Chitra Adwaitvad Ka Jain Drushti Se Tarkik Vishleshan

Here's a comprehensive summary of the Jain text "Chitra Adwaitvad ka Jain Drushti se Tarkik Vishleshan" by Dr. Lalchand Jain, focusing on its analysis of Chitra-Advaitavada from a Jain perspective:

The book "Chitra Adwaitvad ka Jain Drushti se Tarkik Vishleshan" (A Logical Analysis of Chitra-Advaitavada from a Jain Perspective) by Dr. Lalchand Jain critically examines the philosophical stance of Chitra-Advaitavada, primarily associated with some Buddhist Vijnaanavadi (Idealist) philosophers. The author, drawing upon the arguments of prominent Jain philosophers like Dharmakirti, Acarya Vidyananda, Vadivaraja, Prabhachandra, Vadevasuri, and Yashovijaya, presents a detailed refutation of this theory.

Core Tenets of Chitra-Advaitavada:

Chitra-Advaitavada posits that reality is fundamentally of the nature of "Chitra-Jnana" (varied or colorful knowledge). This means:

• Knowledge is varied: Just as a painting has multiple colors, knowledge possesses diverse forms or "shapes."
• Rejection of Jnana-Advaitavada: They do not believe in a single, undifferentiated form of knowledge.
• Exclusive reality of varied knowledge: Only this manifold knowledge exists. External objects are denied existence.
• External objects are unreal: They argue that no valid proof (pramana) can establish the existence of external objects, likening their existence to the horns of a donkey.
• Arguments against external objects:
  • If proof for external objects is formless (nirakara), it cannot establish the specific existence of any particular object as it would be universally present.
  • If proof is form-possessing (sakara), it only proves a varied knowledge, not a distinct external object.
  • Form-possessing knowledge itself cannot be the cause of external objects because it becomes fulfilled by its own experience.
  • The text presents Dharmakirti's argument: if knowledge is not colored blue, what proof is there for a blue external object? If knowledge is blue, what is the purpose of positing an external blue object, since the blue form is already present in knowledge?
  • The timing of knowledge in relation to the object (prior, posterior, or simultaneous) is also debated to undermine the possibility of knowledge cognizing external objects.

Jain Refutation of Chitra-Advaitavada:

The Jain scholars, as presented by Dr. Lalchand Jain, offer a robust counter-argument against Chitra-Advaitavada:

1. Primacy of both Sakara and Nirakara Pramana: Jainism does not limit valid knowledge (pramana) to only form-possessing knowledge. Formless knowledge also plays a role in establishing reality. Therefore, the Chitra-Advaitavadi claim that formless knowledge cannot establish the existence of specific objects is incorrect.

2. Independent Nature of Proof: Proof, like the sun, illuminates phenomena irrespective of being prior, posterior, or simultaneous to them. This counters the Chitra-Advaitavadi attempts to find flaws in the temporal relationship between knowledge and external objects.

3. Analysis of "Impossibility of Separation" (Ashakya Prithakkaranatva):

   • The Chitra-Advaitavadi argument that the colors (blue, yellow, etc.) in knowledge cannot be separated from knowledge itself is challenged.
   • Is it because colors are identical with knowledge? This is circular reasoning (the effect is used as the cause).
   • Is it because colors are cognized by the same knowledge? This leads to the fallacy of "anekantika" (non-exclusive cause) as other knowledge could also be involved, or it implies a lack of distinction between knowledge and its objects, potentially leading to Advaita (non-duality) of a different kind.
   • The Jain critique points out that if the impossibility of separation implies identity, then the Chitra-Advaitavadi position itself becomes self-defeating.
   • They argue that if everything is identical with knowledge, then knowledge itself becomes entangled with all phenomena.

4. The Nature of "Chitra" (Variety):

   • If the impossibility of separating colors from knowledge means knowledge is inherently one, then the argument for "Chitra" (variety) within knowledge is undermined.
   • If the Chitra-Advaitavadi accepts that the varied colors in knowledge are due to the nature of knowledge itself, they must also accept that external objects can similarly possess varied forms due to their own nature.

5. External Objects Possess Unity:

   • The Jain argument extends to the nature of external objects. If the impossibility of separating colors within knowledge doesn't negate its unity, then similarly, the impossibility of separating different parts of an external object (like parts of a painting) shouldn't negate its unity.
   • They contend that if colors in knowledge are indistinguishable and occupy the same space, leading to a lack of distinction within knowledge, then the same logic applies to external objects. If different colors in a painting occupy the same space, it negates the "Chitra" aspect of the painting itself.

6. Chitra as a Property of External Objects:

   • The Jain position is that "Chitra" (the manifold appearance of colors) is fundamentally a property of external objects, not of knowledge.
   • Direct perception (pratyaksha) reveals colors as attributes of external substances.
   • The argument that "Chitra" cannot be an attribute of external objects due to the contradiction of grasping and non-grasping is refuted. The perception of one color (e.g., blue) in a painting while not perceiving others (e.g., yellow) is a limitation of perception, not a denial of the external object's reality or its varied attributes.

7. The Illusion of "Chitra" in Knowledge:

   • The Chitra-Advaitavadi claim that "Chitra" is a property of knowledge is seen as a faulty assertion.
   • If the impossibility of separation is due to the contradictory nature of the colors, then it's impossible for these contradictory attributes to reside in a single, indivisible knowledge.
   • If the Chitra-Advaitavadi posits a "partially" varied knowledge, the Jain scholars argue that the same logic should apply to external objects.
   • The text highlights the analogy of the soul (Atman) which is considered one in its essence but possesses multiple attributes (knowledge, perception, happiness, etc.). Similarly, external objects can be considered fundamentally one but possess diverse qualities.

8. Rejection of "Sukhaadi" (Happiness etc.) as Knowledge:

   • A key Chitra-Advaitavadi argument is that happiness, pleasure, etc., are also forms of knowledge because they arise from similar causal factors.
   • Jain scholars strongly refute this. They argue that happiness and knowledge arise from different karmic causes: happiness from the unfolding of auspicious vedaniya karma and knowledge from the subsidence/destruction of jnanaavarna karma.
   • Therefore, treating happiness as identical with knowledge is incorrect. If this were the case, then form, light, etc., would also have to be considered knowledge, leading to a collapse of distinctions.

9. The Nature of Causality and Identity:

   • The Chitra-Advaitavadi argument regarding the common causal factors for knowledge and happiness is also dissected.
   • If the causal factors are absolutely identical, then the argument is flawed because the causes are indeed different.
   • If the causal factors are partially identical, then the argument becomes "anekantika" because other phenomena also arise from partially similar causes.
   • The text emphasizes that the ultimate substratum for happiness and knowledge is the soul (Atman), which is a distinct substance.

Conclusion:

The book concludes that Chitra-Advaitavada, like other non-dualistic theories, fails to withstand logical scrutiny. The Jain perspective, emphasizing the reality of both the soul (Atman) and external objects (Dravyas) with their diverse and independent attributes, provides a more consistent and comprehensive understanding of reality. The Chitra-Advaitavadi attempt to reduce all reality to a single, manifold form of knowledge is ultimately deemed untenable from a logical and Jain philosophical standpoint.