Bauddha Pratyaksha Lakshana - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Bauddha Pratyaksha Lakshana" by Sukhlal Sanghavi, based on the given pages:

This text, "Bauddha Pratyaksha Lakshana" (The Definition of Perception in Buddhist Logic), authored by Sukhlal Sanghavi, explores the differing views on the definition of pratyaksha (perception) within Buddhist philosophical traditions and how these views were received and critiqued by later Vedic and Jain scholars.

The author identifies two main traditions within Buddhist logical thought concerning the definition of perception:

The tradition that defines perception without the qualifier "abhraanta" (non-erroneous): This tradition is primarily championed by Dingnaga. His definitions and explanations are found in works like Pramanasamuccaya (1.3) and Nyayapravesa (p. 7).
The tradition that defines perception with the qualifier "abhraanta" (non-erroneous): This tradition is primarily championed by Dharmakirti. His definitions and explanations are found in works like Nyayabindu (1.4) and its commentaries by Dharmottariya and others.

The text further highlights that Shantarakshita, in his Tattvasangraha (verse 1214), supported Dharmakirti's second tradition. The author suggests that by Shantarakshita's time, there were clear divisions among Buddhist logicians. One faction, adhering to Dingnaga's definition (without "abhraanta"), attempted to apply it even to erroneous cognitions like the perception of a yellow conch (as discussed in Tattvasangraha verse 1324).

Shantarakshita, in response to this, sought to explain the essence of Dingnaga's viewpoint in a way that would both support Dingnaga's definition (lacking "abhraanta") and preserve the validity of Dharmakirti's tradition (with "abhraanta"). Both Shantarakshita and his disciple Kamalashila held both Dingnaga and Dharmakirti in high regard, leading them to attempt a reconciliation between these two opposing Buddhist factions.

The text then notes that post-Buddhist logical treatises often critique both of these Buddhist traditions.

Works by Bhamaha (Kavyalankara 5.6, p. 32) and Uddyotakara (Nyayavarttika 1.1.4, p. 41) specifically mention Dingnaga's definition of perception.
In contrast, prominent Vedic scholars who came after Uddyotakara, such as Vachaspati (Tattvavarttika, p. 154), Jayanta (Nyayamayjari, p. 52), Sridhara (Nyayakandali, p. 160), and Shalikanatha (Prakaranapancasika, p. 47), all mention Dharmakirti's definition of perception as a preliminary point of discussion (purvapaksha) in their critiques.

The author then shifts to the Jain critique of Buddhist theories of perception. Jain scholars, in their refutations, address and counter both Dingnaga's and Dharmakirti's definitions.

A key point of discussion regarding Jain logic is the qualifier "badha-varjita" (free from contradiction/negation) found in the definition of pramana (means of valid knowledge) in Nyayavatara, attributed to Siddhasena Divakara. The text raises a question: Is this "badha-varjita" a reflection of Akshapada's (Nyayasutra 1.1.4) "avyabhichari" (non-erroneous) qualifier in his definition of perception? Is it an imitation of the "badha-varjita" in the definition of pramana attributed to Kumarila ('tatrapoorvartha-vijnanam pramanam badha-varjitam')? Or is it a transformation of Dharmakirti's "abhraanta" qualifier from Nyayabindu (1.4)? Or is it an original contribution of Divakara himself?

The author asserts that Acharya Hemachandra's critique of Buddhist theories of perception is specifically directed at Dharmakirti's tradition, not Dingnaga's. This is evidenced by Hemachandra's reference in Pramana-Mimamsa (2.3).

The text further delves into the Buddhist concept of "kalpana-apodha" (free from conceptualization) within their definition of perception. It states that there were diverse opinions among Buddhist logicians themselves regarding the meaning of the word "kalpana." This complexity can be understood through Shantarakshita's detailed discussions on the topic in Tattvasangraha (from verse 1214 onwards) and through the extensive refutations by various Vedic and Jain logicians who criticized the Buddhist position. These critiques reveal a wide range of meanings attributed to the word "kalpana." The author specifically points to the text Tattvopaplavasimha (p. 41), which is primarily a work of refutation, as presenting a comprehensive collection of the prevailing and possible interpretations of the word "kalpana" and the related arguments.

Despite this broad spectrum of interpretations, Acharya Hemachandra, in his critique, specifically addresses only the definition of "kalpana" as understood by Dharmakirti (as found in Nyayabindu 1.5), which was also accepted and supported by Shantarakshita (Tattvasangraha 1214). Hemachandra does not address other interpretations of "kalpana."

The text concludes with citations to various works supporting these discussions, including references to Pramana-Mimamsa, Nyayavarttika, Tattvavarttika, Kandali, Nyayamayjari, Tattvartha-sloka, and Prameyakamala-martanda.