Comparative Study Of Jaina Theories Of Reality And Knowledge

Here's a comprehensive summary of "A Comparative Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge" by Y. J. Padmarajiah:

Overall Goal: The book, a posthumously published doctoral thesis from Oxford University, undertakes a rigorous comparative analysis of Jaina theories of reality (ontology) and knowledge (epistemology) against the backdrop of other major Indian philosophical schools (Vedanta, Buddhism, Samkhya, Nyaya-Vaisheshika, Mimamsa, etc.) and relevant Western philosophical concepts (Hegelianism, Kant, Whitehead, Bertrand Russell). The author's aim is to highlight the unique contributions of Jaina philosophy, particularly its concept of "identity-in-difference," and to demonstrate its sophistication and consistency, especially when contrasted with perceived limitations in other systems.

Part I: Ontology (The Nature of Reality)

• Central Thesis: Padmarajiah argues that a balanced and adequate understanding of reality requires a co-ordinate synthesis of identity and difference, rather than an absolutist emphasis on one over the other. He proposes a five-fold classification of ontological approaches:

  1. Philosophy of Being or Identity (e.g., Advaita Vedanta).
  2. Philosophy of Becoming or Difference (e.g., Buddhism).
  3. Philosophy subordinating Difference to Identity (e.g., Samkhya, some Bhedābheda systems like Rāmānuja, Hegelianism).
  4. Philosophy subordinating Identity to Difference (e.g., Vaisheshika, Dvaita of Madhva).
  5. Philosophy co-ordinating Identity and Difference (Jainism).

• Critique of Opposing Views:

  • Vedanta (Advaita): Critiqued for its monism based on "identity alone" (abheda) and its doctrine of vivartavāda (illusory transformation), which Padmarajiah argues leads to a denigration of the empirical world and a problematic concept of an absolute, attributeless Brahman. Sankara's charge of contradiction against Jainism for holding contradictory attributes (like being and non-being) simultaneously is addressed.
  • Buddhism: Critiqued for its extreme focus on "difference alone" (bheda) and its doctrine of momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda), leading to a philosophy of flux and substancelessness (anatta). The Buddhist charge of contradiction against Jainism is also discussed.
  • Samkhya: While recognizing the interplay of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, the system is seen as subordinating difference to identity due to its emphasis on satkāryavāda (the effect pre-exists in the cause).
  • Bhedābheda Systems (Bhartṛprapañca, Bhāskara, Yādava, Nimbārka, Rāmānuja): These are examined for their attempts to reconcile identity and difference. While acknowledging their contribution, Padmarajiah finds them ultimately subordinating difference to identity, often through the concept of brahmapariņāmavāda (Brahman's real transformation), or struggling with the implications of satkāryavāda. Nimbārka's attempt at a svābhāvika (natural) bhedābheda is noted, but still seen as having dependent elements. Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita is characterized as a "temperate monism" where identity (Brahman) remains primary.
  • Hegelianism: Compared to Jainism for its dialectical synthesis of identity and difference, but ultimately criticized for its absolutism and "panlogism" (mentalism), which subordinates difference to an all-encompassing Absolute. The Jaina distinction between a "conjunctive synthesis" (Hegel) and a "disjunctive synthesis" (Jainism) is highlighted.
  • Vaiseșika: Critiqued for its atomistic pluralism and extreme emphasis on viśeṣa (difference/particularity), leading to a "subordination of identity to difference." The problematic nature of samavāya (necessary relation) as an external entity is also discussed.
  • Dvaita (Madhva): Further intensifies the emphasis on difference (viśeṣa) to the point where it is considered the very "stuff of the cosmos." While acknowledging identity (saviśeṣābhedavāda), it is ultimately seen as subordinate to difference.

• Jaina Philosophy of Identity-in-Difference (Anekāntavāda):

  • Core Principle: Reality is characterized by utpāda (origination/change), vyaya (destruction/change), and dhrauvya (permanence/continuity). These are co-ordinate and integral aspects, not contradictory ones.
  • Defense Against Criticism: Padmarajiah addresses criticisms like virodha (contradiction), vyadhikaraṇatā (lack of common abode), anavasthā (infinite regress), śaṅkara (confusion), vyatikara (exchange of natures), saṁsaya (doubt), apratipatti (non-apprehension), and viśayavyavasthāhāni (indeterminability). He argues these arise from misinterpreting the Jaina concept of determinate negation and the integral nature of identity and difference.
  • Ubhayavāda vs. Jātyantaravāda: The author distinguishes between ubhayavāda (externalistic combination of identity and difference, like in Vaiseṣika) and Jātyantaravāda (Jaina doctrine of unique and integral synthesis). Ubhayavāda is criticized for its mechanistic approach and externalism, while Jātyantaravāda emphasizes the unique character of each real arising from the integral synthesis of its constituent identity and difference.
  • Confirmation from Western Thinkers: Padmarajiah finds support for the Jaina view of co-existing permanence and change in A. N. Whitehead (union of permanence and flux), Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (threefold character of reality: production, continuance, destruction), and Immanuel Kant (substance as dynamic energy in perpetual change).
  • Dravya and Guņa/Paryāya: The book delves into controversies regarding these core ontological categories.
    • Dravya as Concrete Universal: Padmarajiah refutes the attempt by some critics to equate the Jaina dravya with the Hegelian "concrete universal," highlighting the Jaina insistence on the co-ordinate status of difference and its realistic, rather than idealistic, foundation.
    • Guņa vs. Paryāya: The differing views are presented: Abhedavāda (synonymous), Bhedavāda (distinct), and Bhedābhedavāda (identical yet distinct). Padmarajiah leans towards the Bhedābhedavāda perspective, suggesting a nuanced understanding of internal and external aspects.

