Abhidharma And Jainism

Here's a comprehensive summary of Johannes Bronkhorst's "Abhidharma And Jainism":

This paper by Johannes Bronkhorst explores the intellectual exchange between early Buddhism and Jainism, focusing specifically on the question of whether Buddhism influenced Jainism, a question that has received less attention than the reverse. Bronkhorst argues that significant Buddhist Abhidharma concepts, particularly the doctrine of momentariness and the concept of the "pudgala" (person as a composite entity), likely influenced the development of later Jaina philosophical thought.

Key Arguments and Evidence:

• Momentariness and Early Jaina Texts:

  • Bronkhorst begins by examining a passage in the Süyagada (one of the oldest Svetambara Jaina canonical texts) that demonstrates familiarity with the Buddhist concept of the five skandhas (aggregates) and, more significantly, the theory of momentariness.
  • The theory of momentariness is not an early Buddhist concept but appears to have developed later, likely in the Sarvästivāda tradition or related Abhidharma schools, possibly as early as the mid-2nd century BCE in texts like the Pancavastuka.
  • The presence of this theory in the Süyagada suggests that this Jaina text must date from at least this period, indicating that Jainism was aware of this specific Buddhist development.
  • Bronkhorst acknowledges a counter-argument from Rospatt regarding the Jain definition of a "moment" being linked to movement, which seems at odds with Buddhist momentariness. However, Bronkhorst argues that even if the definition was distinct, the idea of moments was likely borrowed by Jainism from Buddhist Abhidharma.

• The Concept of the "Pudgala" (Person) and Composite Entities:

  • The Süyagada passage also reveals acquaintance with the Buddhist concept of the "person" (pudgala) as a composite entity, specifically the view that the soul is "neither different nor not different" from the skandhas. This aligns with the views of the Buddhist Pudgalavādins.
  • Bronkhorst notes that many Buddhist schools rejected the existence of composite entities, including the person, as they were seen as mere collections of momentary dharmas. The Pudgalavādins, however, maintained the existence of the person while still viewing it as a collection of skandhas.
  • The acquaintance of the Süyagada with this specific Buddhist idea about the person suggests it predates the middle of the 2nd century BCE, the likely period of the Pudgalavādins' emergence.

• Jaina Response to Buddhist Ideas on Composite Entities:

  • Bronkhorst investigates the subsequent Jaina attitude towards composite objects. He observes that later Jaina canonical texts acknowledge the existence of both composite entities and their parts, unlike the Sarvästivādins who tended to deny the existence of composite entities.
  • Passages in texts like the Uttarajjhayana and Viyahapannatti indicate a philosophical debate within Jainism about the existence of aggregates (e.g., whether an aggregate exists independently of its components). Bronkhorst suggests that Jainism may have adopted this philosophical question from Buddhism and then provided a distinct, often opposing, answer.

• The Semantic Evolution of "Pudgala" in Jainism:

  • A significant point of influence lies in Jainism's use of the word pudgala. While Buddhists used this term specifically for the person as a composite entity, Jainas later came to use it to mean "material object" or "material atom."
  • Bronkhorst traces the potential semantic shift from "person" to "material object" in early Jaina texts. He highlights examples in the Süyagada and Ayara where poggala seems to refer to a "person" or a "portion/quantity" (implying a composite entity).
  • He proposes a developmental trajectory for the meaning of pudgala in Jainism: 'bodily aggregate' → 'material aggregate in general' → 'material object/matter' → 'material atom'. This evolution, he argues, is plausible when considering the Buddhist use of the term.

• The Body-Sized Soul and Karma:

  • Bronkhorst delves into the classical Jaina concept of the soul having the size of the body. He notes that early Jaina texts, like the Acaranga, describe the soul in abstract, formless terms, not tied to bodily size.
  • The notion of a body-sized soul emerges in later canonical texts, like the Uttarajjhayana. Bronkhorst finds this concept puzzling, as it's not primitive and doesn't appear in the earliest Jaina strata.
  • He links this development to the Buddhist concept of the pudgala, which inherently occupied the same space as the physical body. While Jainism maintained a distinct soul, the adoption of a body-sized soul might have been influenced by the Buddhist model.
  • This development is further connected to the evolution of the Jaina doctrine of karma. Early Jaina texts are vague on how karma attaches to the soul. The classical doctrine, which sees karma as atomic particles, is likely a later innovation, potentially coinciding with the development of the body-sized soul.
  • The concept of a "karma body" and the mechanism of attracting karmic particles to fill the soul's space bring the Jaina conception of embodied existence closer to the Buddhist pudgala, uniting bodily and mental/spiritual functions within the body's space.

Conclusion:

Bronkhorst concludes that the chronological evidence supports the idea that Jainism was influenced by Buddhist Abhidharma. The Süyagada's familiarity with the Buddhist theory of momentariness and the concept of the pudgala predates the clear articulation of these ideas within Jainism. He argues that Jainism likely adopted the philosophical question of composite entities from Buddhism and offered a distinct answer, and that the concept of a body-sized soul, along with certain semantic shifts in the term pudgala, can be plausibly explained as responses to and developments from Buddhist Abhidharma. This influence highlights a dynamic intellectual relationship between these two major Indian traditions.