Collection Of Jaina Philosophical Tracts

This is a comprehensive summary of the Jain philosophical tracts collected and edited by Nagin J. Shah, published by the L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, in 1973 as part of the L.D. Series No. 41. The book contains ten hitherto unpublished Sanskrit tracts from the medieval period, offering insights into how Jain monks engaged with contemporary philosophical views. The introduction by Dr. Nagin J. Shah provides an overview of the authors and their works, along with summaries of each tract.

Here's a breakdown of the ten tracts:

1. Saddarśananirnaya (Decisive Explanation of the Six Philosophical Systems)

   • Author: Merutungasūri of Añcalagacca.
   • Content: This tract begins by defining true Brahmana-hood and Yati-hood, emphasizing truth, penance, and sense control for Brahmins, and equanimity for Yatis, rather than mere ritualistic practices or outward appearances. It then proceeds to explain and examine six major Indian philosophical systems: Bauddha, Mimāmsā (including Vedanta), Sankhya, Nyāyika, Vaiśesika, and Jaina. The author highlights that despite metaphysical differences, all systems agree on life values and spiritual discipline, substantiating this with quotations.

2. Pañcadarśanakhaṇḍana (Refutation of the Five Philosophical Systems)

   • Author: Unknown (Jaina).
   • Content: This treatise refutes four philosophical systems (Nyāya, Vaiśesika, Sankhya, and Bauddha), despite its title suggesting five. The author argues that analogy (upamāna) is a form of inference (anumāna), not an independent means of knowledge. It shows how the twelve categories of Nyāya are covered by the Jaina twofold division of soul (jiva) and non-soul (ajiva). The author rejects debate tactics like quibbling (chala), futile replies (jati), and points of defeat (nigrahasthāna), advocating for discussion aimed solely at finding truth. In refuting Vaiśesika, the author challenges the distinct substances of atoms, the substance of direction (diga), the separation of substance (guni) and property (guna), the claim that sound (śabda) is a quality of space (ākāśa), the concept of universals (sāmānya) being different from the things they reside in, and the need for particularities (viśeṣas) to differentiate liberated souls and atoms. The tract also criticizes Sankhya's views on the three gunas operating without a regulator, the emergence of intellect and ego from Prakriti, the causeless nature of Prakriti's disequilibrium, the emergence of elements from subtle elements, the changeless nature of the soul (Puruṣa), and Prakriti's function for Puruṣa. Finally, it enumerates the twelve ayatanas of Buddhism and shows how they fit within the Jaina jiva-ajiva framework.

3. Vividhamatasthāpakotthāpaka Anumāna Sangraha (Collection of Syllogisms for and Against Various Philosophical Views)

   • Author: Unknown (Jaina).
   • Content: This tract compiles syllogisms for and against important philosophical viewpoints. It includes syllogisms for omniscience, the creatorhood of God (īśvarakartṛtva), and the illusory nature of the world (prapañca-mithyātvā). It then presents inferences supporting Vijñanavāda (Idealism) and refutes it by demolishing its doctrine of citrajñāna. The tract also collects arguments for and against the theory of Absolute Logos (śabda-brahma-vāda) and the existence of objects independent of words. It further discusses twelve syllogisms proving sound (śabda) to be non-material and then establishes its material nature. In the section on Pramāṇa (means of knowledge), the Cārvāka view that inference is not a means of knowledge is refuted by establishing inference as a valid pramāṇa.

4. Vādachatushka (Four Discussions)

   • Author: Unknown (Jaina).
   • Content: This treatise contains four distinct discussions (vāda):
     • Establishing coolness as a quality of fire (Agniśītatvasthāpanāpādana).
     • Establishing the existence of an Omniscient being (Sarvajña-sthāpanāsthalam).
     • Establishing the view that wearing garments does not disqualify one from attaining liberation (ChDivārasthāpanāsthalam).
     • Refuting God (Īśvara) as the creator of the world (Īśvarotthāpanasthalam).
   • The first discussion is presented as a demonstration of Anekāntavāda (non-absolutism). The second addresses the Mimāmsaka view of omniscience. The third discusses the sectarian difference between Svetāmbara and Digambara Jains regarding attire during liberation. The fourth refutes the Nyāya-Vaiśesika belief in God as the creator.

