Dharmakirtis And Kumarilas Refutations Of Existence Of God

This paper by Helmut Krasser, "Dharmakirti's and Kumarila's Refutations of the Existence of God: A Consideration of Their Chronological Order," delves into the arguments of two prominent Indian philosophers, the Buddhist Dharmakirti and the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila, concerning the existence of an eternal God as the creator of the world. The central aim of the paper is to investigate the chronological relationship between their respective refutations, particularly the Pramāṇavārttika (PV) of Dharmakirti and the Ślokavārttika (ŚV) of Kumārila, by examining their arguments against theism.

Krasser begins by outlining the scholarly debate surrounding the chronological order of Dharmakirti and Kumārila. Some scholars, like Erich Frauwallner, propose that Dharmakirti's earliest work already engages with Kumārila's critique, and that Kumārila later refines his views in response to Dharmakirti. Others, like John Taber, suggest the reverse, with Kumārila's Ślokavārttika being composed after the Bṛhattīkā and containing arguments that address Dharmakirti's ideas. Krasser emphasizes that his paper will approach this question by considering material not previously utilized, specifically focusing on their refutations of the concept of an eternal creator God.

The paper then moves to analyze Dharmakirti's refutation in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of his Pramāṇavārttika. Dharmakirti argues that proofs for an eternal creator are flawed, citing logical faults such as "proving what is already accepted" (iṣṭasiddhi), "the probandum not being established in the example" (asiddhir vā dṛṣṭānte), and "doubt" (saṃśayo 'thavā). These criticisms are directed at arguments presented by earlier thinkers like Aviddhakarna and Uddyotakara, who posited a conscious cause for the universe based on its specific configuration and purposefulness, drawing parallels with earthly objects like pots.

Dharmakirti contends that such arguments fail because the observed property (e.g., "having a specific configuration") in the example (e.g., a pot) is not identical to the same property in the subject of the proof (the universe), even if the same word is used. He uses analogies like inferring fire from snow because both are white to illustrate this faulty reasoning. He also clarifies that his critique does not constitute the fallacy of kāryasama (similarity to the effect). Krasser notes that Dharmakirti classifies these logical faults under asiddha (unestablished) in his Pramāṇaviniscaya.

The paper then posits that Dharmakirti's refutations in PV II 10 might be explained by the arguments presented in Kumārila's Ślokavārttika. Krasser examines a section in the Sambandhākṣepaparihāra of the Ślokavārttika where Kumārila addresses Aviddhakarna's proof. Kumārila's critique mirrors Dharmakirti's by arguing that:

• Proving what is already accepted (iṣṭasiddhi): Kumārila argues that if "governance" means merely being a cause, then this is already accepted by Mīmāṃsakas who believe in karma as the cause of all beings' experiences. Even if "will" is introduced, past actions (karma) already presuppose this will.
• The probandum not being established in the example (asiddhir vā dṛṣṭānte): Kumārila suggests that God's own body, which has an origin and specific configuration but is not governed by another conscious being, serves as a counter-example where the proposed reason is present but the conclusion is absent. This makes the argument inconclusive (anēkānta). He also argues that if pots are governed by potters, they are not governed by God, thus lacking the property to be proven. If they are governed by God, then the example itself is flawed.
• Doubt (saṃśayo 'thavā): Kumārila highlights the problem of infinite regression if God's body needs to be governed by another conscious being. He also raises the issue of unconscious atoms obeying God's will if God creates without a physical body like a potter does with tools. Furthermore, he argues that the reason becomes contradictory if it implies that the universe is created by a non-God and perishable being.

Krasser then demonstrates the significant correspondence between Kumārila's arguments and how Dharmakirti's commentators (like Prajñākaragupta and Devendrabuddhi) explain his refutations. They illustrate the logical faults (e.g., iṣṭasiddhi, asiddhir vā dṛṣṭānte, saṃśayo 'thavā) in a manner that closely aligns with Kumārila's exposition. This leads Krasser to conclude that Dharmakirti was likely aware of Kumārila's critique when formulating his own refutations. He suggests that Dharmakirti may have found it sufficient to allude to some of the faults already elaborated by Kumārila, without needing to repeat all of them, and that his commentators' explanations reflect this shared understanding.

In essence, the paper establishes a strong link between Dharmakirti and Kumārila's arguments against the existence of a creator God, suggesting a potential influence of Kumārila on Dharmakirti, or at least a shared intellectual landscape where similar refutations were being developed and discussed. This analysis contributes to the ongoing scholarly debate about the chronological order and intellectual interactions between these two influential figures.