Darshan Shabda Ka Visheshartha - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Darshan Shabda ka Visheshartha" by Sukhlal Sanghavi, focusing on the sixth point of discussion:

The text "Darshan Shabda ka Visheshartha" by Sukhlal Sanghavi, found in "Z_Darshan_aur_Chintan_Part_1_2_002661.pdf" from Jain Education International, delves into the multifaceted meaning of the term "Darshan" within Jain tradition. While "Darshan" is commonly understood in various traditions to mean visual perception ("ghatdarshan"), direct experience or realization ("atmadarshan"), or a specific school of thought ("Nyaya-Darshan"), the Jain tradition imbues it with two additional, less universally recognized meanings: faith or conviction (Shraddhan) and mere general cognition or observation (Samanya-bodh or Alochan matra). The author focuses the discussion on this latter meaning of "Darshan" as mere general cognition.

The text then proceeds to discuss six points related to this concept of "Darshan" as general cognition:

Existence: Most traditions accept a form of general cognition where an object is perceived in its un-differentiated essence, though they may use different terms. Jain tradition calls this "Darshan." Indian philosophical traditions like Nyaya-Vaisheshika, Sankhya-Yoga, and Mimamsa, as well as Buddhism, acknowledge a "Nirvikalpaka" (undifferentiated) cognition as the initial stage of knowledge acquisition. However, some Vedanta traditions (Madhva, Vallabha) and the Shaktivada tradition (Bharthrihari) deny the existence of any cognition devoid of some specific characteristic or relation. They argue that even the primary stage of knowledge involves some form of predication.
Worldly vs. Otherworldly: Traditions that accept the existence of "Nirvikalpaka" generally accept the worldly "Nirvikalpaka" arising from sensory contact. The question here is about the existence of the otherworldly "Nirvikalpaka." Both Jain and Buddhist traditions posit such cognition arising from yogic powers or special soul-strength, independent of sensory contact. In Buddhism, this is known as "Yogisambodhana," while in Jainism, it's "Avadhidarshan" and "Kevaldarshan." Since Nyaya-Vaisheshika, Sankhya-Yoga, and Mimamsa accept the existence of yogis and their extraordinary knowledge, they do not seem to have an obstacle to accepting otherworldly "Nirvikalpaka." Thus, it's suggested that all "Nirvikalpaka" proponents accept both worldly and otherworldly forms.
Nature of the Object: All proponents of "Nirvikalpaka" consider existence itself as the object of this cognition, but they differ on the nature of existence. For Buddhists, only "arthakriyakaritva" (functional efficacy) is true, confined to momentary individuals. For Shankar Vedanta, the absolute, all-pervading Brahman is existence. Nyaya-Vaisheshika and Mimamsa consider existence as pure being or as "jati" (universal), distinct from the Buddhist and Vedantic concepts. Sankhya-Yoga and Jain traditions, being proponents of "parinaminityatva" (transformational permanence), consider existence to be characterized by origination, decay, and permanence. Regardless of these differences, it's undisputed that all "Nirvikalpaka" proponents assert existence as the object of "Nirvikalpaka."
Direct vs. Indirect: While some cognition can be both indirect and direct (like savikalpaka), "Nirvikalpaka" is considered exclusively direct by all its proponents. This is because it arises without the mediation of other cognitions and is therefore immediate. However, the Jain tradition classifies "Darshan" as also indirect. According to logical definitions, "mati-jnana" (sense-based cognition) is considered "samvyavaharika-pratyaksha" (conventional direct perception). Therefore, "Darshan," the initial cognition in the process of "mati-upayoga," can also be called "samvyavaharika-pratyaksha." But according to the older scriptural classification, which doesn't distinguish between absolute and conventional direct perception, "mati-jnana" is considered purely indirect, as seen in Tattvartha Sutra (1.11). Thus, according to the Jain tradition, sense-originating "Darshan" is indirect, not direct. In essence, according to the logical definition, "Darshan" in Jainism is both direct and indirect. "Avadhi" and "Kevala" "Darshan" are purely direct, while sense-originating "Darshan," though indirect, is considered "samvyavaharika-pratyaksha." However, according to the scriptural tradition, sense-originating "Darshan" is merely indirect, while "Avadhi" and other "Darshans" independent of senses are purely direct.
Causative Factors: The worldly "Nirvikalpaka," which is "samvyavaharika-darshan" in Jain logic, arises from the conjunction of the object and the sense, along with the presence of the light, as far as possible. The otherworldly "Nirvikalpaka," which is "paramarthika-darshan" in Jainism, is said to arise solely from special soul-power, independent of sensory contact. In terms of causative factors, Jain and non-Jain traditions generally agree. However, Shankar Vedanta holds a different view, believing that even the undifferentiated Brahman cognition arising from Mahavakyas like "Tattvamasi" is "Nirvikalpaka." According to this view, words, etc., also become causative factors for "Nirvikalpaka," which is not accepted by other traditions.
Validity (Pramananya): Non-Jain traditions are also not unanimous regarding the validity of "Nirvikalpaka." Buddhist and Vedanta philosophies consider "Nirvikalpaka" as proof itself, and indeed as the primary and ultimate proof. In Nyaya-Vaisheshika, there isn't a single established view on the validity of "Nirvikalpaka." According to the ancient tradition, "Nirvikalpaka" is considered "prama" (valid cognition), as explained by Shridhara and Vishvanatha. However, in Ganesh's modern tradition, "Nirvikalpaka" is considered neither valid nor invalid. According to this view, being devoid of the characteristics of "prama" or "aprama," "Nirvikalpaka" is distinct from both. Following Nyaya-Vaisheshika, Mimamsa and Sankhya-Yoga also hold similar views on the validity of "Nirvikalpaka." The Jain tradition's view on this matter is particularly noteworthy.

