Asvaghosa And Vaisesika

This academic article, "Aśvaghoṣa and Vaiśeṣika" by Johannes Bronkhorst, challenges the established view that the early Buddhist poet and philosopher Aśvaghoṣa was unaware of the Vaiśeṣika philosophical system. Bronkhorst argues that specific passages in Aśvaghoṣa's Buddhacarita are best understood when interpreted through the lens of Vaiśeṣika thought, suggesting a level of familiarity that contradicts earlier scholarly conclusions.

The article begins by acknowledging E.H. Johnston's influential assertion that Aśvaghoṣa was entirely ignorant of Vaiśeṣika, a claim based on the absence of its mention in his works compared to later Buddhist texts that explicitly include it. Johnston's argument from silence is considered strong due to his thorough textual knowledge. However, Bronkhorst presents a passage in the twelfth chapter of the Buddhacarita (12.77) where the Bodhisattva debates with his teacher Arāda Kālāma.

While Arāda's teachings are largely aligned with Sāmkhya, containing notions like kṣetrajña (knower of the field), Bronkhorst highlights a specific point of contention for the Bodhisattva: the persistence of a "self" or "soul" (Ātman). The Bodhisattva argues that liberation is impossible as long as the notion of a self remains. The passage in question, Buddhacarita 12.77, discusses liberation in relation to "qualities" (guṇa) and "number" (saṁkhyā).

Bronkhorst reinterprets Johnston's translation of this verse, which struggled with the term saṁkhyā. He proposes that in the context of Vaiśeṣika, saṁkhyā refers to "number," which Vaiśeṣika considers a quality. Even a liberated soul, from a Vaiśeṣika perspective, would possess the quality of having a number (e.g., being one among many liberated souls). The article cites the Prasastapāda's Padārthadharmasaṁgraha to list qualities that can reside in the soul, including "number," and notes that some of these persist even in liberation according to Vaiśeṣika. This leads to a revised translation of the stanza, where the criticism is directed at the idea that a soul not released from qualities like "number" is not devoid of qualities and therefore not liberated.

The argument is further strengthened by the following stanza (Buddhacarita 12.78), which discusses the inseparability of qualities from their possessor. Bronkhorst contrasts this with Sāmkhya, which, as understood from early sources, viewed material objects as mere collections of qualities. Vaiśeṣika, however, consistently distinguished between qualities and the possessor of qualities. Thus, a criticism denying this distinction would make more sense directed at Vaiśeṣika than Sāmkhya.

The article then analyzes stanzas 12.80-81, where the Bodhisattva uses the term kṣetrajña (a Sāmkhya term) but presents an argument that strongly resonates with Vaiśeṣika thought. The criticism centers on the nature of a disembodied knower of the field: if it is knowing, it has an object and thus cannot be liberated; if it is unknowing, then the concept of a soul is unnecessary, as even inanimate objects like logs or walls are unknowing. Bronkhorst argues that this criticism targets the Vaiśeṣika view that consciousness or knowledge (buddhi) is a quality of the soul that ceases upon liberation. In this liberated state, the Vaiśeṣika soul is unconscious, akin to a log or wall, a view that has been ridiculed but is integral to their system. The presence of this specific criticism in Aśvaghoṣa's work suggests his familiarity with this Vaiśeṣika doctrine.

Finally, Bronkhorst turns to recent scholarship by Eli Franco concerning early Vaiśeṣika theories of qualities. Franco's work on fragments from the Spitzer manuscript (dating to the 3rd century CE) reveals an early Vaiśeṣika position that differs in some aspects from later texts, including the idea of an omnipresent soul and qualities that can be "contracted into a minute state." Bronkhorst speculates that this concept of "contraction" might have been a Vaiśeṣika response to the objection raised in the Buddhacarita regarding the persistence of qualities like "number" in a liberated soul. While acknowledging this as speculation, it suggests that such objections were indeed a topic of discussion and potential defense within the Vaiśeṣika school.

In conclusion, Bronkhorst's article makes a compelling case for Aśvaghoṣa's acquaintance with Vaiśeṣika philosophy, based on his interpretation of specific argumentative points in the Buddhacarita. This challenges previous assumptions and suggests a more dynamic intellectual exchange between early Buddhist and Vaiśeṣika thinkers than previously recognized.