Bharatiya Vangamay Me Anuman Vichar

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided text from "Bharatiya Vangamay me Anuman Vichar" by Darbarilal Kothiya, focusing on the concept of inference (Anumana) in Indian literature:

The book "Bharatiya Vangamay me Anuman Vichar" (The Thought of Inference in Indian Literature) by Darbarilal Kothiya explores the historical development and philosophical nuances of inference as a means of knowledge (pramana) within the broader landscape of Indian thought.

The Significance of Inference in Indian Logic:

• Universal Acceptance (with exceptions): The text establishes that, with the exception of Charvaka (Lokayata) philosophy, all other Indian philosophical schools accept inference as a valid pramana. It is considered a crucial tool for understanding unperceived objects and for acquiring metaphysical knowledge.
• Historical Roots: The author questions the exact origin and nomenclature of inference in ancient Indian texts. While direct terms like "anumana" or its synonyms are not found in early Vedic texts like the Rigveda, the Upanishads exhibit nascent concepts that can be considered precursors.
  • "Vakovakyam" in the Upanishads: The term "vakovakyam" (dialogue, dialectic) found in the Chandogya Upanishad is interpreted by scholars like Shankara and Dr. Bhagwandas as referring to logic or a system of discourse and argumentation. This suggests an early engagement with reasoned thought.
  • Other Upanishadic Mentions: Other Upanishads mention "hetu" (reason), "drishtanta" (example), and "anumiyate" (is inferred), indicating the gradual emergence of inferential reasoning for spiritual discussions. The term "nyaya" (logic) also appears, pointing towards the development of logical frameworks.
• Early Terminology: In ancient times, terms like "hetu," "tarka," "nyaya," and "anvikshiki" were often used interchangeably to denote inference or the discipline of reasoning.

The Evolution of Anvikshiki and Related Concepts:

• Anvikshiki: The term "anvikshiki" is identified as a significant concept related to inference. Its etymological meaning, "anu" (after) + "iksha" (to see), suggests a process of subsequent examination or inquiry. Vatsyayana defines "anviksha" as a detailed understanding of objects already known through perception and scripture, and "anvikshiki" as the vidya (knowledge) that operates through this process, essentially logic or the science of inference.
• Inclusion of Soul and Reasoning: Dr. Satish Chandra Vidyabhushan suggests that "anvikshiki" encompassed both the philosophy of the soul and the methods of reasoning, noting its use by schools like Sankhya, Yoga, and Lokayata to establish or deny the existence of the soul.
• Kautilya's Arthashastra: Kautilya highlights the importance of "anvikshiki" for understanding the relative strengths of arguments, bringing stability to the intellect in happiness and sorrow, and fostering skill in wisdom, speech, and action. He likens it to a lamp that illuminates all knowledge and actions.
• Manusmriti: The Manusmriti uses terms like "tarka" and "tarko," alongside "hetuka," "anvikshiki," and "hetushastra." It explicitly states that those seeking knowledge of dharma should understand inference in addition to perception and scriptural knowledge. This indicates that "hetushastra" and "anvikshiki" were associated with inference and useful for establishing disputed or unproven entities.

Anvikshiki as a Precursor to Inference:

The text posits that "anvikshiki" can be considered a precursor to the developed concept of inference, serving as a foundational discipline for logical inquiry.

The Development of Inference in Major Philosophical Schools:

The book then delves into the specific development of inference within key Indian philosophical traditions:

• Nyaya-Darshana (Logic):

