Dvadasharam Naychakram Part 2 Tika

This comprehensive summary outlines the core arguments presented in the second part of the Dvādashāram Nayachakram, specifically focusing on the fifth through eighth aras (modes of consideration). The text, authored by Ācārya Sri Mallavādi Kshamashraman and commented upon by Ācārya Sri Sighsuri Gani Vadi Ksamasramana, with editing by Muni Jambūvijayaji, is a significant work in Jain philosophical and logical discourse.

Overall Scope and Context:

• The Nayachakram explores twelve aras (modes of consideration). This volume, Part II, covers the fifth to eighth aras.
• The text aims to refute extreme philosophical positions (like eternalism or nihilism) and establish the nuanced Jain perspective, particularly the doctrine of anekāntavāda (non-onesidedness).
• The commentary, Nyayāgamanusāriṇī, is crucial for understanding the original text, explaining its intricate philosophical and logical arguments by referencing various Indian philosophical schools.
• The editor, Muni Jambūvijayaji, is commended for his meticulous research, consulting rare manuscripts and translating complex Tibetan Buddhist logic into Sanskrit, which significantly aids in reconstructing and understanding the original Nayachakram.

Summary of the Aras (5-8):

1. Fifth Ara: Ubhaýam (Both) / Ubhayavidhiḥ (Consideration of Both)

   • Central Theme: This ara refutes the exclusive views that only dravya (substance) or only kriyā (action/change) constitute reality. It argues that both dravya and kriyā are essential and interdependent aspects of any entity.
   • Arguments:
     • It criticizes the extreme view that only dravya is reality, stating that if dravya were unchanging and actionless, it would be like a lotus in the sky (a non-existent entity).
     • It argues against the view that only kriyā is reality, as action requires a substratum (dravya) to act upon. Without dravya, kriyā would be like the horn of a rabbit (non-existent).
     • The text establishes that dravya and kriyā are inseparable and mutually dependent. Dravya is that which has the potential for change (kriyā), and kriyā is the manifestation of that potential within dravya. The author uses analogies like a potter and clay, or a dancer and dance, to illustrate this interdependence.
     • It also critiques the absolute views of the Grammarians (Vaiyakaranah) regarding dravya and kriyā, suggesting their understanding is incomplete.
     • The ara emphasizes that all phenomena possess both substantiality (dravya) and modality/change (kriyā), a core concept aligning with Jain ontology and the principle of syādvāda.

2. Sixth Ara: Ubhayavidhiḥ (Both Vidhi and Niyama) / Ubhayavidhiḥ (Consideration of Vidhi of Both)

   • Central Theme: This ara delves into the concepts of vidhi (rule/general characteristic) and niyama (specific characteristic/exception), arguing that both are essential and interconnected. It critiques the Vaiseṣikah school for their approach.
   • Arguments:
     • It discusses how vidhi (general characteristic, sāmānya) and niyama (specific characteristic, viśeṣa) are both necessary for a complete understanding of reality. The general characteristic is followed by the specific characteristic, and vice-versa.
     • The text explains the Vaiseṣika concept of vidhi and niyama in relation to sāmānya and viśeṣa, but argues that their interpretation is flawed.
     • It highlights the importance of considering both aspects to avoid one-sidedness, aligning with the anekāntavāda principle.
     • The author traces the origins of these ideas to ancient Jain texts, citing a passage from the Jīvā Jivābhigama Sūtra.
     • The ara concludes that the interplay of general and specific characteristics is crucial for understanding reality, a view that is presented as a unique contribution of Jain logic.

3. Seventh Ara: Ubhayobhayam (Both of Both) / Ubhayobhayavidhiḥ (Consideration of Both of Both)

   • Central Theme: This ara focuses on the nature of reality as described by the Vaiseṣikah school, particularly their concepts of bhāva (existence/state) and abhāva (non-existence/negation), and refutes their arguments, particularly their critique of syādvāda.
   • Arguments:
     • It extensively analyzes and criticizes Vaiseṣika texts like Vaiseṣika Sūtra, Vākya, Bhāṣya, and commentaries like Prashastamati Tika. The critique highlights the historical significance of these references as many of the original Vaiseṣika works are no longer extant.
     • It addresses the Vaiseṣika concept of apoha (negation/exclusion) as the meaning of a word, as propounded by the Buddhist logician Dignāga, refuting it in detail.
     • The ara emphasizes the Jain understanding of reality as both existent (bhāva) and non-existent (abhāva) in its different aspects (anekāntavāda). It argues that the Vaiseṣika attempt to label phenomena as exclusively one or the other is a misunderstanding.
     • The text discusses the meaning of a word (śabda) according to Dignāga and his commentators, exploring the concept of apoha, and demonstrating how the Jain perspective differs.
     • It presents the ṛjusūtra (ṛjusūtranaya) perspective, focusing on the momentary aspect of reality, contrasting it with the substantialist views.

4. Eighth Ara: Ubhayaniyamam (Both Niyama) / Ubhayaniyamaḥ (Consideration of Both Niyama)

   • Central Theme: This ara focuses on niyama (rule/determination) in relation to both vidhi (general principle) and niyama (specific principle). It critically examines the doctrines of Bhartṛhari, his teacher Vasurata, and the Buddhist logician Dignāga and his commentators.
   • Arguments:
     • It asserts that niyama (specifics) are primary, and vidhi (generals) are secondary, or vice-versa, in a dialectical consideration. The text posits that "the specific is primary, the general is secondary."
     • It delves into the doctrines of Bhartṛhari and Vasurata, likely regarding linguistic philosophy or the nature of the word (śabda).
     • The most extensive part of this ara is dedicated to refuting the theories of Dignāga and his followers, particularly concerning apoha (negation) and the nature of reality as understood by Buddhist logicians. The author meticulously analyzes and counters their arguments, drawing heavily on restored Sanskrit texts translated from Tibetan, demonstrating Muni Jambūvijayaji's scholarly prowess.
     • The text emphasizes that niyama (determinations or specifics) are the focus here, guiding the understanding of both general principles (vidhi) and their specific applications.
     • This ara completes the second nemi (section) of the Nayachakram, covering the Aras from five to eight.

Overall Significance:

The second part of the Dvādashāram Nayachakram (Part II) is a monumental work that showcases the depth of Jain philosophical reasoning and its critical engagement with other Indian philosophical traditions. The detailed analysis of concepts like dravya, kriyā, vidhi, niyama, bhāva, abhāva, and apoha, along with the refutation of opposing schools' views, highlights the sophisticated logical framework of Jainism. The extensive reliance on rare manuscripts and the critical scholarship of Muni Jambūvijayaji make this edition invaluable for scholars of Indian philosophy. The work reinforces the Jain emphasis on understanding reality from multiple, non-contradictory perspectives (anekāntavāda).