinsically linguistic, composed of linguistic units. It is not an evolute from prakriti as in Samkhya/Yoga, nor is it merely a cognizing organ. There is no ontological distinction between consciousness (citi) and buddhi; it's a functional difference. Even in its dynamic aspect, buddhi is a continuum of cognitions reflecting specific linguistic units.
• Meaning and Reality: Bharthari argues that word meanings are not external things, images, or even a secondary linguistic reality. The distinction between a meaning and its signifier is ultimately an artificial one. The meaning (artha) is a manifestation (vivarta) of the word (sabda).
• Primacy of Language in Experience: Bharthari's view implies that sense experience precedes conceptualization, though the primacy of sense experience itself cannot be definitively proven. He does not deny the independent existence of physical objects but suggests that their differentiation and our awareness of them stem from the language principle (sabda-tattva-brahman).
• Avidya (Ignorance) as Linguistic Distortion: For Bharthari, avidya is not about mistaking essence or believing in the reality of the perceptible world in the way some other traditions define it. Instead, it lies in the failure to recognize the distortions that language introduces. Language, by its nature, creates distinctions where none exist and obscures distinctions that are present, both spatially and temporally. This linguistic distortion is inherent and beginningless, just like the language principle itself.
• Distinction of Roles: Aklujkar notes that Bharthari can be understood in different roles: as a Grammarian (accepting everything words can denote), as a philosopher (accepting only physical things and the language principle as truly existing), and as a religious thinker (entertaining the possibility that the language principle alone remains, potentially superseding the physical world).
• Contrast with Other Scholars: Aklujkar explicitly states that his interpretation of Bharthari differs from many established scholars, attributing this to the historical context (Bharthari predating Sankara) and the comprehensive analysis of textual evidence, including ancient commentators.
• Bharthari's Legacy: While later Paninian grammarians primarily quoted Bharthari, traditions like Kashmir Saivism and Poetics (Alankara-shastra) are seen as more directly continuing his epistemological line of thought.

In essence, Aklujkar's paper positions Bharthari as a pioneering philosopher who fundamentally reframed epistemological inquiry by demonstrating the inextricable link between language, thought, and reality, arguing that an understanding of language is paramount to grasping knowledge and the nature of existence.