Dignagas Alambanapariksa

This document is an academic work by Erich Frauwallner, titled "Dignāgas Alambanaparīkşā. Text, Übersetzung und Erläuterungen." It presents a critical edition, translation, and detailed explanation of Dignāga's Alambanaparīkṣā, a seminal work in Buddhist epistemology, specifically addressing the nature of the object of cognition.

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Introduction (Vorwort):

• Manuscript Tradition: Frauwallner begins by outlining the available translations and commentaries of Dignāga's Alambanaparīkṣākārikā (verses) and Alambanaparīkṣāvrtti (commentary).
  • Translations: Tibetan (in the Bstan-gyur, with specific references to different editions), Chinese (by Paramārtha and Hiuan-Tsang).
  • Commentaries: Dharmapāla (in Chinese translation), Vinītadeva (in Tibetan translation).
• Reliability of Sources: Frauwallner states that the Tibetan translation offers the best representation of the Sanskrit original, validated by the commentaries. He notes that the Chinese translations are less accurate and often contain explanatory additions, with Hiuan-Tsang's version leaning more towards a paraphrase.
• Methodology: The present work provides the Tibetan text of the Alambanaparīkṣāvrtti, with readings from both the Berlin (Narthang) and Paris editions of the Bstan-gyur. The Kārikā (verses) are not separately reproduced as they are largely incorporated into the Vrtti. The commentary of Vinītadeva is used extensively, noting important deviations. The translation aims for fidelity to the original's brevity and ambiguity, avoiding interpretive additions to prevent attributing translator's thoughts to the author. The accompanying explanations incorporate insights from Dharmapāla and Vinītadeva but exclude discussions beyond Dignāga's text.
• Abbreviations:
  • A = Alambanaparīkṣākārikā
  • V = Vrtti (Dignāga's commentary)
  • T = Țīkā (Vinītadeva's commentary)

Tibetan Text (Pages 3-6):

• This section presents the actual Tibetan text of the Alambanaparīkṣāvrtti. It includes the title in Tibetan and Sanskrit, a salutation, and the opening arguments of Dignāga.
• The text begins by addressing the view that external objects, such as atoms, are the basis of cognition. Dignāga argues against this, asserting that while atoms may be the cause, they do not themselves carry the image or form of the cognition. He uses the analogy of sensory organs, which are causes but not the objects themselves.
• He further critiques the idea that aggregates of atoms are the object, arguing that such aggregates are not "really existing" (dravyasat) and are like "a second moon," an illusion.
• Dignāga then examines the view that the forms (ākāra) of aggregates, even if not ultimately real, are the objects of cognition. He argues that if this were true, all objects made of the same type of atoms (e.g., pots) should appear identical, and differences in form (like between a pot and a bowl) would not be explicable by the atoms themselves, as atoms are considered indivisible and similarly shaped (kugelförmig).
• He concludes that the apparent forms are sāmvṛta (scheinbar, conventional) and not dravyasat (wirklichen, ultimately real). The disappearance of the perception of a pot when its constituent atoms are conceptually removed, but not the disappearance of the perception of its color, is presented as evidence that the perceived object is not external.

Translation (Pages 7-11):

