Anuman

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text about Anumāna (Inference), based on the excerpt from Sukhlal Sanghavi's work:

Anumāna: The Nature and Development of Inference in Jain Philosophy

This text, Anumāna, authored by Sukhlal Sanghavi, delves into the philosophical concept of inference, a crucial means of knowledge (pramāṇa) within Indian philosophical traditions, particularly Jainism. The author traces the evolution of the understanding of anumāna through different historical periods and its specific development within Jainism.

Understanding the Term "Anumāna"

The word "Anumāna" itself has two primary meanings:

• Anumiti (Inferential Cognition): When the word is used in an abstract sense, it refers to the resulting knowledge gained through inference.
• Anumitikaraṇa (Instrument of Inference): When used instrumentally, it refers to the means by which inferential knowledge is obtained.

The word is analyzed into its components: "anu" (after, following) and "māna" (knowledge, cognition). Therefore, anumāna signifies knowledge that arises after some other knowledge. This "other knowledge" is specifically the knowledge of the linga (sign, middle term) and its vyāpti (invariable concomitance) with the sādhya (thing to be inferred, major term). This crucial inferential link is also known as lingaparamarśa.

A key distinction is drawn between pratyakṣa (perception) and anumāna. While pratyakṣa is not necessarily dependent on prior knowledge, anumāna is always knowledge-dependent. This dependence is hinted at by the term "tat-purvakam" (preceded by that) in the Nyaya Sutras, indicating that inference always follows some other knowledge.

The Role of Perception in Inference

Crucially, the text emphasizes that all inference, regardless of its subject matter or the type of hetu (reason/cause) involved, ultimately has its roots in perceptual knowledge. It's impossible to have inference without some form of perception at its foundation. While perception is independent in its origination, inference is always dependent on it.

Historical Development of the Concept of Anumāna

The author divides the philosophical development of anumāna into three periods:

1. Vedic Period: The formal study of the definition and types of anumāna began in the Vedic tradition. While the exact origin is unknown, its early development is found in ancient Vedic texts. Both Jain and Buddhist traditions initially adopted this Vedic understanding. The Vedic period saw two main streams of thought regarding anumāna:

   • Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṁsaka Tradition: These traditions, as seen in the works of Praśastapāda and Śābara, primarily describe two types of inference. The author speculates that these traditions might have been originally unified.
   • Nyaya, Sāṁkhya, and Caraka Tradition: These traditions, on the other hand, outline three types of inference. While the terminology for these types might differ slightly across texts, the foundational concept remains the same. Examples, however, vary.

2. Buddhist Period (Starting from the 5th Century CE): This era marks a significant shift. Buddhist logicians, most notably Dignāga, challenged the Vedic understanding of inference. Dignāga formulated an independent definition of anumāna and proposed its types based on a Buddhist perspective. His approach was widely adopted by subsequent Buddhist scholars like Dharmakīrti. This led to a strong intellectual debate between Vedic and Buddhist logicians, with the former defending their traditions and the latter critiquing them.

   • Impact on Jainism: The Buddhist critique also influenced Jain philosophy. Jain logicians like Siddhasena began to formulate their own independent definitions of inference. Bhaṭṭāraka Akalaṅka went further, not only formulating his own definitions but also initiating a critique of the Vedic classification of inference, a critique that was further elaborated by later Digambara Jain scholars like Vidyānanda.

   The Buddhist period resulted in two main outcomes:

   • Independent Formulations: Both Buddhist and Jain traditions developed independent definitions and classifications of inference, often critiquing the Vedic models that their earlier proponents had adopted.
   • Mutual Critiques: A clear front of debate emerged between Vedic and Buddhist logicians, with extensive refutations and defenses of their respective theories of inference.

3. Neo-Nyāya Period (Starting with Upādhyāya Gaṅgeśa): This period saw a refinement and subtle modification of the Vedic understanding of inference by Upādhyāya Gaṅgeśa. His elaborated definitions were accepted by subsequent Neo-Nyāya and other Vedic philosophical schools. By this time, Buddhist logicians had largely faded from prominence, so their engagement with this new phase is less evident. However, Jain tradition continued to engage with these developments. Jain scholars like Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya studied Neo-Nyāya, yet their works on epistemology (like Tarkabhāṣā) did not explicitly accept or reject the refined Neo-Nyāya definition of anumāna. Instead, they maintained the traditional Jain understanding of inference.

Jain Tradition's Specific Path

• Early Jainism: The earliest mention of three types of inference in Jainism appears in the Anuyogadvāra Sūtra (circa 1st Century CE). The terminology used is identical to that of the Nyaya school. However, the examples provided in Anuyogadvāra Sūtra also implicitly encompass the two-fold classification found in the Vaiśeṣika-Mīmāṁsaka tradition, suggesting a nuanced integration.
• Acharya Hemacandra: Hemacandra's definition of anumāna aligns with the earlier Jain logicians like Siddhasena and Akalaṅka. A notable aspect of Hemacandra's contribution is his abandonment of the critique of the Vedic three-fold classification of inference, which had been a common practice among earlier Jain scholars (including Śvetāmbara logicians like Abhayadeva and Vādī Devasūri).
  • Resolution of Inconsistency: This abandonment by Hemacandra is seen as resolving an inconsistency within the Śvetāmbara tradition. Earlier, Āryarakṣita, a revered Jain āgama-dhara, had extensively supported the Nyaya-based three-fold inference, but his successors, like Abhayadeva, had vehemently critiqued it. This created a contradiction. Hemacandra, by not critiquing the three-fold classification, brought Śvetāmbara Jainism back in line with earlier support for this division, arguably by following the path of Digambara scholars like Akalaṅka who did not recognize Āryarakṣita's work and therefore their critique wasn't inherently contradictory to their own tradition's lineage.
• Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya: Following Hemacandra's lead in not rejecting the Vedic three-fold classification of anumāna, Yaśovijaya also refrained from doing so in his Tarkabhāṣā. However, he did reject the Nyaya-centric five characteristics of a valid middle term (hetu).

In essence, Anumāna by Sukhlal Sanghavi provides a detailed historical and philosophical survey of the concept of inference, highlighting its Vedic origins, its transformation in the Buddhist period, and its specific evolution and nuances within Jain philosophical thought, particularly in relation to its engagement with other Indian traditions.