Die Theorie Der Schlussfolgerung Bei Parasarabhatta - Book Summary

Here is a comprehensive summary in English of the provided Jain text, "Die Theorie Der Schlussfolgerung Bei Parasarabhatta" by Gerhard Oberhammer:

This paper by Gerhard Oberhammer meticulously reconstructs the theory of inference (anumānam) as presented by Parāśarabhaṭṭa in his lost philosophical magnum opus, the Tattvaratnākaraḥ. The author focuses on key fragments found primarily in the works of Venkaṭanātha, aiming to systemize Parāśarabhaṭṭa's views on two central problems: vyāpti (invariable concomitance) and upādhi (a limiting condition or extraneous factor that invalidates an inference).

1. The Theory of Vyāpti

Definition of Vyāpti: While Parāśarabhaṭṭa's exact wording is not preserved, a paraphrase attributed to his commentator Śrīnivāsa describes vyāpti as sāmānādhikaranyam eva vyāptih (co-substrate relation) in the absence of knowledge of vyabhicāraḥ (deviation). Oberhammer notes that the term sāmānādhikaranyam is questionable, as Parāśarabhaṭṭa typically uses sambandhaḥ or anvayaḥ.
Absence of Upādhi in the Definition: A key characteristic of Parāśarabhaṭṭa's vyāpti definition is the omission of the concept of upādhi. This contrasts with contemporary logicians like Udayana, Venkaṭanātha, and Meghanādāri, who defined vyāpti in relation to the absence of upādhi. Oberhammer suggests two reasons for this:
1. Parāśarabhaṭṭa might have followed the Mimāmsā tradition, which emphasizes the necessity of the connection rather than the formal aspect of being upādhi-free.
2. There was a critique against Udayana's definition of vyāpti and upādhi for committing the error of mutual dependence (anyonyāśrayatvam).
Determination of Vyāpti through Single Observation: Parāśarabhaṭṭa's view that vyāpti can be established by a single observation (sakṛdgrāhyaḥ) diverges from both the Nyāya school's emphasis on multiple observations (bhūyodarśanam) and the prevalent Visiṣṭādvaita view of his time. Oberhammer argues that Parāśarabhaṭṭa's reasoning for this was likely grounded in the Visiṣṭādvaita and Mimāmsā doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge (svataḥprāmānyam). If an observation is inherently valid, then the vyāpti observed in that single instance must also be valid.
The Role of "Common Form" (Sāmānyarūpaikyam) and "Essence of Perception" (Pratītisvarasāt): To explain the possibility of immediate recognition of vyāpti through a single observation, Parāśarabhaṭṭa developed a unique theory. He proposed that perception of a "common form" (sāmānyarūpaikyāt) in a group of instances allows for the recognition of all individuals belonging to that common form. This also involved a "third type of contact" (sannihitadhūmādivyaktisamyuktasyendriyasya tadāśritadhūmatvādiḥ samyuktāśritas, tadāśrayatvena vyaktyantarāni samyuktāni).
Parāśarabhaṭṭa's Conception of Universals (Sāmānyam): Parāśarabhaṭṭa's teaching on universals (sāmānyam) appears to be in contrast to the common Visiṣṭādvaita opinion of his time, which did not treat universals as a separate category but rather as similarity (sādṛśyam) and a quality (guṇaḥ). Parāśarabhaṭṭa, however, viewed similarity as a distinct object of knowledge (prameyam). He argued against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of universals, proposing that the commonality in naming things of the same class stems from a unified "form of appearance" (ākāraikyam) or "common form" (sāmānyarūpaikyam). This form is perceived directly through perception, specifically through the contact described earlier. This perception is a savikalpikapratyakṣa (determinate perception), which excludes the connection of determinations with anything else.
Reconstruction of Vyāpti Determination: Parāśarabhaṭṭa's theory posits that in observing a concrete connection, the perception of the commonality of the observed phenomena is included. This, in turn, implies the perception of all individual cases belonging to these commonalities. This process allows for the identification of different types of vyāpti: universal (samavyāptiḥ), one-sided (ekasāyī Vyāptiḥ), or none at all.

