Dharmakirtis Criticism Of Jaina Doctrine Of Multiplexity Of Reality Anekantavada

Here's a comprehensive summary of Piotr Balcerowicz's paper, "Dharmakīrti's Criticism of the Jaina Doctrine of Multiplexity of Reality (Anekāntavāda)":

This paper analyzes the critique of the Jaina doctrine of anekāntavāda (non-one-sidedness or multiplexity of reality) by the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti, as presented in his work Pramāṇavārttika (PV) and its commentaries. Balcerowicz aims to identify potential sources of Dharmakīrti's arguments within Jaina literature, scrutinize his understanding and presentation of anekāntavāda, and examine the Jaina responses to his criticism.

Dharmakīrti's Core Argument and Examples:

Dharmakīrti's criticism, found in PV/PVSV 3.181-184, targets the Jaina idea that reality is multifaceted. His central argument hinges on the principle of ekāntavāda (one-sidedness or absolute singularity of character) being the only viable foundation for knowledge and language. He believes that if reality is truly multifaceted as the Jainas claim, it leads to absurd consequences that undermine logical reasoning and communication.

• The Camel and Yoghurt Example: The most famous example Dharmakīrti uses is the Jaina proposition: "A camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt; it is not, in a certain sense, yoghurt." Dharmakīrti argues that if an entity can be described in such contradictory ways, then all distinctions vanish. If a camel can be considered yoghurt, then an injunction to "eat yoghurt" would allow one to eat a camel. This, he contends, would make distinctions meaningless and render specific actions and judgments impossible. He attributes this view to the "shameless" ( ahrikāh) Jainas.
• Rejection of "Both Forms": Dharmakīrti argues against the idea that entities possess "both forms" ( ubhayarūpatve), meaning both their own essential nature and the nature of something else. He posits that if such a dual nature were admitted, distinctions would be revoked.
• Critique of "Everything of Everything": He also attacks the notion that "everything is of the nature of everything" (sarvātmatve ca sarveṣām), arguing that this would lead to the impossibility of distinct cognitions and linguistic units. If everything were identical, there would be no basis for differentiating concepts or words.
• The Problem of Universal Character: Dharmakīrti challenges the Jaina idea that the universal character of entities might consist in the distinction of their essential natures. He questions how language can refer to such distinctions if they are inexpressible.

Jaina Sources and the Interpretation of Anekāntavāda

Balcerowicz dedicates significant portions of the paper to reconstructing the Jaina doctrine of anekāntavāda as Dharmakīrti might have encountered it.

• Syādvāda and Saptabhangī: Dharmakīrti's example of "camel and yoghurt" is identified as a reference to the Jaina syādvāda (the doctrine of conditional predication) and its extension, the saptabhangī (seven-fold syllogism). This doctrine uses the modal operator syāt ("in a certain sense") to assert multiple, seemingly contradictory, aspects of reality from different perspectives (naya).
• Key Jaina Concepts: Balcerowicz highlights core components of anekāntavāda known to Dharmakīrti:
  • The assertion of qualified identity or difference with the modal operator syāt.
  • The idea of entities having "double forms" (both their own and another's nature, or universal and particular).
  • The concept of an atiśaya (ultimate quality) that might differentiate entities.
  • The contention that "everything is of the nature of everything" and the absence of essential distinctions.
  • The possibility of the universal character consisting in the distinction of essential natures.
• Sources: Balcerowicz notes that Dharmakīrti's specific Jaina sources are difficult to pinpoint. However, the examples and arguments he presents are clearly based on established Jaina philosophical concepts like syādvāda, naya, and the seven-fold syllogism. He also examines the role of Jaina commentators like Karnakagomin and Manorathanandin in interpreting Dharmakīrti's arguments and the Jaina doctrine itself.

Jaina Responses to Dharmakīrti's Criticism

The paper details the Jaina counter-arguments, primarily from philosophers like Abhayadevasūri, Vādirājasūri, and Akalankadeva.

• Misrepresentation: The overarching Jaina response is that Dharmakīrti fundamentally misrepresents their doctrine. They claim he attributes to them views they never held.
• The Universal: Jainas argue that Dharmakīrti misunderstands their concept of the universal (sāmānya). They deny having posited a single, synchronic homogeneity between unrelated entities like a camel and yoghurt, based on an "ultimate quality" (atiśaya) or a shared essence in the way Dharmakīrti suggests. They emphasize that their predication is always context-dependent and perspective-based.
• The Camel-Yoghurt Example: Jainas contend that Dharmakīrti's camel-yoghurt example is not an authentic representation of their doctrine, as their typical examples involved more mundane objects like pots or cloth. They suggest Dharmakīrti invented the example to caricature their philosophy.
• The Role of Parameters: Jaina thinkers point out that Dharmakīrti overlooks the crucial role of parameters like substance (dravya), place (kṣetra), time (kāla), and condition (bhāva) in Jaina analysis, which qualify the predication and prevent the absurd conclusions Dharmakīrti draws.
• Substance vs. Mode: They also highlight Dharmakīrti's failure to distinguish between the substantial aspect (dravya) and the modal aspect (paryāya) of reality, which are fundamental to their propositions of existence (syād asti) and non-existence (syān nāsti).
• Ridicule and Counter-Ridicule: The paper notes that Jaina philosophers often responded to Dharmakīrti's sharp and sometimes scornful language (e.g., calling his opponents "shameless") with their own ridicule, portraying Dharmakīrti as a "jester" who misunderstands their philosophy.

Reliability of Dharmakīrti's Account

Balcerowicz concludes that while Dharmakīrti was likely aware of the core tenets of anekāntavāda, his portrayal is often inaccurate and may have been deliberately simplified or caricatured to serve his polemical aims. He argues that Dharmakīrti's objective was not a faithful doxographical report but a strategic refutation, leading him to create simplified, paradoxical examples like the camel and yoghurt to highlight what he perceived as the inherent contradictions in the Jaina system.

In essence, the paper provides a detailed analysis of a significant historical debate in Indian philosophy, showing how a prominent Buddhist critic engaged with and, according to the Jainas, misrepresented a central doctrine of Jainism, and how the Jaina thinkers defended their position against these critiques.