• This section provides Frauwallner's German translation of the Tibetan text.
• Critique of External Objects: The translation mirrors the arguments from the Tibetan text, systematically dismantling the notion of external objects (atoms or aggregates of atoms) as the alambana (basis or object) of cognition.
  • Atoms: Cannot be the object because they don't bear the image of the cognition, even if they are its cause.
  • Aggregates: Are not "really existing" and thus cannot be causes, making them invalid objects.
  • Forms of Aggregates: If the form of the aggregate were the object, then objects made of identical atoms should appear identical, which is not the case (e.g., pots vs. bowls). The difference in form is not explained by the atoms themselves.
• Dignāga's Own Thesis: Dignāga proposes that the cognizable form (grāhyāṁśa) within the cognition itself, which appears as if external, is the true object of perception. This internal form possesses the characteristics of both being the image of the object and being the cause of the cognition.
• Causality Argument: A significant part of the discussion addresses the objection that a part of cognition cannot be its cause, especially if they arise simultaneously. Dignāga counters this by:
  • Citing the logicians (tarkika) who argue that causality can be inferred from constant conjunction, even if simultaneous.
  • Suggesting that the form of the object within cognition leaves an impression that acts as a cause for subsequent similar cognitions, thus establishing a causal link over time.
• Sense Organs: Dignāga also addresses the existence of sense organs. He argues that they are to be understood as "forces" (śakti) inferred from their effects (cognitions), rather than material entities. These forces can reside within cognition itself and be understood as seeds (bīja) in the alayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness), aligning with Yogācāra philosophy.

Explanations (Erläuterungen) (Pages 11-15):

• This section provides Frauwallner's scholarly commentary and analysis.
• Context: Frauwallner places Dignāga's work within the broader context of Buddhist philosophy, particularly in response to Vasubandhu's Vimśatikā and the debate on the existence of an external world.
• Dignāga's Question: Dignāga's central question is whether an external world, however it might be constituted, can be the object of our cognition, using the established definition of an object of perception: it must produce a cognition that bears its image, and it must correspond to that image.
• Critique of Opposing Views:
  • Atoms as Objects: Dignāga refutes the view that atoms are objects. Even if they are the cause, they don't bear the image of the complex object we perceive. This view is attributed to older Vaibhāṣikas.
  • Aggregates as Objects: Dignāga refutes the view that aggregates of atoms are objects. While they might bear the image, they are not "really existing" (dravyasat) and thus cannot be causes. This view is associated with the Sautrāntikas.
  • Forms of Aggregates Adhering to Atoms: This third view attempts to bridge the gap by suggesting that the perceived form (sthūlarūpa) inheres in the individual atoms. Dignāga argues against this by pointing out that if true, all objects made of the same atoms would appear identical, and the difference in form (pot vs. bowl) cannot be explained by the atoms alone. He reiterates that the form is conventional (sāmvṛta) and not ultimately real.
• Dignāga's Yogācāra Stance: Frauwallner highlights that in the Alambanaparīkṣā, Dignāga clearly adopts the Yogācāra position, asserting that the cognizable form within cognition is the object of perception.
• Causality and Sense Organs (Revisited): The explanation elaborates on Dignāga's arguments for the internal form being the cause and the nature of sense organs as forces residing within consciousness, akin to seeds in the storehouse consciousness. He discusses how the perception of the external world is a result of these internal processes.
• Dharmakīrti's Development: Frauwallner briefly mentions how Dharmakīrti later refined Dignāga's ideas on causality, distinguishing between a "producing cause" and a "determining cause."

Appendix (Anhang) (Pages 14-15):

• This section contains the Tibetan text of the first thirteen verses of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya related to perception.
• Frauwallner provides a German translation and brief notes for these verses.
• These verses articulate Dignāga's own doctrine of perception, emphasizing direct perception (pratyakṣa) as being free from conceptualization (kalpanāpodha) and self-cognized (svasaṃvedya), with the object's form within cognition being the pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge).

Postscript (Nachbemerkung) (Page 15):

• Frauwallner notes a delay in the publication of his work and mentions that he was unable to incorporate the publication of Yamaguchi's work due to the printing process being too far advanced.

Overall Significance:

Erich Frauwallner's Dignāgas Alambanaparīkşā is a crucial scholarly contribution that provides an authoritative edition and detailed analysis of Dignāga's significant work on the nature of perception and the critique of external reality. It clarifies Dignāga's arguments against various realist positions and establishes his own Yogācāra-leaning theory of internal cognition as the basis for our experience of the world. The work is essential for anyone studying Buddhist epistemology, particularly the Vijñaptimātratā (consciousness-only) school and the development of Buddhist logic and metaphysics.