Bhartiya Tarkikoni Pratyaksha Vishyak Charcha - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Bhartiya Tarkikoni Pratyaksha Vishyak Charcha" by Nagin J Shah, focusing on the discussion of 'Pratyaksha' (Perception) among Indian logicians:

The book explores the complex and often divergent views on the nature and scope of Pratyaksha (perception) among various schools of Indian philosophy, primarily focusing on the Nyaya-Vaisheshika and Jain traditions.

1. The Core Problem: Defining Pratyaksha

The central issue that troubled both Nyaya-Vaisheshika and Jain logicians was the challenge of defining Pratyaksha in a way that could encompass both sensory perception (Indriya Sannikersh) and yogic intuition (Yogic Gyaan).

The Nyaya-Vaisheshika Standpoint:
- Early Nyaya logicians accepted four pramanas (means of valid knowledge): Pratyaksha, Anumana (inference), Upamana (comparison), and Shabda (verbal testimony).
- They believed that a pramana is a non-erroneous knowledge about an object.
- However, they acknowledged the possibility of Yogic Gyaan, which is also non-erroneous but doesn't involve sensory contact or fit the definitions of Anumana, Upamana, or Shabda.
- This yogic knowledge was seen as independent of prior knowledge (gyanantar-nirapeksh or nirvikalpak), whereas other pramanas are dependent on prior knowledge (gyanantar-sapeksh or savikalpak).
- Mahayana Buddhist philosophers (Shunyavadi and Vignyanavadi) used the concept of yogic knowledge to argue for two levels of reality: the ultimate (paramarthik) and the empirical (vyavaharik). Yogic knowledge, they claimed, apprehends the ultimate reality and is thus an ultimate pramana, while sensory perception and others apprehend empirical reality and are empirical pramanas.
- This posed a dilemma for Nyaya logicians: how to establish yogic knowledge as a valid pramana without compromising their single-level reality view. While yogic knowledge wasn't dependent on prior knowledge (like inference), it also wasn't directly caused by sensory contact.
- The solution they sought was to formulate a definition of Pratyaksha that could apply to both sensory perception and yogic knowledge, thereby asserting that reality is of a single kind and all pramanas lead to its apprehension.
The Jain Standpoint:
- Jain tradition defines Pratyaksha as knowledge attained by the soul without any external instruments.
- Savikalpak knowledge (like inference, comparison) requires the mind, and sensory perception requires the senses.
- Therefore, for Jains, only Avadhi, Manahparyaya, and Keval knowledge (three types of yogic knowledge) qualify as Pratyaksha.
- However, excluding sensory knowledge from Pratyaksha was not simple. Jain logicians also faced the challenge of formulating a definition of Pratyaksha that could encompass both yogic knowledge and sensory perception.

2. The Shared Challenge:

The book highlights that both Nyaya-Vaisheshika and Jain logicians, despite different underlying reasons, faced the same fundamental problem: to define Pratyaksha in a way that accommodates both yogic knowledge and sensory perception. Mimamsa philosophers, on the other hand, did not face this issue as they did not believe in the possibility of yogic knowledge or the existence of God.

3. Attempts to Define Pratyaksha:

Various attempts were made by logicians to resolve this definitional challenge:

Using Synonymous Terms: Some logicians used synonymous terms for Pratyaksha as its definition.
- Siddhasena Divakara and Bhartrisarvajna proposed "aproksha gyaan" (non-mediated knowledge).
- Udayanacharya proposed "sakshatkar gyaan" (direct realization).
- Some Jain logicians like Akalanka, Hemachandra, and Yashodevijaya proposed "vishad ya sphut gyaan" (clear or distinct knowledge). However, this raised the question of defining "clarity" or "distinctness." Akalanka defined clarity as a unique apprehension of meaning compared to inference, but this was seen as circular.
- Gangesha proposed "gyanakarank gyaan" (knowledge that is not an instrument of knowledge), and Hemachandra proposed "pramanantar-nirapeksh gyaan" (knowledge independent of other means of knowledge). While similar, these definitions struggled to apply to savikalpak perception.

