Dharmottaras Ksanabhangasiddhih

This document contains an excerpt from Erich Frauwallner's scholarly work on the Buddhist philosopher Dharmottara, specifically focusing on his treatise Kṣaṇabhangasiddhiḥ (Proof of Momentariness). Frauwallner's introduction and the translated text itself delve into the philosophical arguments for the doctrine of kṣaṇabhaṅga (momentariness) within Indian Buddhist logic.

Here's a breakdown of the key points discussed in the provided pages:

I. Introduction by Erich Frauwallner:

• The Doctrine of Momentariness: Frauwallner notes that the doctrine of momentariness was established relatively early in most Buddhist schools and was primarily defended and proven rather than further developed.
• Three Main Proofs: He identifies three primary lines of reasoning used to support momentariness:
  1. Inference from Impermanence (vināśitvānumānam): Things are impermanent by their very nature, independent of external causes.
  2. Inference from Being (sattvānumānam): Deriving momentariness from the very nature of existence. Frauwallner attributes the development of this approach to Dharmakirti and suggests it became increasingly prominent, eventually overshadowing the first method.
  3. Appeal to Sense Perception: This was a less significant line of argument.
• Dharmottara's Place: Frauwallner situates Dharmottara as an important figure in this intellectual lineage, placing him chronologically after Dharmakirti and possibly in the 8th century CE. He notes that Dharmottara was a student of Subhagupta, who critiqued Dharmakirti.
• Dharmottara's Contribution: Frauwallner highlights that Dharmottara's Kṣaṇabhangasiddhiḥ exclusively focuses on the sattvānumānam (inference from being) but still draws heavily on arguments from the vināśitvānumānam (impermanence). He emphasizes that while Dharmottara worked within Dharmakirti's framework, he possessed a unique perspective and made original contributions, earning him recognition and influence.
• Textual Basis: Frauwallner explains that his edition of the text is based on the Narthang and Derge printings of the Tibetan Tanjur. He acknowledges the limitations of the manuscript tradition and his own editorial interventions to ensure readability and clarity.

II. Text of Kṣaṇabhangasiddhiḥ (Translation and Summary of Key Arguments):

The translated text presents Dharmottara's arguments against the idea of things persisting beyond a single moment. The core of his argument revolves around the concept of arthakriyā (effective action or causal efficacy) as the defining characteristic of existence.

Here are some of the key lines of reasoning presented:

• The Problem with "Remaining": Dharmottara argues that if things truly "remained" or persisted, their very nature would need to be constant. However, anything that is supposed to "remain" in the same way must be distinct from that which is "perishing" or "changing."
• Causal Efficacy as the Criterion: The central argument is that if something is to have causal efficacy, it must be capable of producing an effect. If a thing were to exist for more than one moment, its causal efficacy would need to be understood in terms of either continuity or a succession of moments.
• The Argument from Contradiction: Dharmottara challenges the notion of things existing for more than a single moment. He uses analogies and logical deductions to show that if something were to persist, it would either have to be unchanging (and thus not truly "existing" in a dynamic sense) or its existence would involve a contradiction.
• Critique of Counterarguments:
  • Against "Persistence of Essence": He refutes the idea that an unchanging essence could persist through moments. If the essence were unchanging, it wouldn't be capable of producing different effects at different times.
  • Against "Sensory Perception": Dharmottara argues that sensory perception grasps things in their immediate presentation. If things were momentary, sensory perception would only grasp that momentary aspect. The argument suggests that our perception of continuity or enduring objects is an inference or conceptualization, not direct sensory data of persistence.
  • Against "Memory and Recognition": He contends that if things were truly momentary, memory and recognition would be impossible because the object recognized would have ceased to exist. The fact that we can recognize things implies some form of continuity or re-presentation, which he then analyzes to show it's not actual persistence but a conceptual construction.
  • Critique of "Intermediate Moments": He addresses the idea of intermediate moments or transitional states, arguing that these, too, must be momentary, leading to an infinite regress or a contradiction.
• The Nature of "Momentary": Dharmottara clarifies what "momentary" means, emphasizing its connection to the inability of an entity to remain in the same way across temporal distinctions (earlier and later).
• Examples and Analogies: Throughout the text, Dharmottara uses examples like fire, light, seeds, hammers, pots, and visual perception to illustrate his logical points.
• The Role of Pramāṇa (Epistemology): The text implicitly engages with Buddhist epistemology, discussing the validity of different means of knowing (like perception and inference) in establishing or refuting momentariness.
• Rejection of Eternalism: The entire argument is geared towards dismantling the idea of eternalism (belief in enduring, unchanging substances) and establishing the Buddhist doctrine of impermanence and momentariness.

In essence, Dharmottara, through Kṣaṇabhangasiddhiḥ, rigorously defends the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, arguing that the very nature of existence, when analyzed through logic and the principles of causal efficacy, precludes any entity from persisting beyond a single, indivisible moment.