Dharmottaras Theory Of Knowledge In His Laghupramanyapariksa - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary of Helmut Krasser's analysis of Dharmottara's Theory of Knowledge in his Laghupramanyapariksa, based on the provided text:

Introduction and Methodology:

Helmut Krasser presents a systematic overview of Dharmottara's theory of knowledge as expounded in his Laghupramanyapariksa (LPP). Krasser acknowledges the complexity of Dharmottara's writing, noting his tendency to interrupt his main arguments for detailed explanations and to revisit topics from various perspectives. To make the text accessible, Krasser aims for a more organized presentation, omitting some of the finer details of Dharmottara's arguments and focusing on the core concepts. He clarifies that this summary does not aim to trace the entire development of Dharmottara's epistemology but rather to illuminate his views within the LPP. He also specifies that Sanskrit terms in brackets are based on parallel Sanskrit materials or assumed equivalents of the Tibetan translations.

Core Definition of Valid Cognition (Pramana):

Dharmottara, following Dharmakīrti, defines valid cognition (pramāṇa) as reliable cognition (avisamvādakam jñānam). Reliability (avisamvādaka) is explained as the capability to cause a person to obtain (prāpaka) the indicated object (pradarsita vastu), provided that object is capable of producing an effect (arthakriyāsamartha).

Indicating (Pradarśakatva): Causing one to obtain the object is identified with indicating the object of activity (pravrttivisaya). Indicating is the cause or means that motivates a person.
Motivating (Pravartakatva): This is equated with indicating.
Capability of Causing to Obtain (Prāpanaśakti): Crucially, causing to obtain does not mean the object must be obtained. It refers to the capability of causing attainment, meaning the cognition would be incorrect if the object isn't obtained for some reason.

Types of Pramana:

Dharmottara identifies two types of valid cognition:

Perception (Pratyakşa): Ascertains the object as it is seen (drstatayā).
Inference (Anumāna): Determines the object through a logical mark that does not deviate from it (lingāvyabhicăritaya).

The "Unknown Object" Criterion:

Dharmottara, like Dharmakīrti, insists that a cognition must relate to an as yet unknown object (anadhigatavisaya) to be valid. He uses this to exclude cognitions that arise from earlier moments (phases) of cognition, as only the initial phase is considered valid.

Pramana Vyapara (Function) and Pramana Phala (Effect):

Function: The activity of indicating is the function of a correct cognition (pramāṇavyāpāra). This function is not merely grasping an object but determining or ascertaining it. This determining is the cause of obtaining the object.
One Particular Exclusion (Ekavyāvrtti): Dharmottara elaborates that the function of determining an object involves limiting its nature by excluding it from other things. This "one particular exclusion" is the complete function of pramāṇa. For example, determining something as blue excludes it from non-blue things.
Effect: Determining is also considered the effect of a valid cognition (pramāṇaphala). Since determining is the cause of activity, activity itself is also seen as an effect.
Activity (Pravrtti): This is defined as an understanding accompanied by bodily and verbal operation, motivated by a desire to obtain a specific, determined object. This "activity" is momentary, occurring in the moment immediately following the initial phase of perception or inference.

The Role of Conception (Vikalpa) in Perception:

A key issue is how perception (pratyakşa), which is by definition free from conceptual construction (kalpanapodha), can perform the function of determining (adhyavasāya). Dharmottara explains that while the initial, non-conceptual phase of perception (nirvikalpika) is the agent of the valid cognition, it places its function of indicating the object into the immediately following conceptual cognition (savikalpika). This conceptual cognition "takes over" or imitates the function of perception, allowing for determination. However, it is the prior perceptual phase that is considered the true pramāṇa, as the conceptual cognition relies on it and doesn't ascertain the object without it.

The Object of Correct Cognition (Visaya/Artha):

Dharmottara distinguishes between two kinds of objects:

Grasped Object (Grāhya): This is the momentary phase of the external object (in perception) or the conceptual image (in inference). These are not directly obtainable.
Determined Object (Adhyavaseya): This is the object determined in terms of appearance (ākāra), time (kāla), and space (deśa). This determined object is what can be obtained.

Appearance (Ākāra): Refers to an essential property capable of producing an effect. For Dharmottara, only atoms of color are truly effect-producing; shape is a property of the mental image, not the real thing.
Determining the Real Thing: While conceptual cognitions determine the object, the validity of perception rests on its connection to the ultimately real, momentary thing. For instance, a perceived continuum of phases is determined, and a later phase of that continuum is the truly obtainable object.

