Die Gottesidee In Der Indischen Philosophie Des Ersten Nachchristlichen Jahrtausends

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, focusing on its discussion of the concept of Isvara (God) in Indian philosophy during the first millennium CE:

The article "Die Gottesidee In Der Indischen Philosophie Des Ersten Nachchristlichen Jahrtausends" by Gerhard Oberhammer, published in Kairos (likely a theological or philosophical journal), explores the concept of God (Isvara) within various Indian philosophical traditions during the first millennium CE. The author emphasizes that the study of God in Indian philosophy is crucial for understanding religion in general, as it reveals the inherent tension between faith and reason, myth and philosophy.

Oberhammer begins by citing Pascal's observation that "it is the heart that feels God, not reason," suggesting that this is also the fundamental source of Hindu theology. He argues that the Indian philosophical concept of Isvara arises not from pure philosophy but from the "heart" – the core of human personality where image, concept, and transcendental experience converge. This initial holistic experience is later differentiated into myth, philosophy, and mysticism.

The author highlights that philosophical reflection on the divine (Isvara) is rooted in religious and mythical conceptions of God. However, not all mythological ideas are suitable for philosophical elaboration. A mythological concept of God must possess a certain structural suitability, either inherently or through interaction with philosophical concepts, to be amenable to logical and conceptual structuring.

Oberhammer identifies three main typological approaches to the philosophical structuring of religious-mythological ideas of God in the first millennium CE:

1. The Sāṅkhyist Yoga:

   • Oberhammer notes that Yoga's theological doctrine is not central to the original atheistic Sāṅkhya system, which focused on a method of mystical experience of being. The concept of Isvara was later incorporated from mythological theology and adapted using Sāṅkhya's conceptual framework.
   • In this system, God is defined as a puruṣa (consciousness) who, due to his omniscience, has never wrongly identified himself with empirical events and therefore exists in eternal emancipation (kaivalyam).
   • However, since Sāṅkhya considers activity and cognition as phenomena of Prakṛti (matter), Isvara, as pure consciousness, would be inactive and without knowledge. To reconcile this with mythological notions of God's omnipotence and omniscience, Yoga introduced a material counterpart to God, composed of pure sattva. This counterpart served as an instrument for God's action in the world, allowing him to possess these attributes without compromising his essential nature as pure consciousness.
   • This dualistic structure, where God is both pure consciousness and has a material aspect, is seen as a precursor to later developments. The concept of divine consorts in mythology could be interpreted as divine forces (śakti) analogous to this material counterpart.

2. The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Systems:

   • These two schools, which gradually merged, presented a different approach. They attempted to integrate the concept of a supreme being into their mechanistic, natural-philosophical worldview.
   • The defining characteristic here is the attempt to categorize God within the system's existing ontological framework, primarily as a dravya (substance). This led to significant debate among scholars, with some viewing God as a unique kind of soul (ātman) and others as a distinct substance.
   • The Vaiśeṣika concept of ātman was problematic for defining God as it lacked transcendence and inherent spirituality, being considered a part of the world subject to the cycle of rebirth and possessing consciousness only as transient properties.
   • Consequently, other Nyāya scholars proposed that God be understood as a unique substance, in addition to the system's already accepted eternal substances (atoms, space, time, etc.).
   • In this view, God is defined as the efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa) of the world, not in the sense of creation ex nihilo (which is foreign to Indian philosophy), but as the initiator and regulator of the world process in accordance with karma. God's omniscience is understood as the "knowledge-endowed actor" (buddhimat-kartā) who initiates the world's coming into being and passing away.
   • Prasastapada's description of God's function in the origination of the world illustrates this natural-philosophical integration. God's will and perception trigger atomic interactions, leading to the formation of the world. This approach, while demythologizing God, integrates him into the world's fabric, making him a "being alongside other beings" with a specific function.
   • The article notes that this integration often incorporates mythological narratives, particularly in descriptions of cosmic creation and destruction.

3. The Monistic Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara:

   • Oberhammer cautiously suggests that it might seem audacious to speak of a "God-idea" in relation to Śaṅkara's concept of Brahman. However, a typological-systematic analysis justifies this, especially since Śaṅkara himself does not always strictly differentiate between Īśvara and the ultimate reality, Brahman.
   • Śaṅkara's approach is seen as a development from the Sāṅkhyist Yoga's dualistic conception. While Yoga posited God as pure consciousness (puruṣa) and also a material counterpart for his worldly interaction, Śaṅkara, building on the Upanishadic tradition, views Brahman as the sole reality and the "primal stuff" of the world.
   • He interprets the "unmanifested name and form" (avyākṛta nāmarūpe), from which the world arises, as a world-seed inherent in Brahman. This is analogous to the material counterpart in Yoga, representing the "world-dimension" of God.
   • However, Śaṅkara pushes this to illusionistic monism. The plurality of souls and the distinctness of the world (as taught by Yoga) are dissolved. The only reality is the non-cosmic, spiritual Brahman. The "unmanifested name and form" are essentially inseparable from Brahman, having no existence independent of it.
   • Typologically, the "material counterpart" transforms from a bearer of God's action into the material cause of the world.
   • Śaṅkara's concept of Ātman (Self) is compared to the Sāṅkhya puruṣa. Both represent an absolute, transcendent, and unchanging consciousness. The method of deriving the Ātman from empirical consciousness is similar to Sāṅkhya's derivation of puruṣa.
   • The crucial element for Śaṅkara is the identity of Ātman and Brahman, a concept he inherits from the Upanishads and Brahmasūtras. While this identity is foundational, Oberhammer suggests that Śaṅkara's derivation of Ātman might be influenced by the puruṣa concept rather than solely dictated by the Brahmasūtras' monism.
   • Śaṅkara's Brahman-idea is ultimately presented as the conceptual structuring of the God-image experienced by the mystic in an acosmic and a-mythological inner experience. It represents the ultimate consequence of the Sāṅkhyist Yoga's conception of God as the ideal for the yogi's meditative journey towards the Absolute. The article notes a certain "break" in Śaṅkara's rational structure due to the absence of a real substrate for phenomena, which was present in Sāṅkhya's Prakṛti.

In conclusion, Oberhammer's article provides a comparative analysis of how different Indian philosophical schools conceptually structured the idea of Isvara, demonstrating the interplay between religious myth, philosophical reasoning, and the inherent human quest for understanding the divine. He highlights how each system attempts to reconcile the transcendence of the divine with its perceived immanence and activity in the world, revealing distinct typological patterns in the development of Indian theology.