Arth Me Mul Aur Uska Samadhan

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Arth mein Mul aur uska Samadhan" by Bansidhar Pandit:

The book "Arth mein Mul aur uska Samadhan" (Mistakes in Meaning and Their Solutions) by Bansidhar Pandit aims to address and correct perceived errors in the interpretation of certain philosophical and linguistic concepts within Jain tradition, particularly as found in classical texts and their commentaries. The author expresses concern that some misinterpretations, once established in tradition, are accepted without critical examination. He presents two specific instances where he believes the traditional understanding is flawed and offers his own reasoned corrections.

Instance 1: Analysis of a passage from Nyayadeepika

• The Passage: The author cites a passage from Nyayadeepika: "Asadharana dharmavachanam lakshanamiti kecit, tad anupapannam lakshyamivachanasya lakshana dharmavachanamhi samadhikaranAbhaavaprasangat."
• The Traditional Interpretation (as per a Hindi commentary by Pt. Khubchand Ji): According to this commentary, some scholars define a characteristic (lakshana) as something that is absolutely uncommon (asadharana dharma). This view is deemed incorrect because, for a characteristic to be valid, the thing being described (lakshya) and the characteristic (lakshana) must reside in the same "locus" (ek adhikaran). If this is not the case, then the characteristic of a pot (ghata) would have to be considered a cloth (pata), which is absurd. The commentary further explains that according to the proponent of this view, the characteristic resides in the lakshya, and the lakshya resides in its parts. For example, the characteristic of earth (prithvi) is smell (gandha). Smell resides in earth, and earth resides in its parts. This leads to an impossibility.
• Pandit Bansidhar Pandit's Critique of the Traditional Interpretation:
  1. The "One Locus" Rule: Pandit Pandit argues that the rule of needing a single locus for lakshya and lakshana is not universally applicable. He uses the analogy of milk and water in one pot, where they share a locus, yet the objection of mutual lakshya-lakshana relationship still persists. Similarly, taste (rasa) and form (roopa) always reside in the same locus, making the objection clear there.
  2. Nyayadeepika's Own Stance: He points out that the author of Nyayadeepika itself does not accept the strict one-locus rule. For instance, the characteristic of fire is heat (ushnata), and the characteristic of Devadatta is a staff (danda). No scholar would accept a single locus for these.
  3. Misinterpretation of "Resides in Parts": The commentary's claim that according to the Naiyayikas (logicians), the characteristic resides in the lakshya, and the lakshya resides in its parts, is also deemed incorrect. Pandit Pandit clarifies that a characteristic does not necessarily reside in the "parts" of the lakshya. Moreover, according to Naiyayikas, a quality's characteristic resides in the quality itself, and the quality resides in the substance (dravya), not its parts. Therefore, stating that the lakshya resides in its parts is a generalization that needs careful consideration.
• Pandit Bansidhar Pandit's Proposed Correct Interpretation:
  • "Vachana" means word or sentence. In defining a characteristic, there are two parts: the lakshya-vachana and the lakshana-vachana.
  • Naiyayikas define a characteristic as the statement of an uncommon characteristic. If the lakshana-vachana is a statement of a characteristic, then the lakshya-vachana must be a statement of the substance possessing the characteristic.
  • Examples like "Samyagjnanam pramanam" (Right knowledge is proof) and "Gandhavati prithvi" (Earth having smell) illustrate this. In these, "samyagjnana" (right knowledge) is the characteristic of "pramana" (proof), and "gandhavati" (having smell) is the characteristic of "prithvi" (earth). Therefore, "samyagjnana" and "gandhavati" are lakshana-vachanas, and "pramana" and "prithvi" are lakshya-vachanas.
  • Crucially, the thing denoted by the lakshya-vachana is the same as the thing denoted by the lakshana-vachana. This is called samadhikaranya (co-ordination or apposition). This co-ordination is necessary because without it, words in the same grammatical case cannot be used.
  • Samadhikaranya is defined as the usage of words with different "grounds of activity" (pravritti nimitta) to refer to the same meaning. For instance, "samyagjnana" has the ground of activity of "samyagjnana-tva," while "pramana" has the ground of activity of "pramana-tva." Both point to the same entity because right knowledge is proof.
  • Therefore, the Naiyayika definition of a characteristic as the statement of an uncommon characteristic is correct, but it necessitates that the lakshya-vachana and lakshana-vachana refer to the same meaning (samadhikaranya). The traditional commentary's argument that this leads to an impossibility is flawed.