  • Gautama's Nyaya Sutras: The structured development of inference begins with Gautama's Nyaya Sutras. While Gautama's definition of inference ("tat purvakam" - that which follows from something else) is concise, his classification of inference into Purvavat (what follows from a cause), Sheshavat (what follows from an effect), and Samanyato-drishta (what follows from general observation) is foundational.
  • The Five-Limbed Syllogism (Panchavayava): Gautama also defines the five parts of an inferential argument: Pratigya (proposition), Hetu (reason), Udaharana (example), Upanaya (application), and Nigamana (conclusion).
  • Vatsyayana's Commentary: Vatsyayana's commentary significantly elaborates on Gautama's concepts. He defines inference as proceeding after perceiving the relationship between a sign (linga) and the signified (lingin). He provides examples for the three types of inference and defends the five-limbed structure against a ten-membered alternative.
  • Udyotakara and Later Nyaya: Udyotakara, Vachaspati Mishra, Jayanta Bhatta, Udayana, Gangeśa Upadhyaya, and Vishvanath are highlighted for their contributions in refining definitions, analyzing concepts like vyapti (invariable concomitance), pakshadharmata (property of the subject), and paramarsha (inferential cognition). Udyotakara's definition of inference as "linga-paramarsha" (cognition of the sign) marked a shift towards understanding inference as the cognitive act itself, rather than just the causal factors.
  • Influence of Other Schools: The development was also influenced by Buddhist logicians like Dignaga and Dharmakirti, and Vedic philosophers like Kumarila.

• Vaisheshika-Darshana:

  • Kanada's Sutras: Kanada, the founder of Vaisheshika, introduces inference through the term "laingika" (related to a sign). He mentions "hetu" (reason), "apadesha" (statement of reason), "linga" (sign), and "pramana" (means of knowledge). He also categorizes inferential reasoning based on the relationship between cause and effect, and mentions fallacies of reason (hetvabhasas).
  • Prashastapada's Commentary: Prashastapada's commentary is crucial for Vaisheshika's contribution to inference. He defines inference as "linga-darshanat sanjayamanam laingikam" (that which arises from the perception of a sign). He is credited with the first explicit description of a "tri-rūpa hetu" (reason with three characteristics): being located in the subject (pakshadharmata), being present in similar instances (sapakshavrittitva), and being absent in dissimilar instances (vipakshasattvam). This tri-rūpa framework likely influenced Buddhist logic. He also elaborates on the types of vyapti-graha (apprehension of concomitance) and introduces new categories of fallacies.

• Bauddha-Darshana (Buddhism):

  • Early Texts: Early Buddhist texts like the Brahmajala Sutta mention "tarka" and "tarkin," which are interpreted as the science of logic and logicians. While the context sometimes criticizes the misuse of logic, it acknowledges its existence and utility.
  • Dignaga and Dharmakirti: Buddhist logicians, particularly Dignaga and Dharmakirti, revolutionized Indian logic. Dignaga's work established the "tri-rūpa hetu" as the cornerstone of valid inference and developed a systematic approach to syllogism. Dharmakirti further refined these ideas, focusing on the nature of valid cognition and inference, and developing sophisticated theories of perception and inference. Their emphasis on the causal relation and the absence of fallacies significantly impacted subsequent Indian philosophical discourse.

• Mimamsa-Darshana:

  • Kumarila Bhatta: Kumarila Bhatta, a prominent Mimamsa scholar, contributed significantly to the understanding of inference, even in a tradition where logic was not primary. He composed a dedicated chapter on inference in his Shlokavartika, analyzing the nature of vyapya (the sign) and its relationship with the vyapaka (the signified), defining both direct and indirect forms of concomitance.

• Vedanta and Sankhya:

  • Vedanta: Texts like Vedantaparibhasha discuss the epistemological aspects of Vedanta, including inference.
  • Sankhya: Sankhya scholars like Ishvarakrishna accepted inference as valid and classified it into three types. Commentators like Ishvarakrishna, Mathar, and Vachaspati Mishra further elaborated on these concepts.

