Dharmottara

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, focusing on the contributions of Dharmottara to the Apoha doctrine, based on Erich Frauwallner's analysis:

The provided text is an excerpt from "Beiträge zur Apohalehre" (Contributions to the Apoha Doctrine) by Erich Frauwallner, with the specific section focusing on Dharmottara. Frauwallner's work aims to trace the development of the Apoha doctrine after Dharmakirti.

Key Points about Dharmottara's Contribution:

• Breaking Dharmakirti's Dominance: Frauwallner highlights that while Buddhist philosophers after Dharmakirti (like Subhagupta, Devendramati, Sakyamati, Santirakṣita, and Kamalasila) largely repeated Dharmakirti's ideas, Dharmottara was the first significant philosopher after Dharmakirti to break free from his intellectual dominance. Dharmottara, while working within Dharmakirti's framework, was able to develop his own distinct perspectives on various questions related to Apoha.

• Influence: Dharmottara is considered the first significant Buddhist philosopher after Dharmakirti to have a greater influence on subsequent thought.

• Primary Source: Dharmottara's views are primarily found in his work, the Apohaprakaraṇam. Unfortunately, the Sanskrit original is lost, and only a Tibetan translation survives, which Frauwallner acknowledges is a less than ideal substitute.

• Challenges in Research: Frauwallner notes the difficulties in reconstructing Dharmottara's thought due to the loss of the original Sanskrit text and the limited helpfulness of polemical works by opponents like Jayantabhaṭṭa and Vacaspatimiśra, who often misunderstood or misrepresented the original ideas. This forces reliance almost exclusively on the Tibetan translation.

• Focus on "Apoha" (Exclusion/Other-Exclusion): The core of the text discusses Dharmottara's engagement with the Apoha doctrine, which is central to Buddhist epistemology and semantics. Apoha posits that concepts are understood through the negation or exclusion of what they are not.

Dharmottara's Specific Arguments and Innovations:

1. The Object of Words and Concepts:

   • Reaffirmation of Dharmakirti: Dharmottara begins by reaffirming Dharmakirti's position that the object of words (śabda-viṣaya) is the same as the object of conceptual thought (vikalpa-viṣaya). This marks a conclusion to a long-standing debate, with Dharmakirti having already established this, but Dharmottara makes it the immediate starting point of his exposition.
   • Nature of the Conceptual Object: While Dharmakirti stated that the object of conceptual thought is the "mental image" (pratibimba) that is projected outward and attributed to external things, Dharmottara seeks to define this object more precisely.
   • Distinction from External Reality and Cognition: Dharmottara argues that the object of conceptual thought is neither an external reality (artha) nor cognition itself (jñāna). Instead, it is something completely unreal (alīka), perceived as external (bāhya) but not truly existing externally, rather projected by our cognition (āropita). This is a significant clarification, emphasizing the unreal nature of conceptual objects.
   • Unreality and "Other-Exclusion" (Anyapoha): Dharmottara strongly links the unreal nature of conceptual objects to the Apoha doctrine. He asserts that these objects are fundamentally "other-exclusion" (anyapoha), specifically the exclusion of all other things (paryudāsa). This emphasis on the negative aspect of Apoha is a key contribution.

2. The Impossibility of Positive Conceptualization:

   • Dharmottara's Argument for Apoha: Dharmottara grounds the Apoha doctrine in the nature of conceptual objects. Real things, as perceived by sensory experience, do not require affirmation of their existence because existence is inherent in their nature. Conceptual objects, however, require affirmation of existence (sein) and non-existence (nichtsein). Since real things possess positive being (positive Beschaffenheit), they have a positive essence. Conceptual objects, with their different nature, cannot claim the same.
   • Critique of Positive Claims: He argues that conceptual objects lack inherent positive being and do not relate to the positive characteristics of real things. Instead, they are merely "different from other things" (von allem andern verschieden) and based on the difference of things from others. This justification for Apoha, linking it to the unreality of conceptual objects, is a crucial development.
   • Implications for External Things: Consequently, Dharmottara extends this to external things as understood through concepts, stating that what the mind determines in external things is only this "other-exclusion," not their true essence.

3. Critique of Dharmakirti's Nuances:

   • "Reflection" vs. "Projection": While Dharmakirti described the conceptual object as a "reflection" (pratibimba), Dharmottara emphasizes it as a "projection" (āropita). This subtle shift highlights the active role of the mind in creating the conceptual object.
   • Positive vs. Negative Aspects: Frauwallner notes that Dharmakirti, while fundamentally adhering to Apoha, allowed for a certain positive character within the conceptual object. Dharmottara, however, strongly emphasizes the negative aspect, grounding it in the unreality of the conceptual object. This, according to Frauwallner, is a departure from Dharmakirti and potentially leads to problems.

4. The Role of Perception and Memory:

   • Distinguishing Perception and Conception: Dharmottara clarifies the difference between perception (pratyakṣa), which apprehends reality directly, and conception (vikalpa), which determines reality through concepts. While perception is based on actual experience, conceptualization can arise from both direct perception and latent impressions (vāsanā).
   • Unreal Objects and Perception: He addresses the question of how we perceive unreal things. He argues that it's in the nature of conceptual cognition, which is fundamentally "non-knowledge" (avidyā), to present something that appears like real external things. This appearance is confirmed by perception, even if it cannot be further corroborated by similar phenomena.

5. Critique of Objections:

   • Addressing Opponent's Arguments: Dharmottara actively engages with and refutes various counterarguments from opponents, particularly concerning the nature of conceptual determination, the possibility of perceiving unrealities, and the relationship between conceptualization and external reality.
   • Addressing Dharmakirti's "Same Reflection": He tackles objections related to Dharmakirti's idea that multiple instances of the same concept arise from the "same reflection." Dharmottara clarifies that the equality of mental images, not necessarily identical external causation, leads to conceptual unity.

6. Conclusion:

   • Summary of Contributions: Frauwallner concludes that Dharmottara's primary contributions lie in his attempt to precisely define the nature of the conceptual object as something unreal, external, and projected, and his strong emphasis on the negative aspect of Apoha, grounding it in this unreality.
   • Limitations: While acknowledging Dharmottara's independent thought and its influence, Frauwallner points out his limitations. He remains heavily dependent on Dharmakirti, often rephrasing or elaborating on Dharmakirti's ideas rather than introducing entirely new concepts. His arguments sometimes lead to contradictions or a disruption of Dharmakirti's balanced system, often spurred by polemics rather than new observations.

In essence, Dharmottara, as analyzed by Frauwallner, represents a crucial stage in the development of the Apoha doctrine, pushing the boundaries of Dharmakirti's thought by emphasizing the unreal and negative nature of conceptual objects, thereby providing a more robust philosophical foundation for the doctrine of exclusion. However, he also reveals the inherent challenges and potential pitfalls of such a radical approach.