Instance 2: Analysis of a passage from Aptapariksha

• The Passage: The passage in question relates to the definition of "dravya" (substance) and is quoted from page 4 of an older edition of Aptapariksha: "Syanmatam pathivyaptejo vayvakashakaladigatmamanamsi navadravyani. Dravyapadasyarthi iti cet, katham eko dravyapadaarthah? Samanyasanjnabhidhanat'iti chet na samanyasanjnayah samanyavadvishayatvat. Tadarthasya samanyapadarthatve tato visheshapravrittiprasangat; dravyapadarthasyekyasiddheshcha." (Old version of the text.)
• Common Correction: The author notes that in many schools, "samanyavadvishayatvat" is corrected to "samanyavishayatvat," and newer editions even omit the "vat" word. He argues that such corrections, without providing alternative readings, hinder the search for the correct text. He asserts that the original reading with "vat" is indeed correct.
• The Context and the Argument: The author explains that the question concerns the attempt by a proponent (vadi) to establish "dravya" as a single category, despite the Vaiyashika school accepting nine substances (earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, direction, soul, and mind) as the meaning of the word "dravya." The proponent argues that "dravya" is a general name for these nine. The opponent's counter-argument, which Pandit Pandit analyzes, is that a general name (samanya sanjna) refers to something possessing generality ("samanya-vat"), not generality itself ("samanya").
• Pandit Bansidhar Pandit's Analysis of the Opponent's Argument (as presented in Aptapariksha):
  1. Argument 1: "Samanya-vat" Subject Matter: A general name refers to something that possesses generality, not generality itself. This is because people's actions (like bringing or seeing) are directed towards specific instances like earth or water, not towards the abstract concept of "dravyatva" (the generality of being a substance). Therefore, the word "dravya" refers to specific substances possessing generality (like earth, water, etc.).
  2. Argument 2: The Consequence of General Meaning: If "dravya" were understood as merely the generality of "dravyatva," then people would not direct their actions towards specific substances like earth or water upon hearing the word "dravya," but they do. This makes the interpretation of "dravya" as abstract generality illogical.
  3. Argument 3: Failure to Establish Singularity: Even if "dravya" were accepted as the abstract generality of "dravyatva," it would not establish "dravya" as a single substance-entity. The reason for this is further explained later in the text.

Pandit Pandit expresses hope that these identified "mistakes" in meaning will be corrected and invites feedback from scholars.

The text then includes a commentary by Late Pt. Mahendrakumar Ji Jain Nyayatirth, a professor at Syadvad Mahavidyalaya, Kashi, who reviewed Pandit Pandit's article in "Jain Mitra" (May 4, 1933).

Pt. Mahendrakumar Ji's Comments:

• On Nyayadeepika: He distinguishes between "atmabhuta lakshana" (inherent characteristic) and "anatmbhuta lakshana" (non-inherent characteristic). For "anatmbhuta lakshana," samadhikaranya (co-ordination) is not necessary because the characteristic is not intrinsically part of the thing. In "Dandah purusya" (The staff belongs to the man), there is no samadhikaranya in terms of residing in the same locus, nor in terms of meaning. He argues that the characteristic of being knowledgeable (samadhikaranya in meaning) in "Samyagjnanam pramanam" is different from the situation with "Dandah purusya" where the staff does not necessarily identify the man, and the man does not necessarily identify the staff. For "atmabhuta lakshana," samadhikaranya is essential. If this samadhikaranya is in terms of meaning, it can also be in terms of locus.
• On the Analogy of Milk and Water: He disputes the idea that milk and water sharing a pot or taste and form sharing a substance implies a lakshya-lakshana relationship. He explains that lakshya-lakshana is a "vyapya" (dependent) of samadhikaranya, which is "vyapaka" (all-encompassing). Where there is atmabhuta lakshya-lakshana, there must be samadhikaranya, but samadhikaranya doesn't necessarily imply lakshya-lakshana.
• On Fire and Heat: He states that fire and heat share a common locus because the basis of heat is fire itself. They have a partial identity (kathyanchit tadatmya). If they didn't, the concept of quality and qualified substance would be lost.
• Naiyayika View on Substances and Qualities: He clarifies that for Naiyayikas, substances, qualities, and actions are distinct entities with a relationship of "samavaya" (inherence), not "kathyanchit tadatmya." Thus, a substance's characteristic resides in the substance, which resides in its parts (different locus). A quality's characteristic resides in the quality, which resides in the substance (different locus). This inherent difference in locus leads to the "asambhava dosha" (impossibility fault) if a characteristic is applied to a faulty locus.
• The Distinction of "Atmabhuta" Lakshana: He believes the underlying reason for distinguishing "atmabhuta" lakshana is the need for samadhikaranya.

The text concludes with Pandit Bansidhar Pandit's reply to Pt. Mahendrakumar Ji:

• Meaning vs. Locus: Pandit Pandit reiterates that samadhikaranya in meaning ("ekartha-pratipadakatva") is related to words and applies to both "atmabhuta" and "anatmbhuta" lakshanas. Samadhikaranya in locus ("ekadhara-vrittitva") is related to the actual things and is found where they share a locus.
• The Problem with "Gandhavati Prithvi": He argues that if the shared locus is the determinant of lakshya-lakshana, then even Naiyayikas, who accept "Gandhavati Prithvi" as a characteristic, would face a problem, as smell and earth might not always share the same locus. He states that Jains don't reject "gandha" as a characteristic of "prithvi" because of an impossibility fault, but because smell is not an uncommon characteristic (it is also found in water, etc.). He asserts that "gandha" does serve as a signifier for earth for the Naiyayikas, even if they don't share a locus. Therefore, arguing for an "asambhava dosha" based on differing loci is not appropriate.
• The Nature of "Dandi Purushah": He analyzes "Dandi Purushah" (The man with a staff) as an "anatmbhuta" lakshana. He questions why, if samadhikaranya is absent, it should be considered faulty, but in "Samyagjnanam Pramanam," the shared meaning is considered samadhikaranya. He insists that in "Dandi Purushah," the word "Dandi" denotes a person with a staff, and this is the same meaning as the word "Purushah." Thus, even in "anatmbhuta" lakshana, there is samadhikaranya in meaning.
• Shared Locus as a Determinant: He challenges the idea that shared locus determines lakshya-lakshana. He points out that taste and form, or milk and water, share a locus, but that doesn't automatically make them lakshya-lakshana. He reiterates that lakshya-lakshana is not universally governed by samadhikaranya.
• The Concept of "Tadatmya": He explains the Jain concept of "tadatmya" (partial identity) between form-possessor and form, and quality-possessor and quality. This involves both difference and non-difference. The non-difference is why heat is the form of fire, and the difference is what allows us to speak of a quality and its possessor.
• Focus on Words: He concludes by returning to the original point: Nyayadeepika's argument is about the lack of samadhikaranya between the words (lakshya-vachana and lakshana-vachana), not necessarily between the actual things. He insists that samadhikaranya in meaning ("ekartha-pratipadakatva") is present in both "atmabhuta" and "anatmbhuta" lakshanas.

In essence, the book is a detailed philosophical and linguistic debate on the precise definitions and applicability of terms like "lakshana" (characteristic), "lakshya" (thing characterized), and "samadhikaranya" (co-ordination), aiming to refine these concepts within Jain philosophical discourse.