Bharatharis Critism In Jain Logic

This document is a summary of a Jain critique of Bhartrhari's philosophy, specifically his concept of Śabdadvaita (non-duality of sound or word). The author, Dr. Narendra Kumar Dash, outlines the arguments of various Jain logicians against Bhartrhari's core tenet that Śabda (sound/word) is the substratum of the world of appearance.

Here's a breakdown of the key points:

• Bhartrhari's Śabdadvaita: Bhartrhari, a grammarian-philosopher, believed that Śabda is the fundamental reality and the basis of all existence and appearance.

• Jain Logicians' Counterarguments: The Jain tradition, through figures like Vidyanandi, Abhayadeva Suri, Prabhacandra, Vadideva Suri, and Shree Yasovijaya Jee, has extensively debated and refuted this concept.

• Critique of Perception (Pratyakṣa):

  • Jain logicians argue that Śabdabrahman is a prameya (object of knowledge) and therefore requires a pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge) for its recognition.
  • They contend that Śabdabrahman cannot be perceived through indriyajanya pratyakṣa (sense-perception). They argue that sense organs perceive things that are present and large, and Śabdabrahman doesn't fit this description. They also question which sense organ could perceive Śabdabrahman, and if it's the ear, then all things should be perceivable by all senses, which is not true.
  • They also reject atindriyapratyakṣa (suprasensuous perception). While grammarians suggest yogis can realize Śabdabrahman through meditation (dhyāna), Jains argue this would require the existence of yoga and contradict the non-dualistic principle if the yogi is distinct from Śabdabrahman.
  • The concept of svasamvedana pratyakṣa (self-awareness) is also rejected. If Śabdabrahman were self-aware, then all its manifestations (like words such as 'ghata' and 'paja') would also be self-aware, which is demonstrably false. They also point out that knowledge itself, if momentary and partless (as per Buddhist views), cannot establish the existence of an eternal Śabdabrahman.

• Critique of Inference (Anumāna):

  • Jain logicians argue that inference requires a valid middle term (linga) to establish a conclusion. They question what the linga could be for Śabdabrahman.
  • They challenge whether inference can be based on causality (kāryalingānumāna) or essential nature (svabhāvālingānumāna). Since Śabdabrahman is considered eternal and without action, causality is not applicable. If its existence is to be proven by its essential nature, then the existence of Śabdabrahman itself must first be established, creating a circular argument. Furthermore, if Śabdabrahman is changeless, how can it have an essential nature that implies action or change?

• Critique of Verbal Testimony (Śabda/Āgama):

  • Jains question whether Śabdabrahman is identical with verbal testimony or separate from it.
  • If identical, there's no cause-and-effect relationship to establish it.
  • If separate, it violates the non-dualistic principle of Śabdabrahman.
  • They also argue that verbal testimony, if considered a vivarta (manifestation/appearance) of Śabdabrahman, would be an unreal entity (asat) proving a real entity (sat), which is illogical. They challenge how asat (verbal testimony) can prove sat (Śabdabrahman).

• Rejection of Avidya (Ignorance):

  • Grammarians attempt to explain the non-manifestation of Śabdabrahman due to grāhakatvābhāva (absence of the perceiver) or avidyā (ignorance).
  • Jains reject grāhakatvābhāva because, in Śabdadvaita, Śabdabrahman itself is the perceiver and its power to be perceived is always present.
  • They also reject avidyā as an explanation because it is either identical with Śabdabrahman (which is rejected) or separate. If separate, it's either an existent or non-existent entity, both of which are refuted by Jain logic.

• Conclusion: The Jain logicians, as presented by Dash, consistently argue that the existence of Śabdabrahman, as proposed by Bhartrhari, cannot be established by any of the accepted means of valid knowledge: perception, inference, or verbal testimony. They reject the idea that the world is solely produced from an eternal Śabda and that knowledge is intrinsically tied to words in the way grammarians suggest. The text highlights a significant philosophical debate spanning centuries within the Jain tradition.