Bahyartha Siddhikarika Of Subhagupta

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided text on Subhagupta's Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā:

This paper, authored by Masaaki Hattori, focuses on the Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā (Treatise Proving the Objective Reality of External Objects) by Subhagupta. The central aim of the paper is to establish the identity of Subhagupta with the Tibetan scholar Dge-sruns and to analyze the philosophical content of Subhagupta's work.

Key Arguments and Findings:

• Scholarly Debate on Subhagupta's Identity: The paper begins by outlining a scholarly debate regarding the identity of Subhagupta.

  • S. C. Vidyabhusana identified the Tibetan author Dge-sruns with Kalyānagupta and Subhagupta with śubhākaragupta (a late 11th-century Tantrika).
  • B. Bhattacharya criticized this, suggesting Haribhadrasūri might be referring to Bhadanta śubhagupta, whose views appear in the Bahir-artha-parikșa of the Tattva-samgraha. He doubted śubhākaragupta's involvement in logic following Dharmakīrti.
  • Y. Miyasaka recently proposed that Dge-sruns is the Tibetan name for śubhagupta, based on the equivalence of "dge" and "śubha," similarities in their theories of convention (sanketa), and Haribhadrasūri's dating (c. 750 AD) which predates śubhākaragupta.

• Hattori's Confirmation of Miyasaka's Theory: Hattori agrees with Miyasaka's identification of Dge-sruns and Subhagupta. He substantiates this by presenting a list of identified quotations where passages from the Bahir-artha-parikșa (attributed to Bhadanta Subhagupta) directly correspond to verses in the Bahyârtha-siddhi-kārika of Dge-sruns. This provides strong evidence for their identity.

• Content and Purpose of the Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā:

  • The treatise consists of 183 couplets.
  • It is explicitly aimed at refuting the Vijñānavāda (Consciousness-Only) theory and proving the objective reality of external objects.
  • It begins by presenting the Vijñānavāda tenet that sensory objects are not independently existent in the external world, akin to dream objects or double moons seen by those with eye ailments.
  • Subhagupta then criticizes this doctrine using various arguments.

• Engagement with Vasubandhu and Dignāga:

  • Subhagupta specifically targets the views of Vasubandhu and Dignāga, prominent Vijñānavāda philosophers.
  • He debates Vasubandhu's argument that purposive action towards an object is possible even if the object is unreal (e.g., nocturnal emission during a dream). Subhagupta counters that the ascertainment of the object (arthaniścaya), not just action, proves reality. He argues that while one can act on an illusion, true ascertainment of the object is not possible.
  • He also refutes the idea that an unreal object in a dream is indistinguishable from a real object perceived by the senses, citing the example of a child conceived in a dream versus a real child, where the latter allows for ascertainment of objective reality.
  • Subhagupta's critique extends to Dignāga's view that a visible object, being an aggregation of atoms, is not a real substance because it is apprehended through conceptual construction. Dignāga argued that such aggregations cannot produce mental reflections of their own form. Subhagupta contradicts Dignāga by asserting that an aggregation of atoms is a simple substance existing objectively.

• Critique of Dharmakīrti's Sahôpalambha-niyama:

  • While Haribhadrasūri called Subhagupta a follower of Dharmakīrti, Subhagupta evidently opposes certain theories of Dharmakīrti.
  • Specifically, Subhagupta analyzes Dharmakīrti's famous argument for the non-difference between an object (like "blue") and its cognition, based on their invariable co-presence (sahôpalambha-niyama).
  • Subhagupta dissects the meaning of "together" (saha).
    • If "together" means simultaneity, the argument is flawed, as even simultaneously operating things can be different (e.g., Buddha's intellect and a being's mind).
    • If "together" means sameness, the argument is contradictory, as "together" usually presupposes difference.
  • He further argues that if "together" implies "by one person" (eka), the reason is unproven, as an object cognized by one is also cognized by another. Even if "one" means "as one," it contradicts the omniscience of a Buddha who recognizes differences.
  • Hattori concludes that Subhagupta's interpretation of sahôpalambha-niyama as a necessary relation between cognition and external objects is realist, while Dharmakīrti's theory is indicative of his Vijñānavāda leaning. This suggests Subhagupta was not a direct follower of Dharmakīrti's thought.

• Dating of Subhagupta: Based on these analyses and connections, Subhagupta is dated to approximately 650-750 AD, placing him after Dharmakīrti and before Śāntarakṣita and Haribhadrasūri.

• Further Research: The paper notes that Subhagupta might have been a teacher of Dharmottara, but conclusive evidence is lacking. It also acknowledges recent corroboration of Subhagupta's identity with Dge-sruns by E. Frauwallner.

In essence, Hattori's paper meticulously re-establishes the identity of the Indian Buddhist philosopher Subhagupta with the Tibetan Dge-sruns and provides a detailed analysis of his Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā, highlighting its significance as a realist critique of Vijñānavāda, particularly the arguments of Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and even Dharmakīrti himself, in defense of the objective existence of the external world.