Drushtantabhasa

Added to library: September 1, 2025

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First page of Drushtantabhasa

Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary in English of the provided Jain text, focusing on the concept of Drushtantabhasa (fallacies of example) within the context of logical argumentation:

The text, "Drushtantabhasa" by Sukhlal Sanghavi, delves into the concept of fallacies related to examples (Drushtantabhasa) within the framework of logical reasoning, particularly in the context of inferential arguments (Parartha Anumana).

Origin and Evolution of Drushtantabhasa:

  • The concept of fallacies in general, especially those related to the middle term (Hetvabhasa), is very ancient, with clear and detailed discussions found in ancient Indian philosophical texts like the Kanadasutras and Nyayasutras.
  • However, the author notes that the explicit discussion of Drushtantabhasa (fallacies of the example) does not appear to be as ancient as Hetvabhasa. It is suggested that the concept of Drushtantabhasa likely emerged later, inspired by the idea of Hetvabhasa.
  • It's unclear whether Vedic or Buddhist logicians were the first to develop the concept of Drushtantabhasa.

Development in Different Traditions:

  • Buddhist Tradition:

    • Dignaga: In the Nyayapravesha attributed to Dignaga, there are ten types of Drushtantabhasa: five based on similarity (Sadhyamya) and five based on dissimilarity (Vaidharmya). The "Ubhasiddha" (involving both subject and predicate) has two sub-types, leading to a total of six Sadhyamya and six Vaidharmya Drushtantabhasas according to this work.
    • Prashastapada: He also discusses these twelve (six Sadhyamya and six Vaidharmya) fallacies, using the term Nidarshanabhasa instead of Drushtantabhasa, as the term Nidarshana (example) is central to his understanding of a syllogism. While the examples and essence are similar to Nyayapravesha, the names differ.
    • Mathara: Seems to follow Prashastapada, also preferring the term Nidarshanabhasa. He mentions ten fallacies, possibly omitting the two types of Ashrayasiddha (dependent on the substratum).
    • Jayanta: While commenting on the Nyayasutras, Jayanta recognized the lack of explicit discussion on Drushtantabhasa. He incorporated all the fallacies described in Nyayapravesha, thus addressing the perceived deficiency in the original Nyayasutras.
    • Vātsyāyana's Nyayasutra commentary: While not directly detailing Drushtantabhasa, commentaries on these foundational texts implicitly dealt with issues that would later be classified as such.
    • Vyasa (on Nyayasutra): Mentioned in the context of Hetvabhasa but not explicitly Drushtantabhasa.
    • Nyayasara: Discusses twelve fallacies, six of similarity and six of dissimilarity, similar to Prashastapada, using the term Udaharanaabhasa. It also introduces eight additional "doubtful" Udaharanaabhasa (four of similarity and four of dissimilarity), suggesting later developments.
    • Dharmakirti: Elaborately describes eighteen Drushtantabhasa (nine of similarity and nine of dissimilarity). It's suggested that the eight doubtful types in Nyayasara might be a modification of an earlier tradition, with Dharmakirti refining them into three types of doubtful fallacies for both similarity and dissimilarity. The number of fallacies and the way they are presented show progressive development, continuing even after Dharmakirti.
  • Jain Tradition:

    • Siddhasena Divakara: Is considered the earliest expounder of Drushtantabhasa in the Jain tradition. He adopted the term Drushtantabhasa from the Buddhist tradition, rather than Nidarshanabhasa or Udaharanaabhasa from the Vedic tradition. While not specifying a number, he is thought to have believed in nine types for each category, similar to Dharmakirti.
    • Manikyavadi: Reduced the number of fallacies to eight in total (four of similarity and four of dissimilarity), even creating new examples.
    • Vadi Devasuri: Followed Manikyavadi in providing examples but largely imitated Dharmakirti in the number and names of the fallacies. A notable contribution by Vadi Devasuri was to counter Dharmakirti's criticism of Jain Tirthankaras by highlighting the shortcomings of the Buddha in his examples.
    • Hemachandra Acharya:
      • He prefers the term Drushtantabhasa and provides a rationale for using it over Nidarshanabhasa or Udaharanaabhasa.
      • Key Contributions:
        1. Correction of Dharmakirti: While using Dharmakirti as an ideal, Hemachandra made some reasoned modifications. He argued that Ananvaya (without connection) and Avyatireka (without exception) are not distinct categories but are inherent in the other eight types.
        2. Refinement of Examples: He presented two types, Apradarshitanya and Apradarshitavyatireka, with examples that he considered more thoughtful than Dharmakirti's. He believed these fallacies arise from the absence of a proper example, not just the absence of certain terms like "vatsa" (like).
        3. Ecumenical Approach: In an era of sectarian conflict, Hemachandra demonstrated remarkable intellectual generosity by attempting to neutralize the venom of sectarian bias. He aimed to make his works accessible to all, composing examples that would prove the point without causing offense, contrasting with the pointed criticisms made by Dharmakirti and Vadi Devasuri against each other's traditions.

Other Relevant Concepts and Traditions:

  • Dushana and Dushanasabhasa (Defects and Pseudo-Defects): The text also broadly discusses Dushana (actual defects) and Dushanasabhasa (fallacious defects) in argumentation. It notes the historical development of this literature in Brahmanical, Buddhist, and Jain traditions.
    • Brahmanical Tradition: Focuses on Hetvabhasa (fallacies of the middle term) and has ancient texts like Nyayasutras and commentaries.
    • Buddhist Tradition: Developed significant literature on fallacies, with key works like Upayahridaya, Tarkashastra, Pramanasamuccaya, and Nyayabindu.
    • Jain Tradition: Has important texts like Nyayavatara, Siddhivinishchaya Tika, and Pramanayatattvaloka.
  • Synonyms: Words like Upalambha, Pratishedha, Dushana, Khandana, Uttara are used for these concepts.
  • Purpose: The main purpose of identifying and classifying these fallacies is to enable debaters to avoid them in their own arguments and to expose them in their opponent's arguments, thereby establishing the validity of their own position.
  • Use of False Reasoning (Jati, Chala): A significant point of divergence is the permissibility of using fallacious arguments like Jati (sophistical rejoinder) and Chala (equivocation).
    • Brahmanical and early Buddhist traditions: Supported the use of these for the sake of defending truth or for practical reasons (like protecting crops with thorns), even if not for personal gain.
    • Later Buddhist tradition: While acknowledging them, began to strongly prohibit their use.
    • Jain tradition: From the outset, has strictly prohibited the use of false reasoning (Mithya Uttara), emphasizing renunciation and detachment. While some later Jain scholars (particularly Svetambara) made exceptions under specific circumstances, Digambara tradition generally maintained a strict prohibition.
  • Hemachandra's Classification of Jatis: The text includes a table listing various types of Jatis as described in different philosophical schools, highlighting the Jain contribution to this classification.
  • Hemachandra's Definition of Dushana and Dushanasabhasa: Hemachandra's definitions are compared to those in Nyayapravesha and Nyayabindu. He considers Chala to be a type of Jati because it's a fallacious rejoinder. He advocates for refuting all fallacies with true arguments but notes that he doesn't provide individual refutations for each Jati as some earlier authors did.

In essence, the text provides a historical overview and analytical exploration of Drushtantabhasa within Indian logic, tracing its development through different philosophical schools and highlighting the specific contributions and nuances introduced by Jain scholars, particularly Hemachandra Acharya, emphasizing the Jain emphasis on truthfulness and the renunciation of sophistry.