2. The Theory of Upādhi

Structure of Parāśarabhaṭṭa's Upādhi Doctrine: Venkaṭanātha's account in the Nyāyaparisuddhiḥ indicates that Parāśarabhaṭṭa's upādhi doctrine was structured similarly to the Nyāya presentations, covering its essence (svarūpam), means of determination (pramānam), subtypes (avāntarabhedāḥ), and grounds for refutation (dūṣaṇatvaprakārāḥ).
Parāśarabhaṭṭa's Definition of Upādhi: The core of Parāśarabhaṭṭa's own definition is: "kenacid yasya sambandho yo 'vacchedaka eva hi tasyopadhiḥ" (That which is a limiting factor, avacchedakaḥ, for something related to another is the upādhi). The term avacchedakaḥ (limiter) is significant and plays a crucial role in later developments of Indian logic. This definition differs from Udayana's formulation (sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyavyāpakaḥ), but Oberhammer argues it is typologically derivable from Udayana's other definition of upādhi as sādhyaprayojakam nimittäntaram (an additional cause leading to the sādhya). Parāśarabhaṭṭa understood upādhi as limiting the general applicability of the probans (reason) to those cases that are actually connected with the probandum (what is to be proved).
Preservation of Udayana's Definitions as Characteristics: Parāśarabhaṭṭa retained Udayana's earlier definitions of upādhi (e.g., sādhyavyāpakaḥ sādhanāvyāpakah) as characteristics (lakṣaṇam) of the upādhi, suggesting he saw them as valid complements to his own essence definition. The inclusion of both the sādhyavyāpakaḥ sādhanāvyāpakah definition and the sādhyasamavyāptiḥ type of definition, which Udayana's school likely favored, indicates Parāśarabhaṭṭa's adherence to Udayana's framework.
Means of Knowing Upādhi: Parāśarabhaṭṭa identified two ways to recognize an upādhi:
1. Lack of completeness in the vyāpti's form (sambandhagrahaṇavelānuyāyisvarūpavaikalyam): This occurs when a perceived connection cannot be re-recognized in its entirety due to missing conditions.
2. Observation of deviation (vyabhicāradarśanam): This is the direct observation of the probans occurring without the probandum.
Classification of Logical Errors (Hetvābhāsāḥ) based on Upādhi: Parāśarabhaṭṭa classified logical fallacies based on the upādhi:
- If the upādhi is identified through deviation (vyabhicāraḥ), the logical reason is either contradicted and inconsistent (bādhita viruddhaḥ) or uncertain (anaikāntikaḥ).
- If the upādhi is identified through the incompleteness of the vyāpti's form, the logical reason is rendered useless (aprayojakaḥ).
Udayana's Influence and Parāśarabhaṭṭa's Position: The fragments strongly suggest that Parāśarabhaṭṭa developed his upādhi doctrine in close alignment with Udayana and his school, sharing similar understandings of the underlying logical problems. Fragment 3, a near paraphrase of Udayana, further supports this. Parāśarabhaṭṭa also adopted Udayana's classification of upādhis as feared (sankaniyaḥ) or established (niśceyaḥ) and the idea that tarka (reasoning) is the best tool to dispel the fear of an upādhi.

Influence and Context:

Influence on Meghanādāri: Parāśarabhaṭṭa's theory, particularly his emphasis on vyāpti being ascertainable through single observation based on common forms, influenced Meghanādāri. However, Meghanādāri appears to have replaced Parāśarabhaṭṭa's explanation with Sālikanātha's theory, possibly due to internal criticism of Parāśarabhaṭṭa's views within his own school.
Significance: This study is crucial for understanding the philosophical development within the Visiṣṭādvaita school between Ramanuja and Venkaṭanātha, a period with few available direct sources. By reconstructing Parāśarabhaṭṭa's theory of inference, Oberhammer sheds light on the intellectual currents and debates of this era, highlighting the significant impact of Nyāya logic, particularly Udayana's work, on Visiṣṭādvaita thinkers.

In essence, Oberhammer's paper reconstructs Parāśarabhaṭṭa's sophisticated theory of inference, emphasizing his unique contributions to the understanding of vyāpti through single observation and the concept of common forms, and his nuanced treatment of upādhi as a "limiter" (avacchedakaḥ), all within the context of his indebtedness to Udayana.