Conceptualizations Of Being In Classical Vaisesika

Added to library: September 1, 2025

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Summary

This article, "Conceptualizations Of Being In Classical Vaisesika" by Wilhelm Halbfass, published by Wilhelm Halbfass, explores the complex and often overlooked concepts of "being" (sattā, bhāva, astitva, sattāsambandha, svātmasattva) within classical Indian Vaišeṣika philosophy. Halbfass argues that while much recent scholarship has focused on "non-being" (abhāva), the foundational concept of "being" itself deserves more thorough investigation.

Here's a breakdown of the key points:

1. The Neglect of "Being":

  • Halbfass begins by highlighting that "being" (sattā, bhāva) as the highest universal (param sāmānyam) is acknowledged but its precise implications and relationship with other terms like astitva, sattāsambandha, and svātmasattva remain underexplored.
  • He suggests that the focus on "non-being" is incomplete without understanding its counterpart, "being," and that Western philosophical terms like "existence" and "essence" can sometimes obscure the Indian nuances.

2. Early Vaišeṣika and the Terms for "Being":

  • The author notes that the Vaišeṣikasūtras of Kaṇāda use sattā and bhāva to represent "being" as the most pervasive common feature of the three primary categories: substance (dravya), quality (guṇa), and action (karman).
  • He speculates that Kaṇāda's initial philosophical program might have been focused on naming and enumerating these categories, with "being" serving as the implicit background for this classification. The authenticity of certain sutras related to "being" and "non-being" is questioned.

3. The Nuances of Sattā and Bhāva:

  • Sattā and bhāva are generally synonymous in the Sūtras, representing "beingness" or "existence" without a direct contrast to "essence." They provide a common ground for all existing things, facilitating classification.
  • Bhāva is noted as being more flexible and having non-terminological uses, while sattā has a more strictly technical role.

4. Prasastapāda's Innovations:

  • The article heavily focuses on Prasastapāda's Padārthadharmasamgraha and its commentaries, as this text is considered a crucial development in Vaišeṣika thought.
  • Prasastapāda introduces the term astitva ("is-ness") as a "common abstract attribute" (sādharmya). He associates astitva with the applicability of the word "is" and the fact that something has an objective basis for being identified, recognized, and distinguished. This connects to "knowableness" (jñeyatva) and "nameableness" (abhidheyatva).
  • He also introduces two distinct ways of "being":
    • Sattāsambandha: "connection with beingness," applied to the three primary categories (dravya, guṇa, karman). This term implies a more "manifest" and potentially temporal or impermanent mode of being.
    • Svātmasattva: "beingness of, or by virtue of, the own nature," applied to the remaining categories: universals (sāmānya), ultimate differences (viseṣa), and inherence (samavāya). This signifies an intrinsic, eternal, and unchangeable mode of being.

5. Interpretations and Critiques:

  • Halbfass discusses various attempts by scholars (Hiriyanna, Patti, Vetter) to translate and interpret these terms, noting their limitations in fully capturing the Indian concepts.
  • He highlights how later commentators like Śridhara and Udayana grapple with Prasastapāda's distinctions, sometimes revealing inherent tensions.
  • The article notes criticisms from other schools of Indian philosophy (Buddhists, Jains, Mimāmsakas, Vedāntins) regarding the Vaišeṣika conception of sattā as a pervasive universal.
  • Critiques often focus on the problem of infinite regress (anavastha) when sattā itself is considered an entity that "is."
  • The distinction between sattā and astitva becomes a point of contention, with later thinkers questioning whether sattā adds anything to the inherent nature (svarūpa) of an individual thing.

6. The Ambivalence of Classical Vaišeṣika:

  • Halbfass argues that the Vaišeṣika approach to "being" is characterized by an inherent ambivalence, stemming from an attempt to integrate an enumerative, nature-oriented philosophy with a categorial analysis.
  • This leads to a tendency to present categorial findings in an enumerative format, where even abstract attributes like sattā are treated as separate, juxtaposable entities.
  • The Vaišeṣika dravya is distinct from other philosophical conceptions of "thing" due to this analytical dissection.
  • The need to restore unity to the world through the postulation of "inherence" (samavāya) after such dissection is also pointed out.

7. Conclusion:

  • Astitva is seen as encompassing the entire realm of categories and representing a "being" that is not a logically separable attribute like sattā.
  • Sattā and astitva represent two different levels of philosophical reflection.
  • While Prasastapāda's attempt to integrate these levels shows systematic insight, the system remains vulnerable to criticism and doesn't foster a robust tradition of ontology.
  • Sattā becomes increasingly fossilized, while astitva tends to evaporate into mere objectivity or thematicity with epistemological reflection.
  • Despite its perceived limitations, the Vaišeṣika conceptualization of "being" served as a crucial catalyst for critical responses and the subsequent development of Indian ontology.

In essence, Halbfass's article provides a detailed analysis of how classical Vaišeṣika philosophers conceptualized "being," tracing the development from early sattā and bhāva to Prasastapāda's more complex distinctions of astitva, sattāsambandha, and svātmasattva. He emphasizes the systematic efforts and inherent tensions within this framework, ultimately positioning it as a significant, albeit not entirely successful, attempt to define the fundamental nature of reality in Indian thought.