Aapta Mimansa

Here's a comprehensive summary of the Jain text "Apta Mimamsa" by Acharya Samantabhadra, as edited and translated by Sarat Chandra Ghoshal, based on the provided pages:

Book Title: Āpta-Mīmāṁsā Author: Acharya Samantabhadra Editor and Translator: Sarat Chandra Ghoshal Publisher: Bharatiya Jnanpith

Overall Nature and Significance:

• Āpta-Mīmāṁsā is a Sanskrit treatise of 114 verses divided into ten chapters. Its title means "propounding the evident one" and it expounds the Jain concept of the "omniscient" (Āpta) in a philosophical and logical manner.
• It is also popularly known as Devāgama-stotra, named after the first word of its first verse. This naming convention is common in Jain eulogistic texts.
• The text is highly esteemed for its comprehensive coverage, aphoristic phrasing, skillful presentation, and poetic flavor. This led prominent Jain scholars like Akalanka, Vidyānandi, and Vasunandi to write extensive commentaries on it.
• Sarat Chandra Ghoshal's translation and editing are noted for making the text more accessible, particularly for researchers of Indian religions and philosophy, and it's considered essential for those entering the field of logic.

Authorship and Traditional Context:

• Āpta-Mīmāṁsā is attributed to the Digambara scholar Saint Samantabhadra.
• According to tradition, it's considered the opening portion of Samantabhadra's larger commentary, the Gandhahasti Mahābhāṣya, on Umāsvāmi's Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra. However, the full Mahābhāṣya is not discovered.
• Evidence for this connection comes from references in later works by scholars like Abhaya-chandra Sūri, Mallișeņa-sūri, and Dharmabhūṣaṇa.
• The work is also linked to Devāgama, possibly indicating it as the auspicious opening (Mangalācharaṇa) of the Gandhahasti Mahābhāṣya.

Central Theme: The Āpta (The Trustworthy/Omniscient)

• The core of the text is the philosophical and logical examination of the Āpta, who in Jainism is the Sarvajña or the omniscient being.
• The work aims to establish the existence and trustworthiness of the Āpta.
• The concept of omniscience was first significantly articulated by Kundakunda and later by Umāsvāmi. The text refutes criticisms, notably those by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, who denied the possibility of omniscience.

Key Arguments and Concepts Explored (Summarized by Chapter/Themes):

• Chapter I: Examination of the Concept of the Great (Guru) and Arguments for Omniscience:

  • Rejection of superficial signs: Miraculous powers or symbols of majesty (like heavenly beings descending) shown by magicians cannot establish the Āpta, as these can be imitated.
  • Internal and external qualities: Even seemingly real divine qualities (like radiance, absence of bodily needs) found in celestial beings are not sufficient to establish omniscience, as these beings are still subject to passions (kaṣāyas) like anger, pride, deceit, and greed, from which the Āpta is completely free.
  • Contradictory Doctrines: The doctrines of various Tirthankaras (like Buddha, Kapila) contradict each other. If all were omniscient, their teachings could not be contradictory. Therefore, only one can be considered the ultimate trustworthy guide.
  • Destruction of Impurities: The text argues that through one's own causes, external and internal impurities can be destroyed, leading to a state of perfection. This is compared to purifying metal. The eight karmas (obscuring and obstructive) must be overcome for omniscience.
  • Inference and Perception: The existence of minute, hidden, or distant objects is established through inference (like smoke indicating fire) or special perception. This serves as an analogy for how an omniscient being can know all things.
  • Faultless Speech: The Āpta's speech is faultless because it aligns with logic and scriptures, and is not opposed by valid proof, much like a physician's diagnosis that is supported by both reasoning and medical science.
  • One-Sided Views are Unreliable: Those who exclusively adhere to one aspect of reality (ekānta) and reject others, or whose doctrines contradict themselves or established truths (like Syādvāda), are unreliable. Their views are refuted by logic and the multi-faceted nature of reality.
  • Abhāva (Non-existence): The text discusses the four types of non-existence (prāgabhāva, pradhvaṁsābhāva, atyantābhāva, anyonyābhāva) and refutes the idea that accepting absolute non-existence or refuting all non-existence leads to logical inconsistencies.
  • Syādvāda (Many-sidedness): The Jaina doctrine of "syāt" (perhaps/in a certain sense) is introduced as a means to reconcile seemingly contradictory aspects of reality. It acknowledges existence and non-existence, oneness and multiplicity, as valid from different viewpoints (nay as).