Jain Perspective on Inference:

The book then focuses specifically on the Jain tradition's contribution to the understanding of inference:

• Early Jain Texts: Early Jain scriptures like the Shatkhandagama mention "hetuvada" (the science of reasons), which is interpreted as synonymous with logic and inference. The Sthanangasutra uses the term "hetu" broadly for all means of knowledge, including inference, and also specifically for the reason within an inference. The Bhagavati Sutra mentions the four traditional means of knowledge, including inference, within dialogues. The Anuyogasutra provides a more detailed discussion of inferential types.
• Jain Classifications:
  • Three Types of Inference: The Anuyogasutra classifies inference into Purvavat (similar to the past), Sheshavat (similar to the remaining), and Drishtasadharmyavat (similar to what is seen by similarity). The examples provided are analyzed for their etymological meaning and potential historical connections.
  • Focus on "Abhinibodha" and "Hetuvada": The Jain tradition often uses the terms "abhinibodha" (a type of mental cognition) and "hetuvada" to refer to inference, emphasizing its role in logical reasoning and acquiring knowledge.
• Key Jain Contributions:
  • Inference within Paroksha Pramana: Unlike many other schools, Jains classify inference under Paroksha Pramana (indirect knowledge) rather than as a separate, independent pramāṇa. They argue that inference is inherently less direct and clear than perception.
  • Rejection of Arthapati as Separate: Jain logicians do not accept Arthapati (postulation) as a separate means of knowledge distinct from inference, arguing that it is a form of inference based on an indispensable relationship.
  • The Importance of "Avinabhava" (Invariable Concomitance): Jain logicians, from Samantabhadra onwards, place paramount importance on "avinabhava" (invariable concomitance or absence of exception) as the sole necessary component of inference. They argue that the presence of the three or five characteristic marks of a reason (hetu) is not sufficient for valid inference without the certainty of invariable concomitance.
  • "Hetu" as "Anyathanupapannatva": They equate the characteristic of a valid reason with "anyathanupapannatva" (being unexplainable otherwise). This concept of a single, indispensable characteristic is a significant Jain contribution.
  • "Tarka" as the sole instrument for ascertaining Vyapti: Jain thinkers, particularly Akalankadeva, emphasized "tarka" (reasoning, logical analysis) as the primary method for ascertaining "vyapti" (invariable concomitance), preceding other Indian schools in this emphasis.
  • "Tathopapatti" and "Anyathanupapatti": Jain logicians introduced the concepts of "tathopapatti" (conforming to what is proper) and "anyathanupapatti" (being unexplainable otherwise) as crucial aspects of inference.
  • Critique of Pakshadharmata: Jain logicians often consider pakshadharmata (the property of being located in the subject) as unnecessary for valid inference, highlighting examples where inference is possible through antarvyapti (internal concomitance) alone.
  • The Single Fallacy of "Akinkichkar": Based on their understanding of "hetu" as solely "anyathanupapannatva," Jain logicians argue that the only true fallacy of inference is "akinkichkar" (ineffective or non-conclusive), representing the absence of this core characteristic.
  • The Role of "Shakyata," "Abhipretata," and "Asiddhata" in Fallacies: Akalank introduced the concept of shakyata (possibility), abhipretata (intended meaning), and asiddhata (unproven) related to the object of inference, which informs the classification of fallacies.
  • Variations in Syllogistic Structure: While the classical five-limbed syllogism is recognized, Jain tradition discusses variations in the number of limbs required depending on the audience's understanding, ranging from two to ten limbs.
  • "Bala Prayogabhasa" (Fallacy of Childish Use): Manikyanandi introduced the concept of "bala prayogabhasa," referring to the improper or incomplete use of syllogistic limbs when explaining to a less knowledgeable audience.
  • "Sadhya-abhas" instead of "Pratigya-abhas": Akalank proposed using "sadhya-abhas" (fallacy of the object of inference) instead of "pratigya-abhas" (fallacy of the proposition), arguing that the logical relationship is directly with the sadhya (the object to be inferred), not merely the proposition.

Conclusion:

The book "Bharatiya Vangamay me Anuman Vichar" provides a detailed and nuanced exploration of inference in Indian thought. It highlights the shared philosophical ground while also pinpointing the unique contributions of each tradition, particularly the Jain emphasis on "avinabhava" and the meticulous analysis of inferential fallacies. The text underscores that the study of inference is not merely an academic exercise but is deeply intertwined with the pursuit of ultimate liberation (nishreyasa) in Indian philosophy.