4. The Debate on Nirvikalpak vs. Savikalpak Perception:

A key point of contention was the role of nirvikalpak (indeterminate) and savikalpak (determinate) knowledge:

Common Ground: Most Indian logicians (Nyaya-Vaisheshika, Jain, Buddhist, Mimamsa) agreed that sensory contact leads to nirvikalpak knowledge, which then, by recalling memory, leads to savikalpak knowledge.
Buddhist Distinction: Buddhists called the nirvikalpak knowledge "Pratyaksha" and the savikalpak knowledge "vikalpa" or "samvrita."
Jain Distinction: Jains called the savikalpak knowledge "Pratyaksha" and the nirvikalpak knowledge "Darshan" (vision).
Nyaya-Vaisheshika/Mimamsa Distinction: They termed the nirvikalpak knowledge "Nirvikalpak Pratyaksha" and the savikalpak knowledge "Savikalpak Pratyaksha."
Hemachandra's Dilemma: Hemachandra, defining Pratyaksha as knowledge independent of other means of knowledge, faced a challenge applying this to savikalpak perception, which is inherently memory-dependent. Gangesha, to avoid this, used the term "gyanakarak" instead of "gyanantar-nirapeksh" and remained silent on the role of memory. The author argues that Gangesha's attempt to compress the two-step process (sensory contact to memory recall to determinate knowledge) into one is unsuccessful.

5. The Process of Perception:

The author outlines a four-step process for perception:

Sensory contact with the object.
Sensory experience of the object.
Recollection of specific past experiences.
Determinate knowledge of the object.

The debate lies not in accepting these steps but in how to label the second and fourth steps.

6. The Buddhist View on Pratyaksha and the Problem of "All-Knower":

The book delves into the Buddhist view that nirvikalpak sensory knowledge directly apprehends all attributes of an object.

The Argument: Buddhists believed no savikalpak knowledge could apprehend all attributes, unlike yogic knowledge. They wrongly assumed that because sensory perception apprehends the existence of an object in time and space, it inherently knows all its attributes. They equated this with yogic knowledge's ability to know all attributes of all objects.
Author's Critique: The author argues this Buddhist view is flawed. They incorrectly label sensory experience (which is not determinate knowledge) as Pratyaksha and savikalpak knowledge as secondary. The author contends that sensory experience, being a preliminary step, should be called nirvikalpak but not necessarily a pramana in itself.
Influence on Jain Logicians: This Buddhist influence is seen in Jain attempts to define Pratyaksha as "clear" or "distinct" knowledge, which is problematic if both nirvikalpak and savikalpak knowledge are considered savikalpak.

7. Hemachandra's Definitions and Gangesha's Apperception:

Hemachandra's definitions, like "pratyaksha gyaan" (perception) where "pratyaksha" implies sensory contact, are seen as reflecting a belief in sensory perception that modern logicians question.
Gangesha's concept of Jnanalakshan Pratyaksha (knowledge-character perception) is compared to modern psychology's "apperception" and is seen as an attempt to explain how past knowledge influences present perception.

8. Critiques of Buddhist and other Views:

The author critiques the Buddhist assertion that sensory nirvikalpak knowledge grasps all attributes of an object, attributing it to a belief in yogic knowledge and an incomplete understanding of mental states. The author also questions the logical validity of certain types of Alaukik Pratyaksha (super-sensory perception) proposed by Gangesha.

9. Epistemological Foundation:

The book concludes by emphasizing that knowledge acquisition relies on sensory experience and the chain of thought based on it. The causal relationship between sensory experience and subsequent determinate knowledge is examined. The author highlights that the human capacity for language significantly enhances the process of gaining knowledge about an object's attributes, even beyond personal experience.

In essence, the book provides a nuanced analysis of the historical debates surrounding the definition of Pratyaksha in Indian philosophy, highlighting the shared challenges faced by different schools and their attempts to reconcile sensory experience with other forms of knowledge, particularly yogic intuition.