Part II: Epistemology

• Anekāntavāda as Realism: Anekāntavāda is presented as the most consistent form of realism in Indian philosophy because it fully embraces the principle of distinction, leading to the idea that reality is not only multiple but each real is infinitely manifold (anekānta). This realism acknowledges an independent objective world, contrasting with the mentalism of idealism. Examples like matter (pudgala) and space (ākāśa) are used to illustrate manifoldness.
• Nayavāda (Theory of Standpoints): This is an analytical method that explores reality from various partial viewpoints (naya) without ruling out others. It helps in understanding the complex nature of reality step-by-step. The author discusses the classification of nayavādas into dravyārthikanaya (substantive) and paryāyārthikanaya (modal), detailing the seven main nayas: Naigama, Sangraha, Vyavahāra, Ṛjusūtra, Śabda, Samabhirūḍha, and Evambhūta, explaining their functions and criticisms. It's presented as a method to avoid absolutism and embrace the relativity of knowledge.
• Syādvāda (Conditional Dialectic / Sevenfold Predication): This is a synthetical method that complements Nayavāda. It uses the particle syāt ("in a certain sense") to qualify each assertion, acknowledging that reality is understood from multiple, conditional viewpoints. The seven modes (bhangas) — asti (is), nāsti (is not), avaktavya (inexpressible), and their combinations—demonstrate this conditional approach. Padmarajiah addresses criticisms of syādvāda as eclecticism, skepticism, and self-contradiction, arguing that the Jaina approach is a "discriminative synthesis" and a validation of experience. The concept of avaktavya (inexpressible) is analyzed as a logical failure to express co-present aspects, not an absolute unknowability.
• Relation (Chapter VII): This chapter examines different theories of relation: as an objective entity (Nyāya-Vaiśeșika), a mental construction (Buddhism, Vedanta), or a structural manifestation. Padmarajiah argues that relation is an objective fact, integral to reality (identity-in-difference), and a key aspect of anekāntavāda. He critiques the Nyāya's externalist view of samavāya and the Buddhist/Vedantin denial of relation.
• Controversies on Dravya and Guņa/Paryāya (Chapter VIII): This chapter explores further nuances:
  • Dravya as Concrete Universal: Refutes the Hegelian comparison due to the Jaina emphasis on co-ordinate difference.
  • Guņa vs. Paryāya: Discusses the differing views on whether qualities (guņa) and modifications (paryāya) are identical, distinct, or both. Padmarajiah highlights the Jaina tendency towards a bhedābhedavāda perspective, where they are distinct but inseparable aspects of dravya.

Conclusion: The book concludes by reiterating the central Jaina thesis of reality as a co-ordinate synthesis of identity-in-difference, supported by anekāntavāda, nayavāda, and syādvāda. It emphasizes that this comprehensive framework provides the most consistent form of realism in Indian philosophy, offering a balanced view that avoids the absolutism of idealism and the extreme flux of Buddhism. The author asserts that the Jaina philosophy, through its rigorous dialectical methods, offers a nuanced and complete understanding of reality, even if it doesn't conform to the absolute ideals of other schools.

Key Takeaways:

• Identity-in-Difference: The core Jaina ontological concept, presented as superior to views emphasizing only identity or only difference.
• Anekāntavāda: The theory of manifoldness is central to Jaina metaphysics and epistemology, representing the most consistent form of realism.
• Nayavāda & Syādvāda: These are complementary methods for understanding the manifold reality, with nayavāda providing the analytical viewpoints and syādvāda offering the synthetical reconciliation of these partial truths through conditional predication.
• Critique of Absolutism: A significant portion of the book is dedicated to critiquing absolutistic systems (especially Advaita Vedanta and Hegelianism) for their failure to adequately account for difference and the empirical world.
• Emphasis on Experience: Padmarajiah highlights the Jaina reliance on direct experience (aposteriorism) as the foundation for its philosophical claims, contrasting it with the aprioristic tendencies of some other schools.
• Unique Contribution: The study aims to establish Jainism's unique philosophical contribution by presenting its ontology and epistemology in a structured, comparative, and critical manner, demonstrating its logical rigor and comprehensive scope.