Central Philosophy Of Jainism Anekanta Vada

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Summary

This document, "The Central Philosophy of Jainism: Anekānta Vāda" by Bimal Krishna Matilal, published by L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, delves into the core principle of Jainism, Anekānta Vāda (the doctrine of non-onesidedness or many-sidedness). The book, a compilation of lectures delivered by Matilal, aims to provide a clear understanding of this complex philosophical concept and its associated methodologies.

Here's a comprehensive summary of its key themes and arguments:

1. Anekānta Vāda: The Core of Jainism

  • Meaning: Anekānta Vāda literally means "theory of non-onesidedness" or "theory of the many-sided nature of reality." It posits that reality is multifaceted and can be viewed from various perspectives. No single viewpoint or assertion can capture the entirety of truth.
  • Contrast with Ekānta Vāda: It stands in opposition to ekānta vāda (one-sided or absolute assertion), which claims a singular, unqualified truth. Jainism argues that such absolutist views lead to dogmatism and intolerance in philosophical discourse.
  • Philosophy of Synthesis: Anekānta Vāda is presented as a philosophy of synthesis, aiming to reconcile and integrate seemingly contradictory viewpoints. It draws parallels with the development of Indian philosophy where various schools often clashed.

2. Methodologies of Anekānta Vāda: Naya Vāda and Syād-Vāda

To operationalize Anekānta Vāda, Jainism developed sophisticated philosophical methodologies:

  • Naya Vāda (Doctrine of Standpoints): This doctrine emphasizes that any assertion about reality is true only from a particular "standpoint" or perspective. Different philosophical schools (like Sāmkhya, Buddhism, Vedanta) are seen as highlighting different nayas.
    • Pure vs. Impure Nayas: A naya is considered "pure" when it acknowledges that it's just one perspective among many, while an "impure" or durnaya treats its viewpoint as absolute and exclusive.
    • Two Fundamental Nayas: Siddhasena Divākara identified two primary nayas: Dravyāstika (substance viewpoint, emphasizing being and permanence) and Paryāyāstika (modification viewpoint, emphasizing change and flux). All other nayas are seen as subdivisions or variations of these two.
    • Seven Nayas: The book discusses the traditional seven nayas: Naigama (common), Samgraha (general), Vyavahāra (practical), Rjusūtra (straight-thread/momentary), Śabda (verbal), Samabhirūḍha (subtle), and Evambhūta (thus-happened). These nayas are categorized into substantial (being) and modificational (becoming), and some into ontological and semantic distinctions.
  • Syād-Vāda (Doctrine of Sevenfold Predication / Saptabhangi): This is the dialectical tool that applies a qualifier, the particle "syāt" (meaning "from a certain point of view" or "perhaps"), to propositions. This particle transforms categorical statements into conditional ones, thereby preventing them from being absolute or one-sided.
    • The Seven Predicates: The core of Syād-Vāda is the formulation of seven possible predication modes for any statement about reality:
      1. Syāt asti (It exists from a certain point of view)
      2. Syāt nāsti (It does not exist from a certain point of view)
      3. Syāt asti nāsti ca (It both exists and does not exist from a certain point of view - gradually)
      4. Syāt avaktavyaḥ (It is inexpressible from a certain point of view - simultaneously positive and negative)
      5. Syāt asti ca avaktavyaḥ ca (It exists and is inexpressible from a certain point of view)
      6. Syāt nāsti ca avaktavyaḥ ca (It does not exist and is inexpressible from a certain point of view)
      7. Syāt asti ca nāsti ca avaktavyaḥ ca (It exists, does not exist, and is inexpressible from a certain point of view)
    • Meaning of "Syāt": The particle "syāt" is crucial; it signifies conditionality and avoids absolute claims, thus preventing contradiction. It's not about doubt or mere probability, but a qualified affirmation or negation.

3. Historical Context and Comparison with Other Schools

  • Buddha's Middle Way: The book compares Mahavira's Anekānta Vāda with the Buddha's Middle Way (Madhyamā Pratipat). While both aimed to avoid extremes, the Buddha's "exclusive" Middle Way rejected extreme views, whereas Mahavira's "inclusive" Anekānta embraced different viewpoints with qualification. The Buddha's method of answering "unexplained" questions using vibhajya-vāda (method of analysis and differentiation) is seen as a precursor, which Mahavira developed into Anekānta.
  • Nāgārjuna and Mādhyamika Dialectic: The Anekānta doctrine is compared with Nāgārjuna's Śūnyatā (emptiness) doctrine and his dialectic. Both schools highlight the paradoxical nature of reality, but Nāgārjuna's conclusion is emptiness, while Jainas aim for synthesis through nayas and syād-vāda.
  • Other Schools: The book examines how Jainism interacts with and critiques the philosophical positions of Sāmkhya (satkāryavāda), Vaiśeṣika (asat-kāryavāda), and Vedānta (vivartavāda), seeing them as representing different ekānta (one-sided) perspectives on causality and reality.

4. Key Philosophical Concepts Explained

  • Existence and Substance: Jainism defines substance (dravya) as that which possesses qualities (guna) and modes (paryāya) and is characterized by origin, decay, and persistence (utpāda, vyaya, dhrauvya). Substance is seen as a combination of being and becoming, permanence and change.
  • Causality: Anekānta Vāda resolves the paradox of causality (whether the effect pre-exists in the cause or is newly created) by asserting that reality is both unchanging (as a substance) and ever-changing (through its modes).
  • Non-violence (Ahiṁsā): Matilal posits a connection between the Jaina principle of non-violence and Anekānta Vāda. Respect for the life of others is extended to respect for the views of others, fostering tolerance and understanding in intellectual discourse.

5. Addressing Objections

The book addresses common criticisms leveled against Anekānta Vāda and Syād-Vāda, such as:

  • Contradiction (Virodha) and Doubt (Samsaya): Jainas defend that the syāt particle renders their seemingly contradictory statements conditional and therefore not absolute contradictions.
  • Intermixture (Samkara): The charge that different nayas or predicates get mixed up is met by emphasizing the systematic use of syāt to qualify each assertion.
  • Self-Refutation: The problem of whether the statement "everything is Anekānta" itself has Anekānta nature is discussed, drawing parallels to similar critiques of Nāgārjuna's Śūnyatā.

Conclusion:

"The Central Philosophy of Jainism: Anekānta Vāda" presents Anekānta Vāda as a sophisticated and comprehensive philosophical system. It's not merely an ontological claim about reality but also a methodological approach to understanding diverse perspectives, fostering intellectual humility, tolerance, and a synthetic understanding of philosophical debates. The book highlights the unique contribution of Jainism to Indian thought through its intricate logical tools like naya and syād-vāda.