In the Jain tradition, the question of validity arose only with the advent of the age of logic, not before. Earlier, there was only a scriptural perspective, where the question of calling "Darshan-upayoga" valid or invalid did not arise. According to that perspective, whether "Darshan" or "Jnana" (knowledge), it could be either right or wrong, and this rightness or wrongness was considered in accordance with spiritual states. If a soul possessed at least the fourth stage of spiritual development (i.e., attained "samyaktva"), then any of its cognitions, general or specific, were considered to be on the path to liberation and thus "samyak" (right). Accordingly, from a scriptural viewpoint, the "Darshan-upayoga" of a soul possessing "samyaktva" is "samyakdarshan," and the "Darshan-upayoga" of a soul with "mithyadrsti" (wrong view) is "mithyadarshan." In practice, even "Darshan" understood as wrong, deluded, or fallacious is considered "samyakdarshan" if it belongs to a soul possessing "samyaktva," while even "Darshan-upayoga" understood as true, non-deluded, and unhindered is considered "mithyadarshan" if it belongs to a soul with "mithyadrsti."

This relative description of the rightness and wrongness of "Darshan" from a scriptural perspective should be understood based on the fact that the commentator Abhayadeva considered "Darshan" also as proof, and similarly, Upadhyaya Yashovijaya considered cognitions like doubt as "samyak" when associated with "samyakdrsti." However, the ancient scriptural tradition, common to both Shvetambara and Digambara, does not hold this view. According to both traditions, "Chakshu" (vision), "Achakshu" (non-vision), and "Avadhi" (clairvoyant vision) are all considered "Darshan." None of these are inherently "samyak" or "mithya" or both. Unlike "mati-jnana," "shruta-jnana," and "avadhi-jnana," which are divided into "samyak" and "mithya," "Darshan" is simply "Darshan." This implies that "Darshan-upayoga," being formless, cannot have the distinction of "samyakdrsti" or "mithyadrsti" applied to it. Whether it's ocular, non-ocular, or clairvoyant, it's just "Darshan." It should be called neither "samyakdarshan" nor "mithyadarshan." This is why "Darshan" is considered the same in the first spiritual stage as in the fourth. Acharya Siddhasena has indicated this in the "Gandhahasti" commentary: "Just as there is a distinction between right and wrong views in the case of form-perceiving cognition, it is not so in the case of Darshan, because in the formless state, both are similar."

