Adwaitwad Me Achar Darshan Ki Sambhavana Jain Drushti Se Samiksha - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Adwaitwad me Achar Darshan ki Sambhavana Jain Drushti se Samiksha" by Sagarmal Jain, focusing on the possibility of an ethical philosophy within Advaita Vedanta from a Jain perspective:

The article critically examines the potential for an ethical philosophy (Achar Darshan) within Advaita Vedanta from a Jain viewpoint. The author, Sagarmal Jain, argues that Advaita Vedanta's core tenet of absolute non-duality (Adwaitwad), which posits Brahman as one, unchanging, and spiritual, presents significant challenges for establishing a robust ethical framework.

Key Criticisms from a Jain Perspective:

Undermining Individual Existence and Morality: If Brahman is truly non-dual and undifferentiated, then the individual seeker's existence itself becomes questionable. Concepts of bondage and liberation, central to ethics and spiritual progress, are reduced to mere illusions. If there is no reality separate from Brahman, then no one is truly bound or liberated. The idea of Brahman itself being bound and liberated is presented as absurd. If the individual soul (Jiva) is merely a vivarta (transformation/appearance) of Brahman, then bondage and liberation are also vivarta, rendering all morality a vivarta as well, thus diminishing its value.
Incompatibility with Change and Development: If the ultimate reality is unchanging and devoid of any modification or difference, then concepts of moral decline or progress, as well as the very idea of bondage and liberation, become difficult to comprehend. Ethics, by its nature, requires duality and plurality to make sense of action, consequence, and development.
The Problem of Causality and Maya: If the ultimate reality is purely spiritual, how does bondage occur? Without any other cause, the concept of a vivarta (transformation) is problematic. The author questions the coherence of explaining bondage without positing another entity. Advaita itself is forced to introduce the concept of Maya (illusion) to explain the multiplicity and bondage, but the author argues that an eternal and indescribable Maya, parallel to the ultimate reality, contradicts the core principles of strict monism. If Maya is not considered unreal (asat), it must be real (sat), which would then contradict the non-dual nature of Brahman. If Maya is indescribable, it cannot be considered unreal or non-existent either. If it's a positive entity, then another reality exists, undermining Advaita.
Western and Jain Scholarly Concerns: The author cites Western thinkers like Max Müller, who called Shankara's Vedanta "rigid monism" and denied the possibility of an ethical philosophy within it. Dr. Arkhardt, in his work "Monotheism and Life Values," is quoted as stating that if Brahman is without attributes and beyond differentiation, it is also beyond good and evil, thus dismantling the foundation of ethics. He also argues that the negation of good-evil and the denial of individual existence make ethical judgment impossible and unnecessary.
Jain Critique of Absolute Non-Duality: Jain scholars like Acharya Samantabhadra (in Aptamimamsa) are cited for their criticism that absolute monism negates distinctions like good/bad karma, pleasure/pain, heaven/hell, and correct/incorrect knowledge, making it ethically incapable. The necessity of duality for ethics is highlighted.
Dr. Ramanand Tiwari's Analysis: Dr. Ramanand Tiwari's research on Shankara's ethical philosophy is discussed. Tiwari's attempt to establish the possibility of ethics in Shankara's philosophy by accepting the distinct existence of the individual soul and the world, even if ultimately inseparable from Brahman, is noted. However, the author suggests that this approach leads to a concept of "difference dependent on non-difference" (abhedashritabhed), which brings Shankara's philosophy closer to Ramanuja's, blurring the lines supposedly created by later Advaitins.
The Distinction Between Ultimate and Practical Levels: A crucial point is made that even Shankara does not accept non-difference at all levels. He acknowledges that difference, though ultimately unreal (asat) from the ultimate perspective, is experienced at the practical level (vyavaharika). It is at this practical level that the possibility of ethics arises. The author agrees that Advaita is not mistaken in accepting non-difference at the ultimate and difference at the practical level, a concept also found in Jain and Buddhist thought.
The Jain Objection to the Negation of the Practical: The core of the Jain objection, however, lies in Advaita's negation of the practical realm as unreal (mithya). The author questions how an ultimate reality can be attained through an unreal practical realm. If practical ethics is unreal, it cannot lead to the realization of the real ultimate principle. The problem arises when the ultimate is considered sat (real) and the practical is considered asat (unreal), creating an unbridgeable gap.
The "Two Views" Argument: The author proposes that both the practical (difference) and the ultimate (non-difference) can be seen as two valid perspectives on reality (Satt), much like how Ram is a son from Dasharatha's perspective and a father from Lava and Kusha's perspective. Both views are valid from their own standpoints and do not necessarily negate each other. The author criticizes rigid Advaitins for failing to recognize that difference and non-difference are simply different viewpoints regarding the ultimate reality, and both can be true from their respective perspectives.
Advaita's Self-Contradiction: If Advaita posits two realities – ultimate and practical – it contradicts its own principle of non-duality. If it accepts both as real, its non-duality is compromised. If it dismisses the practical as unreal, the reality of the empirical world and the possibility of ethics are nullified, a criticism also leveled by Kumarila.
Jain Acceptance of Practical Ethics: The Jain position is that they have no quarrel with Advaita accepting non-difference at the ultimate (which all systems, including Jainism, accept from a substance/essence perspective) or accepting the notion of ethics at the practical level (which is common to Jain, Buddhist, and other philosophies). The sole point of contention is Advaita's insistence on the unreality of the practical.

In conclusion, the article argues that while Advaita Vedanta accepts the practical realm for ethical considerations, its fundamental assertion of the practical's unreality poses a significant philosophical hurdle for a comprehensive and meaningful ethical framework. From a Jain perspective, both the ultimate and the practical are real in their own contexts, and the practical, with its inherent differences, is as crucial for ethical understanding as the ultimate is for ultimate realization.