Comparative Study Of Jaina And Samkhya Yoga Theories Of Parinama

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Comparative Study of Jaina and Samkhya-Yoga Theories of Parinama by Indukala H. Zaveri

This scholarly work by Indukala H. Zaveri explores the concept of Pariņāma, a fundamental doctrine in Indian philosophy signifying change or transformation, and presents a comparative analysis of its understanding within the Jaina and Samkhya-Yoga philosophical systems. The author notes that the concept of Pariņāma is ancient, originating in the Rgveda, and has been universally accepted across most Indian philosophical schools with minor variations. The focus here is on the Jaina and Samkhya-Yoga traditions due to their significant resemblances in this doctrine.

Core Concept of Pariņāma:

Both systems, influenced by Yāska's definition of Viparināma (change in an abiding entity), view the world-process as a transformation within an enduring substance. Umāsvāti, in his Tattvārtha-sūtra, articulates this as utpāda (origination), vyaya (cessation), and dhrauvya (permanence). Vyāsa, the commentator on the Yoga-sūtras, defines Pariņāma similarly as "the production of a different quality upon the cessation of former qualities in a situated substance."

Classification of Pariņāma:

Vyāsa categorizes Pariņāma into three types: Dharma-Pariņāma (change of essential nature), Lakṣaṇa-Pariņāma (change of temporal aspect), and Avasthā-Pariņāma (change of condition). While the Jaina tradition doesn't explicitly use these terms, its concepts of Dravya-Paryāya (modifications of substance) and Guņa-Paryāya (modifications of qualities) correspond to Dharma-Pariņāma and the expression of temporal variations (past, present, future) to Lakṣaṇa-Pariņāma. Avasthā-Pariņāma is understood as change in the state of a Vyañjana-Paryāya (a persistent aspect), which is momentary in Artha-Paryāyas.

Pariņāma and Movement (Pariṣpaṇḍa):

Both Samkhya and Jaina consider Pariņāma to encompass both non-moving changes in substance (Aparispandātmaka-Parināma) and physical movement in space (Parispaṇḍa). These are sometimes categorized as distinct types of kriyā (activity). For the Jaina, Parispaṇḍa is possible only in Jīva (soul) and Pudgala (matter), as these are limited entities. Dharma, Adharma, and Ākāśa (space), being indivisible and all-pervading, do not undergo movement. In Samkhya, Prakṛti (primordial matter) is homogeneous and all-pervading, thus not capable of movement. Movement is possible in its manifold products (Vikṛti) which are limited. A difficulty arises in Samkhya regarding movement without space, which is addressed by some commentators like Vijñānabhikṣu by subsuming Ākāśa into Prakṛti, though this is not explicitly supported by older texts. The Jaina system avoids this difficulty by accepting Ākāśa as an underived entity.

Concept of Time (Kāla):

There is an affinity in the concept of Kāla. Samkhya does not recognize Kāla as an independent entity, viewing it as an aspect of Prakṛti or identical with the Pariņāmas of Prakṛti. A moment is considered a unit of change in the Guņas. The Jaina tradition, however, presents divergent views on Kāla: one as an independent sixth substance (Dravya), and another identifying it with the changes in Jīva and Ajīva (non-soul entities), which aligns with the Samkhya perspective.

Conditioning Factors of Pariņāma:

The Samkhya-Yoga's view that Pariņāma is regulated by place (deśa), time (kāla), form (ākāra), and disposing cause (nimitta) finds a parallel in the Jaina view where Pariņāma is conditioned by substance (dravya), place (kṣetra), time (kāla), and essential nature (bhāva). An illustration from the Raja-vārtika regarding the production of a pot exemplifies this, emphasizing that a pot is made from earth, here, in the present, and with certain qualities, not water, elsewhere, in the past/future, or with different qualities.

Causal Theory: Satkāryavāda vs. Sadasatkāryavāda:

The Samkhya's causal theory is Satkāryavāda, meaning the effect pre-exists in the cause and is merely manifested. The Jaina, while accepting Pariņāma, calls their causal theory Sadasatkāryavāda, where the effect is both existent (potentially in the cause) and non-existent (in its actual manifestation). While both see the effect as a manifestation of an abiding entity, the Jaina, as an Anekāntist (advocate of manifold aspects), incorporates Asat (non-existent) alongside Sat (existent), influenced by Vaiseṣika emphasis on the novelty of the effect. The author points out that the Samkhya's Satkāryavāda cannot be absolute without contradicting its metaphysical framework, and Vidyānanda suggests the Samkhya's view is essentially Jaina, even if not explicitly stated.

Fundamental Differences in Metaphysics and Pariņāma:

The primary divergence stems from their foundational metaphysical differences regarding the nature, number, and derivation of original entities. Samkhya posits a dualism of Sentient (Cetana) and Non-sentient (Jada). While Samkhya identifies the sentient with the unchanging (Kūțastha Puruṣa) and relegates all change to the non-sentient Prakṛti, the Jaina dualism accepts Sentience (Jīva) and Non-sentience (Ajīva) as distinct and both undergo Pariņāma.

The Samkhya system derives twenty-three tattvas from Prakṛti, with subsequent changes being modifications of these tattvas. The Jaina, however, starts with five or six fundamental and underived tattvas (including Jīva, Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma, and Ākāśa). Pudgala is the basis of material phenomena, while Jīva undergoes psychic transformations. Dharma, Adharma, and Ākāśa facilitate movement, stillness, and space, respectively.

Consequences of Pariņāma Application:

The crucial distinction lies in the Samkhya's denial of Pariņāma to Puruṣas, making it difficult to relate them to the changing Prakṛti. Puruṣas are merely witnesses, and concepts like knowledge, experience, bondage, and liberation are ultimately transformations of Prakṛti. Puruṣas are never truly bound or liberated.

In contrast, the Jaina application of Pariņāma to Jīvas allows for a smooth explanation of their interaction with Pudgala. Bhava-karma (psychic karma) in Jīva and Dravya-karma (material karma) in Pudgala are directly attributable to Jīvas. This explains phenomena like knowledge, enjoyment, bondage, and liberation as direct experiences of the Jīva. The author notes a potential difficulty for Jaina philosophy: how can transformations of Jīva and Pudgala, which are fundamentally different, relate to each other? However, Samkhya avoids this by positing an absolute distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛti, where experiences in Puruṣa are merely metaphorical (aupacārika).

Conclusion:

The study concludes that while Samkhya holds a stronger metaphysical position due to the distinctness of Puruṣa and Prakṛti, the Jaina theory of Pariņāma is empirically more comprehensible due to its direct application to the soul and its interaction with matter. The differences in their understanding of Pariņāma are rooted in their fundamental ontological assumptions about the nature of reality.