Generals (Sāmānya) and Particulars (Viśeşa):

Particulars (Viśeşa): These are the real, momentary entities that produce effects. They consist of atoms of color.
Generals (Sāmānya): These are not considered real as they don't produce effects. They are conceptualized common properties shared by particulars. While not independently real, they are not entirely nonexistent and are grasped when particulars are grasped.
Distinguishing Validity: The relationship between generals and particulars is crucial for distinguishing valid from invalid cognitions. If the determined general characteristics contradict the particular (in terms of time, space, or appearance), the cognition is invalid.

Problematic Cognitions (Contradictions):

Dharmottara addresses apparent contradictions where a valid cognition determines an object with characteristics that seem to contradict its real nature. He explains these by showing that the perceived "contradictions" are often due to misinterpretations of generality, the nature of the mental image, or the limitations of perception:

Momentary vs. Non-Momentary: Duration is a property of the grasping cognition, not the real momentary thing. What appears as non-momentary is a common feature, not the real object itself.
Gross vs. Subtle: A mass of atoms can be seen as gross, but the individual atoms within that mass are subtle.
Large vs. Small: Shape and extension are properties of the mental image, not the real thing.
Clear vs. Unclear: Unclarity can be due to external factors (like dust) interacting with the object, not an inherent contradiction in the object itself.
Coalescing vs. Non-Coalescing Leaves: If the "interval" between leaves is not perceived, the leaves appear to coalesce. This doesn't mean the interval doesn't exist, only that it wasn't grasped.

Invalid Cognitions (Apraamna):

Invalid cognitions are classified as:

Incorrect (Mithya): These cognitions fail to cause the obtainment of their object because their object is unreal. This unreality arises from incorrect determination of space, time, or appearance.
- Space Errors: Mistaking the location of an object.
- Time Errors: Misattributing the time of an object (e.g., a dream cognition of a midday event at midnight).
- Appearance Errors: Misrepresenting essential properties. A mirage perceived as water is erroneous because the essential property of "waterness" is not present.
Doubtful (Samśaya): Doubt does not cause one to obtain their object because the object is not restricted to being or non-being.
- Doubt can be about the existence of an object or its specific identity.
- Non-Obstructive Doubt: If doubt relates to the actual object of perception and one of the possibilities is true, the perception's function is not obstructed. The valid perception motivates action.
- Obstructive Doubt: If the doubt is about something completely unrelated to the object of perception, it obstructs the perception's function and is considered invalid.
- Doubt can also arise from uncertain logical marks or when the nature of a concept is not clearly understood.

Ascertainment of Validity:

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic: Dharmottara suggests validity can be ascertained intrinsically or extrinsically, though he doesn't systematically detail this.
"Necessary Concomitance" (Arthāvinābhāvitva): Validity is due to this concomitance, meaning the cognition arises from the object. This ability to cause obtainment is its validity.
Ascertainment Methods:
- Directly Experienced Objects: Validity is ascertained by perception. This includes doubtful and erroneous cognitions, where a later perception confirms or denies the initial one.
- Indirectly Experienced Objects: Validity is inferred.
Refutation of Inference for Validity: Dharmottara refutes the idea that validity is always inferred from similarity to previous cognitions, arguing that experienced cognitions are known immediately due to familiarity.

Diagrammatic Representation of Cognition:

Krasser provides a diagram illustrating the process of valid perception:

The object's first phase (A-k1) produces a non-conceptual perceptual cognition (C-k2) with the object's image (pratibhāsa).
This perception (C-k2) leads to a determining cognition (C-k3), which ascertains the object's continuum.
C-k2 is the pramāṇa. Its function (vyāpāra) and effect (phala) are performed in C-k3.
The grasped object is the image in C-k2, while the determined object is the continuum (A-k1 - A-kn). The ultimately obtainable object is a later phase of this continuum (A-kn). The validity of perception relates to this obtainable phase.

Conclusion and Spiritual Context:

Dharmottara begins and ends his treatise with homage to the Buddha, framing his epistemological discourse within the Buddhist path to liberation. The Buddha is presented as a source of knowledge (pramānabhūta) because he teaches the cessation of suffering, a reality unknown to most, and by doing so, causes those seeking it to obtain it. This exemplifies the characteristics of valid cognition: being reliable, indicating, and causing attainment. Dharmottara's work thus demonstrates the spiritual significance and necessity of the Buddhist epistemological tradition, which ultimately aims to validate the Buddha's teachings.