5. Parabrahmotthāpanasthala (Establishment of the Supreme Brahman)

   • Author: Bhuvanasundarasūri, a pupil of Somasundarasūri.
   • Content: This tract demolishes the Vedantic inference that the world is illusory due to its perceptibility (drśyatva). The author argues that if perceptibility implies illusion, then unperceived fine atoms and distant mountains should be real. The author engages with Vedantic responses regarding perception (sensory vs. extrasensory), omniscience, and the nature of nescience (avidya), ultimately refuting the Advaita Vedanta doctrine of the world's unreality and the concept of avidya. The tract also critically examines the Vedantic gradation of reality (illusory, empirical, absolute) and the nature of Brahman, particularly questioning its inexpressibility (avacya).

6. Hetuvidambanasthala (Demonstration of the Flaws in Logical Reasoning)

   • Author: Jinamaṇḍana, a pupil of Somasundaraśūri.
   • Content: In the spirit of a Cārvāka, the author demonstrates that inference (anumāna) can never be a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa). He proves the impossibility of the predicate (sādhya) and the probans (hetu), and forcefully shows the impossibility of establishing the necessary universal relation (vyāpti).

7. Hetukhaṇḍanapāṇḍitya alias Vādavijayaprakaraṇa (Expertise in Refuting Arguments)

   • Author: Sadhuvijayayati, a disciple of Jinaharṣa.
   • Content: This tract is divided into five sections dealing with the flaws in logical reasoning (hetvābhāsa), the nature of vitiating conditions (upādhi), its exposition, and the problems and benefits of argumentation. The first section discusses the flaws in a hetu, particularly aprayojakahetu (irrelevant reason), mahāvidyāhetu, and vakracchāyānumānahetu. The second section defines and explains upādhi. The third explains another definition of upādhi and points out defects like impossibility (asiddha), contradiction (viruddha), indeterminacy (anaikāntika), and counter-inference (satpratipakṣa). The fourth section is devoted to pratyupādhi (a condition that negates the defect of upādhi). The fifth section argues that upādhi is nothing more than a hetvābhāsa, and Jain theorists recognize no defect in upādhi other than deviation (vyabhicāra).

8. Pramāṇasāra (Essence of Means of Knowledge)

   • Author: Munīśvarasūri of Vrddha gaccha.
   • Content: This tract is divided into three sections:
     • Pramāṇasvarūpaprarūpaṇa (Description of the Nature of Pramāṇa): The author defines doubt, indeterminate cognition, and error, and excludes pramāṇa from them. He argues that pramāṇa-pravṛtti is impossible for Advaita Vedanta, Jñānādvaita, and Śūnyavāda. The Cārvāka view that perception is the only pramāṇa is refuted. The author considers logic (tarka) an auxiliary to pramāṇa. He defines pramāṇa as knowledge that clarifies both self and others. He maintains that the validity (prāmāṇya) and invalidity (apramāṇya) of cognition are intrinsic in familiarity and extrinsic in initial acquaintance. The object of pramāṇa is characterized by both general (sāmānya) and specific (viśeṣa) features. The Jaina theory of change (pariṇāmavāda) and the Buddhist theory of universal flux (momentariness) and destruction without residue are discussed and refuted. The tract elucidates the Jaina doctrine of Syādvāda (non-absolutism) as a corollary of the ontological theory of infinite properties of a thing and the Sevenfold Judgment.
     • Pramāṇasaṅkhyā-viṣaya-phalavīpratipatti-vyuṣedhaka (Rejection of the Number, Object, and Result of Pramāṇas): This section classifies pramāṇas into perception (pratyakṣa) and non-perception (parokṣa). Pratyakṣa is divided into empirical (sāmvyavaharika) and transcendental (paramārthika). Transcendental perception includes clairvoyance (avadhi) and mind-reading (manahparyāya), while perfect transcendental perception is omniscience (kevala). The author asserts that the cause of kevala knowledge is the absence of attachment and aversion, and that a kevalī does take food. Womanhood is not a bar to kevalihood. Wearing garments does not hinder the attainment of kevalajñāna or moksha. Parokṣa pramāṇas include memory, recognition, logic, inference, and verbal testimony. The distinction between pratyakṣa and parokṣa lies in vividness (spaṣṭatva), meaning the cognition of more specific characteristics.
     • Darśanavyavasthāsvarūpaprarūpaṇa (Description of the Nature of Philosophical Systems): This section summarizes the essentials of six philosophical systems: Jaina, Naiyāyika, Bauddha, Sankhya, Vaiśesika, and Jaiminiya.

