Definite And Indefinite

Here's a comprehensive summary of George Burch's "The Definite and the Indefinite," focusing on its exploration of these fundamental philosophical categories across various traditions:

The essay "The Definite and the Indefinite" by George Burch argues that the fundamental philosophical debate throughout history has revolved around the contrasting values assigned to the definite and the indefinite. These two categories are presented as the bedrock of all other philosophical concepts.

Burch begins by highlighting Chinese philosophy as a prime example of this dichotomy, epitomized by the Confucian and Taoist traditions. Confucianism champions order, rationality, symmetry, and definiteness, advocating for structured social and political life, adherence to rituals, and ordered inner lives. In contrast, Taoism embraces spontaneity, asymmetry, naturalness, and indefiniteness, encouraging individuals to follow instincts, minimize government, and align with the natural flow of existence. Burch notes that while Confucianism shaped China's political system, Taoism and Buddhism fostered its renowned poetry and art, where asymmetry is a key aesthetic principle. He suggests that the Confucian-Taoist distinction isn't about distinct individuals or faiths but rather about differing concerns and attitudes – a shift in interest from the definite to the indefinite.

Moving to ancient Indian thought, Burch observes the presence of both attitudes. The Vedic period and Brahmanas emphasized definite aspects of nature and ritualized societal structures. However, the Upanishads shifted towards seeking an indefinite reality beyond phenomena, often associated with a hermit's life. Burch contends that the Upanishadic perspective ultimately prevailed, dominating Indian philosophy. He identifies Vedanta and Buddhism as the two most influential schools, both of which, despite their differences, tend to devalue the material world of definite things and the mental world of definite minds. For them, the definite is seen as problematic – caused by desire, a mere manifestation, or illusion – while the good lies in merging with the indefinite being of Nirvana or Brahman, characterized by formlessness, indefinite consciousness, and bliss. While acknowledging some reality to the definite world, Indian philosophies prioritize the indefinite. These philosophies are often approached with a religious or quasi-religious spirit, aiming for release from suffering and requiring a change of attitude rather than the acquisition of new facts.

In European thought, Burch traces the initial influence of both attitudes back to Greek philosophy. Anaximander identified ultimate reality with the indefinite (apeiron), from which definite things emerge and into which they return, viewing definiteness as inherently unjust. Conversely, Pythagoras and his followers saw nature as a blend of the indefinite and the definite, with the definite representing good, order, and intelligibility through number and proportion.

Burch argues that the Pythagorean ideal of definiteness, particularly its emphasis on quantitative precision, has been dominant in Western civilization. This influence is evident in Plato's theory of Forms, which posits reality in definite, intelligible forms, and Aristotle's focus on qualitative definiteness, though he acknowledged the necessity of "matter" (the indefinite) as potentiality. Later Greek philosophers, Stoics and Epicureans alike, aligned with definiteness. While Plotinus exalted the indefinite, Burch argues he identified it with Plato's Good, a definite idea. Even Christian philosophers, while some mystics praised the indefinite, generally followed the Greek tradition, conceiving of God in definite terms (e.g., the Trinity). This trend continued with Descartes' emphasis on mathematical knowledge and Newton's description of the physical world through definite forces. Modern science, from Locke's definite ideas to contemporary quantum theory, also largely glorifies definiteness. Burch acknowledges recent trends like Freud's unconscious, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, and Bergson's intuitionism as signs of a potential revolt against this dominance, but argues they haven't fundamentally altered the Western philosophical outlook.

Kant is presented as a unique case, neither definitively for nor against either. He distinguished between the definite phenomenal world (structured by categories) and the indefinite "thing-in-itself." However, his stance on which is truly real remains ambiguous.

Burch posits that the controversy between champions of the definite and the indefinite is more about concern or evaluation than about objective fact. This leads him to propose a resolution to the paradox of perennial philosophy: while there's a perennial philosophy of insight (agreement on facts about being), there's no perennial philosophy of evaluation (differing reactions to those facts). Philosophers agree on the structural facts about being – the existence of definite form and indefinite formlessness, and the force that bridges them – but disagree on their value judgments and preferences.

The essay then details how the definite aspect of being is universally recognized as the world of ordinary experience, with definite things known through senses and intellect. However, how this world is named reveals our evaluation: "civilization," "harmony," "cosmos," "ideas," "substances," "creatures," or "universe" if liked; "artificial convention," "illusion," "suffering," "injustice," or "sin" if disliked; or "phenomenal world" if neutral. Similarly, the indefinite aspect is described as imperceptible, unintelligible, and ineffable, known through feeling. It's called "way of nature," "Brahman," "Nirvana," "the Indefinite," or "ecstasy" if liked; and "barbarism," "discord," "chaos," "necessity," "matter," "nihilo," or "thermodynamic equilibrium" if disliked; or "thing-in-itself" if neutral.

The force that brings definite being out of the indefinite is identified as a major metaphysical problem. Its names reflect our evaluations: "nature," "number," "mind," "demiurge," "unmoved mover," "God," "radiant energy" (laudatory); "corruption," "ignorance," "desire," "separation," "pride" (disparaging); or "categories of the understanding," "division of nature" (neutral). The reversion of the definite to the indefinite occurs when this force ceases to operate.

Burch draws a distinction between active participation in society (associated with Confucianism, Pythagoreanism, Platonism, Aristotelianism, Christianity, and modern science) and withdrawal from society (associated with Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christian monasticism), linking these to attitudes towards the definite and indefinite.

The core thesis is further elaborated by suggesting that the "same metaphysical facts seem to be called by different names in accordance with our different temperamental reactions." He uses the example of Brahman (Vedanta) and Aristotle's matter, arguing that while the labels differ, their intrinsic nature as an ineffable, formless ground of potentiality is similar. The difference lies in the evaluation – "alas!" for Vedanta (form arising from formless) versus "hurrah!" for Aristotelianism.

Burch asserts that while incompatible insights into being are impossible except through error, incompatible evaluations are necessary due to varying temperaments. He concludes that disputes about tastes (evaluations) are not only permissible but enriching, contrasting the universal nature of science (insight) with the diverse artistry of philosophy and culture (evaluation). He advocates for philosophers to engage in these disputes not as adversaries but as artists sharing their appreciated values, acknowledging that within the realm of the definite, there are also alternative philosophies (realism, materialism, idealism) based on which aspect (form, stuff, or knowability) is emphasized.

Finally, he introduces K. C. Bhattacharya's concept of alternative forms of the absolute (synonymous with the indefinite). These approaches – freeing the object from categories, freeing the subject from forms, or freeing experience from the subject-object dichotomy – result in "truth," "freedom," and "value." These are three "alternative formlessnesses" of the absolute, exemplified by the formula "thou art that," which can be stressed on "that" (Brahman), "thou" (Atman), or "art" (Moksha).

In essence, Burch argues that philosophy is characterized by active human interpretation and commitment to either the definite or the indefinite, leading to diverse but equally valid "peaks" or philosophies, rather than a single, unified truth. Science deals with noncommittal facts, while philosophy thrives on committed, artistic portrayals of those facts through evaluation.