Early Tibetan Ideas On Ascertainment Of Validity

This paper, "Early Tibetan Ideas on the Ascertainment of Validity (nges byed kyi tshad ma)" by Ernst Steinkellner, explores how Tibetan scholars engaged with and developed Indian epistemological theories, particularly those of Dharmakīrti.

Steinkellner highlights that Tibetan epistemologists' extensive engagement with Dharmakīrti's work provides valuable insights into the interpretation of the Indian tradition. He notes that this engagement was a process of "trial and error," leading to authoritative commentaries by the 14th and 15th centuries. He argues against dismissing these Tibetan interpretations as merely exegetical, asserting that they involved genuine intellectual creativity within the framework of a living Buddhist tradition.

The paper focuses on the topic of how the validity of a cognition (pramāṇya) is ascertained (niścita), a concept often discussed in Tibetan literature as "the valid cognition which ascertains the validity (of a valid cognition)" (mtshan nyid nges byed kyi tshad ma). This question arises from the debate between Indian Buddhist epistemologists and the Mimāṁsā school, particularly concerning whether validity is intrinsic (svatah) or extrinsic (anyatah) to the cognition itself.

Steinkellner notes that while this topic was a point of contention in Indian Buddhist epistemology, it was of only marginal interest to most Indian scholars, with the exception of Dharmottara. He cites Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla for providing lists of intrinsically and extrinsically valid cognitions. Dharmakīrti himself has only two brief remarks that touch upon this issue, and these were not a comprehensive treatment.

The paper then delves into the early Tibetan engagement with this theme, focusing on the works of Sa-skya Pandita (1182-1251) and his commentary on the Pramāṇaviniscaya. Sa-skya Pandita's work is crucial for understanding the earlier Tibetan views, as he critiques the positions of earlier scholars, specifically mentioning rNgog Lotsāba and his school, and potentially others like Phywa pa Chos kyi seng ge.

Sa-skya Pandita outlines his own position, distinguishing between intrinsically ascertained and extrinsically ascertained valid cognitions. He identifies three kinds of extrinsically ascertained perceptions:

1. First perception (dang po pa): This refers to perceiving something for the first time. Sa-skya Pandita provides examples where the appearance of an object is intrinsically certain, but its reality or specific nature is ascertained extrinsically. He links these cases to Dharmottara's work, though notes that Dharmottara's categorization might not perfectly align.
2. Perception with distracted mind (yid ma gtad pa): In this case, the appearance itself is ascertained extrinsically, where there is doubt about whether something has indeed appeared in one's perception. Steinkellner points out that this category is not clearly found in Dharmottara's writings.
3. Perception with grounds for error ('khrul rgyu can): This refers to erroneous perceptions. Steinkellner notes that Dharmottara considers erroneous perceptions invalid, while Sa-skya Pandita includes them as extrinsically ascertained valid cognitions, a point of divergence.

Steinkellner suggests that Sa-skya Pandita's classifications, particularly the inclusion of "perception with distracted mind" and "perception with grounds for error" as valid cognitions ascertained extrinsically, might represent an "overinterpretation" of Dharmottara. This overinterpretation could stem from a Tibetan tendency towards systematic completeness and a desire to find a place for all relevant concepts within the established Indian framework, even if the exact textual basis in Dharmottara is not fully clear.

The paper concludes by emphasizing the fascinating and impressive efforts of Tibetan scholars in interpreting and creatively shaping the Indian Buddhist epistemological tradition, highlighting that studying these developments offers a direct path to understanding the core of Tibetan intellectual culture.