• Chapter II: Examination of Theses of Absolute Monism (Non-Dualism) and Dualism:

  • Refutation of Advaita: Absolute monism (Advaita) is critiqued for failing to account for apparent dualities like cause and effect, knower and knowable, and the very existence of distinct agents and actions. If everything is one, then the distinctions that lead to knowledge and action become impossible.
  • Refutation of Absolute Distinction: Similarly, an absolute emphasis on difference (prthaktvaikānta) is problematic, as it denies commonalities (sāmānya) and interdependence necessary for consistent understanding.
  • Jaina Reconciliation: The Jaina position, presented through Syādvāda, reconciles these by stating that things are both identical (from one perspective) and different (from another), not absolutely in one way or the other.

• Chapter III: Examination of Traits of Absolute Permanence and Absolute Transience:

  • Refutation of Nityavāda (Eternalism): The view of absolute permanence (like some interpretations of Sankhya) is challenged for eliminating the possibility of change, causation, and effect. If everything is eternally unchanging, how can anything arise or cease?
  • Refutation of Kṣaṇikavāda (Momentariness): The Buddhist view of absolute transience (Kṣaṇikavāda) is critiqued for its inability to account for memory (pratyabhijñā), the continuity of cause and effect, personal identity, and the practicalities of life. If everything is momentary, how can anything be reliably known or acted upon?
  • Jaina Synthesis: The Jaina view affirms that substances possess both permanence (dhrauvya) in their essence and change (utpāda, vyaya) in their modes or modifications (paryāyas), reconciling eternalism and momentariness.

• Chapter IV: Examination of Absolute Distinction between Cause and Effect, Attributes and Substance, and Universal and Particular:

  • Refutation of Nyaya-Vaiseșika Dualism: The philosophy that posits absolute separation between cause and effect, substance and attribute, or general and particular is refuted. The concept of "samavāya" (co-inherence) is discussed, and its limitations in the Nyaya-Vaiseșika framework are highlighted, particularly concerning causation and the nature of reality.
  • Jaina View on Substance and Modification: The Jaina perspective is presented where substance (dravya) is eternal, while its modes (paryāyas) change. This explains how something can be permanent in essence while undergoing transformations.

• Chapter V: Traits of the Relational and the Non-Relational considered in their Absolute Form:

  • This chapter likely continues the critique of absolute standpoints (ekānta) and reinforces the Syādvāda approach by examining concepts like relational existence versus independent existence.

• Chapter VI: Theses of Reasoning and Authority raised in their Absolute Forms:

  • Critiques the absolute reliance on either inference (anumāna) or scripture/testimony (āgama) alone. Both are presented as means of knowledge, but neither exclusively establishes truth. Syādvāda emphasizes the correct and conditional use of both.

• Chapter VII: Theses of the Internal (Cognitive) and the External (Objective) Reality raised in their Absolute Forms:

  • Refutes the Buddhist Vijñānavāda, which asserts that only consciousness (thought) is real, leading to the denial of external objects and the validity of inference and scripture. The Jaina view emphasizes the interplay between knowledge and external reality.

• Chapter VIII: Theses of Determinism by Destiny and by Effort considered in their Absolute Forms:

  • Discusses the interplay of fate (Daiva) and personal effort (Puruṣakāra). It argues against absolute reliance on either, suggesting a conditional relationship where both play a role, and Syādvāda provides a balanced perspective.

• Chapter IX: Theses of earning Demerit by causing pain to others and earning Merit by causing happiness to others:

  • Critiques the notion that karma (merit/demerit) is solely determined by causing pain or happiness to others or oneself. It emphasizes the internal states of the soul, particularly moha (infatuation) and the presence or absence of kaṣāyas (passions), as the true drivers of karmic influx (āsrava). Dhyāna (meditation) is presented as crucial in this process.

• Chapter X: Absolute Theses of Bondage by Nescience and Emancipation by little knowledge:

  • Refutes the idea that bondage arises simply from ignorance (ajñāna) and liberation from minimal knowledge. It emphasizes the role of moha (infatuation/delusion) as the primary cause of bondage. Liberation is achieved by eradicating moha and purifying the soul, which can occur even with partial knowledge if moha is gone, or through complete knowledge (kevalajñāna) when all obscuring karmas are destroyed. The importance of Syādvāda and the concept of nay as (standpoints of view) in understanding reality are reinforced.

Overall Contribution:

Āpta-Mīmāṁsā stands as a cornerstone in Jain philosophy, particularly in its rigorous logical defense of the concept of omniscience and its detailed exposition of Syādvāda as a means to understand a complex, multi-faceted reality. It systematically refutes various opposing philosophical viewpoints by exposing their inherent contradictions and limitations.