Avita And Avita

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Avita And Avita" by Eli Franco, focusing on the scholarly discussion of the terms vita and avita:

The paper "Avita And Avita" by Eli Franco delves into the complex etymology and historical usage of the Sanskrit terms vita and avita in Indian philosophical discourse, particularly within the Samkhya and Nyaya traditions. The central aim of the study is to investigate which of these two variant spellings (avita vs. avita) is the original and more accurate term.

Franco begins by referencing the work of Erich Frauwallner, who reconstructed parts of the Sastitantra and identified vita and avita as modes of reasoning, translating them as "direct (justification)" and "indirect (justification)" respectively. Frauwallner's work highlights that these terms are not unique to Samkhya but also appear in Nyaya texts, with the indirect proof often designated as avita.

A significant portion of the paper is dedicated to examining the textual evidence for both vita and avita. Franco notes that while avita appears more frequently in later texts and commentaries, there's a crucial early manuscript, the Spitzer manuscript, which offers strong support for the reading avita. This manuscript, dated to the 2nd-3rd century AD, is identified as potentially the earliest philosophical Sanskrit manuscript discovered. Its presence of avita significantly predates hitherto earliest known references to the term, suggesting that avita was well-established earlier than the Sastitantra.

Franco then explores the literal meanings of these terms. He analyzes various scholarly interpretations, including:

• "Direct" and "indirect": Frauwallner's contextual translation, widely adopted but not literal.
• "Positive" and "negative": Used by some scholars, like H. Jacobi.
• "Modus ponens" and "modus tollens": P. Chakravarti's interpretation.
• "Inference by elimination": As used in the Yuktidipika.

A key point of contention arises from the etymology. Franco critically examines attempts to derive vita and avita from the same verbal root, particularly the root vi (to go). While vita is reasonably understood as derived from vi + vi (meaning "going apart" or "going in different directions"), the derivation of avita from a + vi + vi proves problematic due to the rarity of the prefix combination and the difficulty in assigning a logical meaning to a "covered" or "concealed" inference.

Franco proposes an alternative etymological explanation:

• Vita: Likely derived from the root vi with the prefix vi, signifying a reasoning that "goes apart" or has various modes, possibly aligning with the five modes mentioned in the Sastitantra.
• Avita: Franco suggests avita might be derived from the root vvi (to have in view, to approach) with the prefix a. This interpretation aligns better with the concept of reasoning, and the Tibetan translation of avita as bsal te 'ons pa is seen as potentially supporting this, especially if bsal (to remove/reject) is intended to reflect the exclusion of alternatives.

Crucially, Franco argues that the variant avita is likely the original reading. This is supported by:

1. The Spitzer manuscript: Providing the earliest direct evidence for avita.
2. The Tibetan translations: Which seem to understand vita as derived from vi+Vi.
3. The difficulty in deriving avita consistently from the same roots as vita.
4. The observation that avita might be a "secondary simplification" of avita.

Franco also addresses the influence of later commentators like Vacaspatimisra, who interpreted avita as a privative form of vita, potentially leading to the widespread adoption of avita in manuscript traditions, including the Yuktidipika. He suggests that some manuscripts of the Yuktidipika may have been "corrected" to reflect avita due to the popularity of commentaries that used this form.

Finally, Franco emphasizes that while vita and avita are strongly associated with Samkhya, they were not exclusively Samkhya terms. They appear in other traditions, including Nyaya and even in the context of Buddhist arguments. They were likely part of a broader vāda-tradition (tradition of public debate) in early Indian logic. The persistence of vita-avita in Samkhya, even as terms became archaic in other schools, is attributed to the relative stability of Samkhya logic. The paper concludes by suggesting that while avita is likely the original reading, the established usage of avita in many texts should be respected, acknowledging the complex historical development of these terms.