Buddhist Theory Of Meaning Apoha And Negative Statements

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This paper by Dhirendra Sharma explores the Buddhist theory of meaning, known as Apoha, and its relationship to negative statements, contrasting it with the realist views prevalent in other Indian philosophical schools.

The essay begins by tracing the historical development of the concept of word-meaning in Indian philosophy. Early Vedic texts viewed words with mystical awe, considering them eternal and the source of knowledge. Later, around 200 BCE, Patañjali's commentary reveals a debate between those who believed words referred to particulars and those who believed they referred to universals. Most non-Buddhist schools, like Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya, eventually synthesized these views, arguing that words denote both universals and particulars, or even more comprehensively (Nyāya stating an individual, its class, and its particular form).

In contrast, the Buddhist thinkers of the Dignāga school developed the Apoha theory. "Apoha" literally means "differentiation" or "exclusion." This theory posits that words are products of mental conceptualization and refer to mental images, not directly to external realities. Meaning, in this view, is the instrument of reference (the word-image relation), distinct from the object of reference. Words are considered to have an a priori existence, independent of external objects.

Sharma clarifies that the Sanskrit term "artha" (meaning) is as ambiguous as its English counterpart. He categorizes the main views on meaning as realist (exemplified by Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṁsā) and idealist/nominalist. Realists hold that words refer to real universals and particulars apprehended by the senses. Buddhists, particularly Dignāga's school, vehemently opposed this, arguing that universals are not external facts but post res (after the fact) conceptualizations.

The core of the Buddhist argument, according to Sharma, is that efficient reality belongs to the momentary particular. What the intellect grasps, following immediate sense-stimulus, is the universal, which is a conceptualized fact apprehended through inference and referred to by words. If words directly meant sensory objects, then saying "honey" would produce a sweet taste.

The Apoha theory is presented as a solution to various philosophical problems, including the nature of universals, the relation between substance and attribute, and the word-meaning relationship. Sharma addresses the common criticism that Apoha is a "negative approach" to meaning, which he argues is a misunderstanding. He states that this charge often stems from non-Buddhist critiques.

Sharma then delves into the basis of Buddhist negation in the law of opposition (virodha). Dharmakirti, a key Buddhist scholar, identified two types of opposition:

1. Efficient opposition or incompatibility (sahabhāva-virodha): Where two facts are incompatible due to their nature, like heat and cold. Their opposition is evident when they are placed together.
2. Logical opposition or contradiction (anyonyopalabdhiparihāra-sthiti-laksana-virodha): Where the essence of two terms is mutual exclusion, like "eternal" and "non-eternal," or "blue" and "non-blue." Neither can be understood without excluding the other.

The first opposition is linked to the negation of terms or entities, while the second is related to the negation of propositions. The Buddhist view is that even affirmative statements imply the exclusion of their contradictory counterparts. For example, "the blue-lotus" excludes non-blue things and non-lotuses. Therefore, Apoha is not merely a positive cognition qualified by exclusion but a dialectical approach based on the law of opposition.

Sharma further explains that Buddhist logicians believed every term and proposition is discriminatory, meaning affirmative and negative are mutually exclusive and inherently linked. Affirmation implies negation, and negation presupposes affirmation.

The essay then addresses the forms of propositions in Indian logic, particularly positive (vidhi) and negative (niṣedha/pratiședha). Negative statements are further divided into:

• Simple negation (prasajya-pratiședha): Direct denial, e.g., "the jar is not here."
• Negation by implication (paryyudāsa): Where a negation implies an affirmation, e.g., "snow is not black" implies it is white (if it's not black, it's something else, usually understood as the opposite or alternative).

The author clarifies how the Buddhist theory relates to these:

• Buddhist negative inference (anupalabdhi) corresponds more to simple negation.
• The Apoha theory primarily corresponds to negation by implication and also involves simple negation.

According to Ratnakīrti, negation by implication is rooted in immediate knowledge and applies to both affirmative and simple negative propositions. This leads to the Buddhist conclusion that there is neither a pure affirmation nor a pure negation. This is illustrated by the example that when asked to tie a cow, one doesn't tie a horse or a dog; this is based on the discriminatory function of language.

In conclusion, Sharma emphasizes that Apoha is the foundation of discriminatory behavior and reflective thinking. Words and reason, through Apoha, manifest differentiation, which is apprehended through language and logic. Thus, the theory of Apoha is a dialectical approach, not a purely negative one, grounded in the fundamental law of opposition.