Antarvyapti Interpreted In Jainism

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The article explores the concept of antarvyāpti (internal concomitance) in Jain logic, contrasting it with bahirvyāpti (external concomitance). The author, Atsushi Uno, argues that Siddhasen Divākara's Nyāyāvatāra (circa 8th century) was likely the first to use the term "antarvyāpti," though scholarly debate exists regarding its earliest user.

Key Concepts and Definitions:

• Antarvyāpti: The invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between the probans (hetu) and the probandum (sādhya) that is found within the subject of the argument (pakṣa). It means the relationship is grasped internally to the argument's subject.
• Bahirvyāpti: The invariable concomitance found outside the pakṣa, typically established through an external example (dṛṣṭānta).
• Pakṣa: The subject of the argument (e.g., the mountain in "the mountain has fire").
• Sādhya: The predicate to be proved (e.g., fire).
• Hetu: The reason or probans (e.g., smoke).
• Dṛṣṭānta: An example used to demonstrate the vyāpti, usually an external instance (e.g., a kitchen).

The Core Argument:

Uno contends that antarvyāpti signifies a more direct and self-contained mode of inference. When the logical relationship (vyāpti) between the hetu and sādhya is understood within the pakṣa itself, then citing an external example (bahirvyāpti) becomes redundant or "useless" (vyartha). The author highlights that the Nyāyāvatāra emphasizes that if the establishment of the probandum is secured solely by antarvyāpti, then the citation of an external example is futile, even if the internal concomitance is absent or unknown.

Historical Development:

• The Nyāyāvatāra is identified as a foundational text for the concept, with its commentary by Siddharṣi and sub-commentary by Devabhadra.
• Later Jain works like Devasūri's Pramāṇanayatattvāloka (PNT) and Hemacandra's Pramāṇamīmāṁsā (PrM) further developed the theory, often taking the Nyāyāvatāra's description almost verbatim.
• Interestingly, the term "antarvyāpti" appears to have declined in usage in later Jain works, though it was adopted and adapted by later Buddhist logicians like Ratnākaraśānti.

The Role of the Dṛṣṭānta:

The article delves into the function and necessity of the dṛṣṭānta. It explains that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school traditionally considers the dṛṣṭānta as the third member of the syllogism, crucial for convincing the opponent, especially those of "slow understanding." However, the Jain tradition, particularly in the context of antarvyāpti, begins to question the indispensable nature of the dṛṣṭānta.

• The author draws a contrast with Western logic's three-membered syllogism and later Indian schools (Buddhism, Mīmāṁsā, Śāṅkara-Vedānta) which prioritize the vyāpti and pakṣadharmatā over the dṛṣṭānta.
• Hemacandra, in PrM, explicitly argues that the dṛṣṭānta is not an indispensable cause of inference, as inferential knowledge is established by the probans (hetu) alone. He argues that the dṛṣṭānta's utility is limited to helping recall the vyāpti or satisfying the opponent, but it doesn't inherently cause knowledge.

Interpretations from Commentaries (Vivṛti):

The Vivṛti on the Nyāyāvatāra provides a nuanced perspective on when the external example is useful or useless:

1. Opponent forgets the vyāpti: External example is useful.
2. Opponent remembers the vyāpti (is conversant): External example is useless because antarvyāpti suffices.
3. Opponent is ignorant of the vyāpti: External example is useless. In this case, tarka (reasoning/logic) is needed first to establish the vyāpti, and only then can sādhya be proven. Antarvyāpti does not function here until tarka clarifies it.

Later Works and Nuances:

• The Pramāṇanayatattvāloka (PNT) is noted for introducing the term "bahyavyāpti" (external vyāpti) and for suggesting that the hetu is the primary cause of inference, with antarvyāpti as a sub-cause.
• The article analyzes specific examples from these texts to illustrate how antarvyāpti functions when a dṛṣṭānta is absent or deemed unnecessary. For instance, arguments where the pakṣa itself represents the highest connotation (like "entity" or "existence") naturally rely on antarvyāpti because no external example can encompass such universal subjects.
• The concept of kevalānvayi anumāna (inference based only on positive concomitance) in the Naiyāyika tradition is also discussed, with the example "Everything is nameable because of knowability" being cited as potentially a modified form of what Jainism would consider antarvyāpti, especially when the subject is universal.

Summary of Functions:

The article concludes by summarizing the core distinctions:

• Antarvyāpti: Functions when vyāpti is sought within the pakṣa, and the dṛṣṭānta is not required.
• Bahirvyāpti: Operates when vyāpti is sought in the dṛṣṭānta, typically to aid a less astute opponent.
• Even with similar arguments (like smoke and fire), the presence or absence of a dṛṣṭānta dictates whether bahirvyāpti or antarvyāpti functions.
• Syllogisms might lack a dṛṣṭānta due to the opponent's faculty, the unavailability of positive vyāpti, or when the pakṣa is a universal concept.

In essence, Atsushi Uno's work highlights a sophisticated development in Jain logic where the internal grasp of the logical relationship within the argument itself (antarvyāpti) is presented as a more potent and sometimes sufficient basis for inference, challenging the absolute necessity of external examples for establishing logical validity.