Akalanka Und Die Buddhististche Tradition

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Akalanka und Die Buddhististche Tradition" by Piotr Balcerowicz, based on the provided pages:

Overall Focus:

The article, "Akalanka and the Buddhist Tradition: From the Non-Apprehension of the Invisible (adrśyānupalabdhi) to Omniscience," by Piotr Balcerowicz, examines the engagement of the Digambara Jain philosopher Akalanka Bhatta (c. 720-780) with Buddhist epistemological traditions, specifically focusing on the works of Dignāga (480-510) and Dharmakirti (600-660). The central theme is Akalanka's critical engagement with Buddhist logical arguments, particularly the concept of anupalabdhi (non-apprehension), and his development of his own philosophical positions, especially concerning adrśyānupalabdhi (non-apprehension of the invisible) and its role in proving concepts like omniscience.

Key Themes and Arguments:

1. Critique of Buddhist Logic:

   • Akalanka critically engages with Dignāga and Dharmakirti's epistemology, particularly their formulation of the three-part logical reason (trairūpyahetu).
   • He refutes the idea that the trairūpyahetu is the sole valid form of logical inference, advocating instead for anyathānupapatti (the principle of non-inexplicability otherwise) as the sole valid logical ground.
   • Akalanka analyzes cases where Buddhist rules, based on the trairūpyahetu, are either refuted or, conversely, demonstrate their validity despite not being accepted by Buddhist thinkers.

2. Adṛśyānupalabdhi (Non-Apprehension of the Invisible) and its Role:

   • Akalanka incorporates the Buddhist argument of adṛśyānupalabdhi, adopted from Dharmakirti, into his own system.
   • Dharmakirti's Position: Dharmakirti views anupalabdhi as a valid means of proving absence. Specifically, for dṛśyānupalabdhi (non-apprehension of the visible), the non-perception of a normally visible object under proper conditions leads to a certain conclusion of its absence. However, for adṛśyānupalabdhi, the non-apprehension of an invisible object, even if conditions are met, only leads to doubt ("Is it there or not?"), not certainty. He categorizes the invisible into objects that are spatially, temporally, or typologically "removed" (viprakṛṣṭa).
   • Akalanka's Counter-Argument: Akalanka challenges Dharmakirti's skeptical view of adṛśyānupalabdhi. He argues that it is possible to gain certainty about the absence or presence of invisible objects, often through their perceptible effects or concomitants.
   • Examples:
     • Absence of Soul: Akalanka uses the example of recognizing the absence of consciousness (soul) in a corpse. This is inferred from the cessation of its observable effects (like warmth, breath, movement). He frames this as a form of kāryānupalabdhi (non-apprehension of the effect), arguing that the absence of the effect proves the absence of the invisible cause.
     • Subtle Entities: He argues for the perceivability of invisible causes through their manifest effects, such as atoms causing macroscopic objects or karma influencing the soul.
     • Omniscience and Liberation: Akalanka utilizes the principle of adṛśyānupalabdhi to argue for the possibility of omniscience and liberation, which are invisible states. He contends that these states can be proven through their observable effects and the principle of gradual perfection (atipaya).
   • Critique of Buddhist Atomism: Akalanka challenges the Buddhist understanding of atoms (anu) and their role in the perceptual process. He argues that if macroscopic objects are divisible into atoms (which are invisible), and if the continuity of macroscopic objects is temporal, then by the principle of adṛśyānupalabdhi, the imperceptibility of past and future moments implies the impermanence of macroscopic objects. However, he further argues that the existence of macroscopic objects implies the existence of atoms. He then controversially claims that the imperceptibility of atoms does not prevent them from causing perceptible effects, and that their eternal nature, inferred from the persistence of their perceptible effects, is also demonstrable through anyathānupapatti.

3. The Role of Anyathānupapatti:

   • Akalanka champions anyathānupapatti as the sole valid logical instrument. This principle posits that if a state of affairs can only be explained in one way, then that explanation must be accepted as true.
   • He applies this principle to the adṛśyānupalabdhi argument, suggesting that by observing the effects of invisible causes, the only logical explanation is the existence of those invisible causes. This contrasts with Dharmakirti's model, where adṛśyānupalabdhi only leads to doubt.

4. Influence and Divergence from Buddhist Thought:

   • The article highlights the significant influence of Dharmakirti's epistemological framework on Akalanka. Akalanka critically engages with and reinterprets Buddhist concepts.
   • Akalanka's philosophical approach is not merely an extension of Dharmakirti's ideas but a critical and independent development, offering original arguments and challenging key Buddhist tenets.
   • The author notes the prevalence of similar concepts regarding the classification of invisible objects (e.g., fine, hidden, remote) in pre-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools (Yoga, Vaiseṣika, Mimāmsā), suggesting a broader intellectual context for the development of these ideas.
   • Akalanka's use of adṛśyānupalabdhi to prove the existence of omniscience and liberation is a distinctly Jain soteriological application, demonstrating how Indian philosophers adapted and repurposed logical tools for their own philosophical systems.

5. Ontological Implications:

   • Akalanka's epistemological arguments have significant ontological implications. By demonstrating the possibility of knowing invisible entities through their effects, he supports Jain metaphysical claims about the soul, karma, and the eternal nature of atoms.
   • He challenges the Buddhist view of reality as fundamentally moment-momentary and mind-dependent, asserting the existence of a more enduring and diverse reality.

In essence, Balcerowicz's article provides a detailed analysis of how the Jain philosopher Akalanka engaged critically with Buddhist epistemology, particularly the concept of non-apprehension of the invisible. Akalanka, while adopting and adapting elements of Buddhist logic, fundamentally reoriented them to support Jain doctrines, especially the possibility of proving invisible entities like the soul and the states of omniscience and liberation, through the principle of anyathānupapatti.