Anekanta Ahimsa And Question Of Pluralism

Here's a comprehensive summary of Anne Vallely's "Anekānta, Ahimsā and the Question of Pluralism":

Anne Vallely's paper explores the intricate relationship between Jainism's core principles of Anekānta (many-sidedness) and Ahimsa (non-violence), and their implications for the contemporary concept of pluralism. She posits that Anekānta offers a unique framework for navigating the challenges of religious and philosophical diversity without succumbing to either extreme moral relativism or religious exclusivism.

Vallely begins by highlighting the traditional understanding of Anekānta and Ahimsā as mutually reinforcing concepts. The acceptance of partial knowledge (Anekānta) is seen as an expression of non-violence, while a commitment to non-violence naturally leads to a pluralistic outlook. However, she immediately raises a critical question: can one uphold Ahimsā as a normative ethical ideal and simultaneously accept as morally valid the beliefs and practices of those who reject it? She points to the common critique that true pluralism is a logical impossibility, as all worldviews require some criteria of truth, making genuine pluralism either a form of moral relativism or another kind of religious exclusivism.

The author then presents an "Experiment with Jain Pluralism" during her year-long stay at the Jain Vishva Bharati Institute (JVBI). Despite the JVBI's unwavering commitment to Ahimsā, evidenced by strict rules against meat and alcohol, Vallely was struck by the prominent display of wisdom from other traditions, such as a saying from Jesus emphasizing humility. This observation sets the stage for the central tension: how can one strongly hold to their own beliefs while also acknowledging the validity of opposing viewpoints?

Vallely recounts her experience teaching Christianity to Jain nuns (samaņis). Initially, the dialogues were smooth as she focused on historical aspects. However, when she shifted to moral stories and theological interpretations, challenges arose. The nuns, steeped in the Jain worldview, found certain Christian narratives, like the raising of Lazarus and turning water into wine, difficult to reconcile with their understanding of spiritual progress and ethical principles. They questioned the "why" behind these miracles, interpreting them through their own lens of tapas (austerities) and karuņā (compassion), sometimes seeing them as crude or materialistic compared to Jain ideals. Vallely admits her struggle to articulate the deeper theological significance of these stories in a way that resonated with the nuns, feeling she was failing to do justice to Christianity and potentially undermining Jain principles by framing it as a flawed view (mithyadarśana).

Reflecting on this experience, Vallely questions the true promise of pluralism. She realizes that in her attempt to share Christianity, she and the nuns had, in effect, translated Christianity into a Jain idiom, rather than genuinely engaging with it on its own terms. This leads her to discuss the critiques of pluralism by scholars like Gavin D'Costa, who argue that pluralism is inherently exclusivist because it inevitably relies on tradition-specific criteria for truth. Nicholas Rescher and Richard Shweder are also cited for their arguments that celebrating diversity often falls short of true pluralism, as most people reject the logical consequence that if others are justified in their different conceptions, then one's own conception might not be uniquely justified. This creates an epistemological impasse, leaving individuals with either inherently exclusivist ways of knowing or retreating into subjectivism and moral relativism.

Vallely then proposes Anekāntavāda as a potential way out of this epistemological dilemma. She emphasizes that Anekānta is considered fundamental to a non-violent way of knowing. Unlike other pluralist positions that focus solely on epistemology, Anekānta's strength lies in its metaphysical contention that reality itself is many-sided. This means that no single viewpoint is definitive, as reality, not just human perception, is inherently complex and contradictory.

Drawing on the concept of nayas (logically distinct viewpoints, each coherent and true in its context but ultimately partial), Jainism, through Anekānta, recognizes that no tradition holds a monopoly on truth. It doesn't merely "permit" diversity but ideally mandates an encounter with it, believing that a fuller picture of reality emerges only through exposure to different ways of knowing and being.

Vallely argues that by accepting reality as manifold, Anekāntavāda can logically support the four propositions of pluralism, particularly the fourth: that if others are rationally justified in their different conceptions, then one's own conception can also be rationally justified. This is not illogical if reality itself is multifaceted. Anekāntavāda helps to overcome the postmodern epistemological confusion by affirming an existent reality, albeit one that is understood as "many-sided" and revealing itself in manifold ways.

In conclusion, Vallely reiterates that practicing Anekānta is challenging. Her own struggles in Ladnun were not failures but evidence of this challenge. She corrects the "pluralists' mistake" of assuming that openness requires abandoning one's own beliefs. Jain pluralism, however, does not demand this. Instead, it allows for a genuine and creative acceptance of diversity. The Jain nuns' unyielding commitment to Ahimsā, while challenging contradictory beliefs, was tempered by the understanding that perceptions are partial and reality is manifold. Vallely concludes that Anekānta compels adherents to engage with other ways of knowing, thus fulfilling the core goal of pluralism: recognizing the autonomy and legitimacy of human diversity.