9. Pramāṇasundara (Beautiful Means of Knowledge)

   • Author: Padmasundara, a pupil of Padmameru.
   • Content: This tract is divided into four sections:
     • Definition of Pramāṇa: Discusses the definition of pramāṇa as knowledge that clarifies both self and others (samyak-svaparavyavasāyātmakam jñānam pramāṇam).
     • Classification of Pramāṇas: Classifies all pramāṇas into pratyakṣa and parokṣa. Pratyakṣa is further classified into empirical (sāmvyavahārika) and principal (mukhya). Empirical pratyakṣa includes initial grasping (avagraha), cogitation (īhā), perceptual judgment (avāya), and retention (dhāraṇā). Principal pratyakṣa includes clairvoyance (avadhī) and mind-reading (manahparyāya), with omniscience (kevalajñāna) being the highest form.
     • Anumāna (Inference): The author classifies parokṣa pramāṇa into anumāna and āgama. Anumāna is further divided into secondary (gauna) and principal (mukhya). Memory, recognition, and logic are considered secondary anumānas, a novel classification in Jain tradition. Principal anumāna is the standard inference. Arthāpatti (implication) and anupalabdhi (non-cognition) are viewed as forms of principal anumāna. The author refutes the threefold or fivefold nature of a valid hetu, establishing the necessity of an invariable concomitance (avinābhāva-niyama). He also refutes the Buddhist view of only three types of hetu and the Sankhya and Vaiśesika classifications of hetus. The distinction between svārtha (for oneself) and parārtha (for others) anumāna is explained. Sadhana (means) is classified into vidhisādhana and pratiṣedhasādhana. Various types of hetvābhāsa (pseudo-hetus), dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa (pseudo-examples), pratyakṣābhāsa (pseudo-perception), smaraṇābhāsa (pseudo-memory), and pratyabhijñābhāsa (pseudo-recognition) are discussed.
     • Āgama (Verbal Testimony): Cognition derived from the words of an authority (āpta) is āgama pramāṇa. The author refutes the Mimāmsā theory of authorless Vedas. Āpta are classified into those with perfect cognition (avikalajñāna) and imperfect cognition (vikalajñāna). Perfect cognition can be direct (pratyakṣa-avikalajñāna-vat, like Tirthankaras and Kevalis) or indirect (parokṣa-avikalajñāna-vat, like Ganadharas). Āgama is characterized by non-discrepancy with other pramāṇas. The tract succinctly explains Anekānta, Pariṇāma (change), Mārga (Path to Liberation), the nine tattvas, the Sevenfold Judgment, and Naya.

10. Syādvādasiḍdhi (Establishment of Syādvāda)

    • Author: Unknown.
    • Content: This tract discusses and refutes various points against the doctrine of Syādvāda. It also points out instances where Nyāya-Vaiśesika theorists accepted the principle of Syādvāda.

Overall, this collection provides valuable primary source material for understanding the complex philosophical debates within Jainism and its engagement with other Indian philosophical traditions during the medieval period. The tracts reveal a sophisticated engagement with epistemology, metaphysics, and logic, showcasing the intellectual prowess of Jain scholars in defending and elaborating their doctrines.