Bemerkungen Zu Isvarasenas Lehre Vom Grund

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The article "Bemerkungen zu Isvarasenas Lehre Vom Grund" by Ernst Steinkellner delves into the logical theories of Isvarasena, particularly his views on the "ground" (hetu) and the absence of the probans in the dissimilar case (vyatireka). Steinkellner uses Dharmakirti's Pramāņavārttikam (PV I) and its commentary (Pramāņavārttikasvavṛtti, PVSV) as the primary source, identifying Isvarasena as a significant interlocutor or opponent within Dharmakirti's work.

Key Areas of Analysis and Isvarasena's Contributions:

1. Dharmakirti's Interpretation of Dignāga and Isvarasena's Role:

   • Steinkellner begins by outlining Dharmakirti's discussion on the three types of grounds (hetu) and his subsequent engagement with specific issues.
   • A crucial point is Dharmakirti's interpretation of Dignāga's doctrine of "ascertainment" (niścaya) regarding the three marks of a valid ground. Dharmakirti argues that Dignāga's concept of ascertainment implicitly requires a "fixed connection" (pratibandha) between the probans and the probandum.
   • Dharmakirti criticizes inferential forms that rely on the absence of the probans in the dissimilar case (vyatireka) without guaranteeing this fixed connection, as such absence can remain doubtful.
   • Within this context, Dharmakirti addresses a particular opponent, identified as his own teacher, Isvarasena, concerning the purpose and method of establishing the absence of the probans in the dissimilar case.

2. Isvarasena's Theory of Non-Perception (Anupalabdhi) as a Means of Knowledge:

   • The Problem: Isvarasena's central contribution, as reconstructed by Steinkellner, is his response to the question of how the absence of the probans in the dissimilar case is known. He argues that mere non-observation (anupalambha) alone cannot reliably establish the absence of the ground. This is because an object might be absent simply due to distance or other observational limitations, not its actual non-existence.
   • Isvarasena's Solution: To overcome this, Isvarasena proposes that non-perception (anupalabdhi) is a distinct and third means of valid cognition (pramāņāntaram).
   • Definition of Non-Perception: For Isvarasena, non-perception is "mere absence of perception" (upalabdhyabhāvamātram). This is significant because it specifically refers to the absence of perception (pratyakṣam), not the absence of any and all means of cognition.
   • Object of Non-Perception: Consequently, the object of non-perception is the absence of the individually existing things (svalakṣaṇa). If an individual thing existed, it would be perceived. Therefore, the absence of the individual is what Isvarasena defines as "pure negation" (prasajyapratisadha).
   • Implications for Logical Theory: This novel concept of non-perception as a distinct pramāṇa necessitated a re-evaluation of the conditions for a valid ground.

3. Isvarasena's Revision of the Marks of a Valid Ground:

   • Dignāga's Three Marks: According to Dignāga (as understood by Dharmakirti), a valid ground must possess three characteristics: it is the essential characteristic of the object, it is present in the similar case (sapakṣa), and it is absent in the dissimilar case (vipakṣa).
   • Isvarasena's Four Marks: Due to the limitations of simple non-perception in establishing the absence of the probans in all dissimilar instances (the "rest" of cases), Isvarasena concludes that the three marks are insufficient to guarantee the infallibility (avyabhicāraḥ) of a ground.
   • He introduces a fourth mark: the object of the ground (the probandum) must not have been cancelled by perception (abādhitavişayatvam). In other words, the conclusion drawn from the ground must not be contradicted by direct perception in any specific instance.
   • Therefore, for Isvarasena, a ground is not solely valid based on the three marks, but also requires that its object remains uncancelled by perception. This effectively means a ground must fulfill at least four conditions to be considered conclusive.

4. Dharmakirti's Polemic Against Isvarasena:

   • Dharmakirti criticizes Isvarasena's position, particularly his concept of "śeṣavat" inference (an inference that possesses the remaining parts). Dharmakirti argues that an inference based on Isvarasena's understanding of the absence of the probans through mere non-perception is problematic.
   • Dharmakirti points out that if the absence of the probans in the dissimilar case is only established by non-perception, it leads to doubt. This is because a non-omniscient observer cannot be sure of the absence of the probans in all dissimilar instances, especially those obscured by distance or other factors.
   • The "remainder" (śeșa) of unobserved cases creates a residue of doubt, making such an inference inconclusive (anaikāntikaḥ).
   • Dharmakirti further suggests that for Isvarasena, the error (vyabhicāra) in an inference arises from the suspicion that the conclusion could be cancelled by perception. This highlights the emphasis Isvarasena places on the uncancelled nature of the object.

5. Significance of Isvarasena's Contributions:

   • Steinkellner posits that Isvarasena's work represents a significant precursor to Dharmakirti's own reformulation of Buddhist logic.
   • Isvarasena's careful consideration of Dignāga's doctrines led him to identify new problems and develop novel theories to address them.
   • His introduction of non-perception as a distinct pramāṇa and his consequent expansion of the marks of a valid ground demonstrate an active development in Buddhist epistemology and logic between Dignāga and Dharmakirti.
   • Steinkellner concludes that while Dharmakirti's critique is fierce, it implicitly acknowledges Isvarasena's attempt to advance logical theory and address fundamental epistemological challenges.

In essence, Steinkellner's article positions Isvarasena as a pivotal figure whose rigorous engagement with Dignāga's logic compelled Dharmakirti to refine and elaborate his own system, particularly concerning the establishment of negative instances and the criteria for valid inference. Isvarasena's most notable contribution discussed here is his proposal of non-perception as a unique means of knowledge, which in turn led him to advocate for a more comprehensive set of conditions for a valid logical ground.