Dignaga On Trairupya Reconsidered

This document is a scholarly article by Shoryu Katsura, titled "Dignāga On Trairupya Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke." It engages in a detailed discussion and defense of Katsura's interpretation of the "trairūpya" (three characteristics) doctrine as formulated by the Buddhist logician Dignāga.

Here's a comprehensive summary of the key points:

1. Dignāga's Innovation: Svārthānumāna and Parārthānumāna:

• Katsura begins by highlighting Dignāga's crucial contribution to Indian logic: the distinction between svārthānumāna (inference for oneself, a private cognitive process for gaining knowledge) and parārthānumāna (inference for others, a public act of proving).
• Dignāga integrated the epistemological (pramāṇa) and debate (vāda) traditions by reclassifying proof (sādhana) as parārthānumāna, a type of inference.

2. The Core of the Discussion: The Trairūpya Doctrine:

• Dignāga defined svārthānumāna as knowledge gained through an anumāna (inference) whose linga (inferential mark or reason) possesses three characteristics (trirūpa).
• The article focuses on the interpretation of these three characteristics, specifically the presence and absence of the linga in relation to the sādhya (the property to be inferred) and its similar/dissimilar instances.

3. The Central Controversy with Prof. Oetke:

• The article is a response to Claus Oetke's critique of previous studies on Dignāga's trairūpya, including Katsura's own earlier work.
• The main point of contention is whether Dignāga intended to include the restrictive particle 'eva' (meaning "only" or "indeed") in the formulation of the second characteristic (and potentially the third). Oetke doubts this, while Katsura argues for its presence and its significant implications.

4. Katsura's Argument for the 'Eva' Restriction:

• Tibetan Textual Evidence: Katsura presents Tibetan translations of key passages from Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya (PS) and its commentary, emphasizing the phrase "nges par gzung ba" which he argues is the Tibetan equivalent of the Sanskrit avadhāraṇa (restriction).
• Dharmottara's Commentary: Katsura cites Dharmottara's commentary on the Nyāyabindu to demonstrate that avadhāraṇa is understood as a restriction by the particle eva, and that its placement is crucial for the meaning of the characteristic.
• Meaning of 'Eva': Katsura explains that eva restricts the domain of one term by another. In the context of trairūpya, the eva in the second characteristic would restrict the domain of the linga to be present only in similar instances (sapakṣa or tattulya).
• Redundancy of the Third Characteristic: Katsura acknowledges that if eva is inserted in the second characteristic (e.g., "present only in similar instances"), the third characteristic (absence in dissimilar instances) might seem redundant. However, he argues that Dignāga's intent was to establish vyāpti (pervasion), a foundational concept for valid inference, and that the eva restriction is essential for this.
• Dignāga's Later Work (PS-Vṛtti II. 21): Katsura points to a later verse by Dignāga that explicitly discusses the role of eva in establishing the proper relation (sambandha) or vyāpti between the linga and the lingin (the marked object). This supports his claim that Dignāga was developing a theory of vyāpti.
• Connection to Hetucakra: Katsura further argues that Dignāga's formulations with eva are necessary to validate certain types of reasons (hetu) in his Hetucakra (Wheel of Reasons), particularly those where the reason's domain is restricted by the sādhya.

5. Oetke's Objections and Katsura's Rebuttals:

• Meaning of "nges par gzung ba": Oetke suggested "ascertained" or "recognized with certainty." Katsura refutes this by showing its equivalence to avadhāraṇa (restriction) based on grammatical traditions and commentaries.
• Purpose of 'Eva' Insertion: Oetke questioned the insertion of eva due to the perceived redundancy of the third characteristic. Katsura argues it's to establish vyāpti, the sufficient condition for a valid inference.
• Translation of "asati": Katsura admits to an earlier misunderstanding of "asati" (in the third characteristic) but accepts Oetke's correction. The debate then shifts to what "absence" refers to (the object to be inferred or similar instances). Katsura supports Oetke's idea that "anumeya" (what is to be inferred) can have multiple meanings, allowing for different interpretations of the third characteristic.

6. The Role of Anvaya and Vyatireka:

• Katsura discusses how the second and third characteristics (without eva) correspond to anvaya (presence in similar instances) and vyatireka (absence in dissimilar instances).
• He presents George Cardona's view that anvaya and vyatireka represent the "Indian Principle of Inductive Reasoning," used to discover relationships.
• Without eva, these are seen as necessary conditions for a valid inferential mark.
• With eva, they become sufficient conditions, establishing the crucial relationship of vyāpti.

7. Broader Interpretations and Methodological Differences:

• Katsura contrasts his "wholistic approach" of considering the entire text and its context with Oetke's tendency to focus on specific passages, sometimes leading to "bold conclusions."
• He promises a future paper to address Oetke's questioning of his reference to other parts of Dignāga's work, intending to connect trairūpya with the theory of drṣṭānta (example).

In essence, Katsura's article is a robust defense of his interpretation that Dignāga's formulation of the three characteristics of a valid inferential mark, particularly the second characteristic, inherently includes the restrictive particle 'eva'. This inclusion is not merely a linguistic nuance but a crucial element that establishes the concept of vyāpti (pervasion), which Dignāga considered the bedrock of sound logical reasoning. He systematically refutes Oetke's objections by drawing on textual evidence, commentaries, and the logical implications of Dignāga's philosophical system.