Darsanamarga Section Of Abhidharmasamuccaya And Its Interpretation By Tibetan Commentators

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The article by L. Schmithausen examines the "Darsanamarga" (Path of Vision or Insight), a crucial stage in the Buddhist path to salvation, as presented in the Abhidharmasamuccaya (AS) attributed to Asanga, and its subsequent interpretation by Tibetan commentators.

1. The Darsanamarga in Buddhism: The Darsanamarga is defined as the initial, direct, and adequate comprehension of Truth. It's the stage that eradicates defilements (klesa) and obstacles (avarana), although not all of them. Subsequent stages often involve a repetition of this profound insight, making it a decisive phase.

2. The Abhidharmasamuccaya's Approach: Schmithausen notes that the AS presents four distinct definitions or characterizations of the Darsanamarga:

• First Definition (Summary): Characterizes it as "non-perception" or "non-apprehension" (anupalambha) of the dichotomy between the apprehended (grāhya) and the apprehending (grāhaka) – subject and object imagined as separate. This definition, reminiscent of Prajnaparamita literature and Yogacara texts, signifies a cessation of ordinary, dualistic experience, leading to the manifestation of non-dual reality (Dharmadhatu).
• Second Definition (Summary): Describes it as a comprehension where the cognized and the cognizer are "the same or alike" (sama samalambyālambakajñana). This points to a non-conceptualizing knowledge (nirvikalpa-jñana) that apprehends True Reality (Tathata) as its own essence. While originating from Śrāvaka traditions, its application in the AS is Mahāyānist.
• Third Definition (Summary): Analyzes the Darsanamarga into three stages of comprehension, focusing on the "essencelessness of person" (pudgalanairatmya) and "essencelessness of dharmas" (dharmanairatmya), and then extending this insight to all phenomena. It's a mix of Śrāvaka and Mahāyāna elements.
• Fourth Definition (Detailed): Appears purely "Hinayanist," describing the Darsanamarga as a process of sixteen moments, focusing on the traditional Four Noble Truths. Each Truth is approached through four cognitive phases. While structurally similar to Vaibhasika views, the AS's specific interpretation of these phases is unique and considered artificial. The AS defines the four phases as:
  1. Dharmajñānakṣānti: Undefiled perception of the Noble Truth.
  2. Dharmajñāna: Perception of liberation achieved in the first phase.
  3. Anvayajñānakṣānti: Cognizing the first two phases.
  4. Anvayajñāna: Confirming the third phase.

Schmithausen highlights that the AS presents these definitions as heterogeneous, potentially contradictory, and simply juxtaposed without aiming for complete doctrinal coherence. The author seems to have arranged them from apophatic and unitary to cataphatic and analytical, and from purely Mahāyāna to mixed and finally "Hinayana" characterizations. The task of achieving doctrinal consistency was thus left to commentators.

3. The Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāşya (ASBh) Interpretation: The ASBh, an Indian commentary, attempts to unify these definitions:

• It interprets the fourth definition's phases in terms of apprehending the Tathata (true essence) of each Truth and the "transformation of the basis" (āśrayaparivṛtti). This makes the latter two phases more compatible with the first three definitions.
• The ASBh views the first three definitions as highlighting different aspects of the Darsanamarga: the formal aspect (calmness and insight free from conceptualization), the content (Tathata characterized by the absence of subject-object dichotomy), and what is not the content (nimittas or pseudo-objective correlates).
• It also asserts that the AS's detailed explanation is a pedagogical tool, with the true nature of the Darsanamarga only accessible through direct experience.
• However, the ASBh does not explicitly address whether these descriptions apply to Śrāvaka or Bodhisattva Darsanamarga.

4. Tibetan Commentaries and Bu ston Rin chen grub: Schmithausen focuses on Bu ston Rin chen grub's commentary, noting its detail and reliance on the ASBh, often elaborating on its points.

• Bu ston's Interpretation of Definitions:

  • He aligns the ASBh's concept of nirvikalpa (non-conceptualizing) with the AS's anupalambha.
  • Bu ston offers word-explanations, some of which are questioned by Schmithausen for potentially deviating from the original intent of the AS or its sources.
  • He largely accepts the ASBh's attempt to harmonize the four definitions, seeing them as complementary aspects rather than contradictory.
  • Crucially, Bu ston attempts to reconcile the AS's exposition with the Abhisamayālamkāra tradition. He argues that the sixteen-moment theory of the fourth definition, while primarily Śrāvaka-oriented, can be applied to Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas with qualifications. This includes the removal of obstacles to knowing (jñeyāvaraṇa) for the latter two, a concept not explicitly in the AS.
  • He also views the third definition as applicable to both vehicles, interpreting the Śrāvaka's limited perception of dharmanairātmya as sufficient for the definition's negative requirements.
  • Bu ston, following the ASBh, interprets the second definition (sama samalambyālambakajñana) as the comprehension of grāhyagrāhakābhāvatathatā (Tathata characterized by the absence of subject-object dichotomy). This interpretation, however, seems to preclude its application to the Śrāvaka Darsanamarga, a point later commentators like Gyal tshab rje and Bo don also suggest, while Śākya mchog ldan attempts to make it applicable to both vehicles by distinguishing between person-related and dharma-related object-subject dichotomies.

• Key Contributions of Bu ston:

  • Integration with Abhisamayālamkāra: Bu ston systematically integrates materials from the Abhisamayālamkāra tradition into his interpretation of the AS, particularly regarding the stages of the Bodhisattva path, which goes beyond the AS itself. This includes concepts like interrupting the Darsanamarga with meditative practices and the gradual versus simultaneous removal of defilements.
  • Addressing Vehicle Differences: He actively tries to make the AS's descriptions applicable to all Buddhist "vehicles" (yānas), explicitly addressing how the analytical description of the Darsanamarga can be understood for Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas.
  • Scholarly Rigor: Schmithausen acknowledges Bu ston's detailed analysis and his refutation of alternative interpretations of the AS's Darsanamarga section, demonstrating a deep engagement with the text and its doctrinal implications.

5. Conclusion: Schmithausen concludes that Indian and Tibetan commentators, particularly Bu ston, worked diligently to create doctrinal consistency from the heterogeneous materials presented in the AS. While the AS itself might have simply collected traditional materials, the commentators, through their interpretations, undertook the task of harmonization. Bu ston's significant contribution lies in his fusion of the AS with the Abhisamayālamkāra tradition, providing a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the Darsanamarga, especially as it relates to the Bodhisattva path, even if some of these elements are not explicitly present in the original AS text. Bu ston is seen as historically accurate in emphasizing the detailed, analytical fourth definition and in acknowledging the "Śrāvakayānist" character of much of the AS material.