This is the scriptural perspective. However, with the entry of logic into the Jain tradition, the question of validity or invalidity arose, and the consideration began to be based on the object rather than spiritual states, as was being done by logicians in other traditions. From this logical perspective, the question arises: does the Jain tradition consider "Darshan" as valid, invalid, both, or neither?

Even from a logical perspective, there is no uniformity in the Jain tradition regarding the validity or invalidity of "Darshan." Generally, both Shvetambara and Digambara logicians place "Darshan" outside the category of proof. This is because they refute the validity of "Nirvikalpaka" as accepted by the Buddhists, and by including terms like "visheshopayoga-bodhaka jnana" (knowledge indicating specific use) and "nirnaya" (determination) in their definitions of proof, they consider the general "upayoga" known as "Darshan" to be outside the definition of proof. Thus, the logical tradition of not considering "Darshan" as proof is common in all Shvetambara and Digambara texts. Manikyanandi and Vadi Devasuri not only placed "Darshan" outside the scope of proof but also called it "pramanabhas" (fallacious proof).

Abhayadeva, the commentator on Sanmati, considered "Darshan" as proof, but that statement should not be understood from a logical perspective. While explaining Sanmati in accordance with the scriptures, he kept the scriptural perspective in mind and called "Darshan" proof in the sense of "samyakdarshan," not proof based on the object from a logical standpoint. This distinction is evident from his context.

However, there appears to be some contradiction in the views of Upadhyaya Yashovijaya regarding the validity and invalidity of "Darshan." On one hand, he describes "Darshan" as the subsequent "Nishchayika avagraha" after "Vyanjanavagraha," which, being a mental process, can fall into the category of proof. On the other hand, in his commentary on Vadi Devasuri's verse defining proof, while explaining the purpose of the word "jnana," he places "Darshan" outside the category of proof. Thus, in his statements, "Darshan" is completely outside proof on one hand, and on the other hand, being "avagraha," it is eligible to be in the category of proof. However, it seems his intention is something else. It is possible that his intention is that even though it is a mental aspect, the "Nishchayika avagraha" should not be counted as proof because it is not capable of initiating or preventing behavior. With this intention, he declared "Darshan" to be outside the category of proof, and in that case, there remains no contradiction.

Acharya Hemachandra, in his "Pramanmimamsa," presents three points related to "Darshan." While describing the nature of "Avagraha," he states that "Darshan," which is "Avikalpaka," is not "Avagraha," but it is the causal antecedent of "Avagraha" and arises after the contact of the sense and the object and before "Avagraha." Describing the "Nirvikalpaka" cognition accepted by the Buddhists as invalid, he states that it is not proof because it is "anadhyavasaaya" (undetermined); only "adhyavasaaya" or "nirnaya" (determination) should be considered proof. While explaining the meaning of "nirnaya," he states that it is cognition that is different from "anadhyavasaaya" and is both "Avikalpaka" and different from doubt. From all these statements of the Acharya, it is concluded that he considers the "Darshan" famous in the Jain tradition and the "Nirvikalpaka" famous in the Buddhist tradition to be the same, and considering "Darshan" as lacking determination, he deems it not proof. And this invalidity is from a logical perspective, not from a scriptural perspective, as all Jain logicians, except Abhayadeva, have maintained. The "Darshan" which is the causal antecedent of "Avagraha" as stated by Acharya Hemachandra should be understood as the "Nishchayika avagraha" of Upadhyaya Ji.